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In the corpus of Western mystical literature, many writers claim that mystical union 
melds the human soul with God, exacting a temporary loss of awareness of their being apart 
from the divine.  This phenomenon particularly intrigued Christian mystics in the late Middle 
Ages, a period coinciding with a noted increase in first-person narration and a renaissance of the 
idea of selfhood as a central concern in literary texts.  This study argues that mystical writers 
face a unique challenge in conveying their sense of standing at a liminal point or threshold, in-
between states of being, negotiating (before the gaze of their readers) where the “self” ends and 
the divine other begins.  Many assert that the ineffable nature of their experience makes this 
impossible to convey directly.   
This dissertation traces representations of the experiencing and narrating I in mystical 
literature to analyze how writers portray such a liminal state.  After exploring liminality as a 
valuable critical concept for understanding mystical narrative, and as a central component of 
medieval Christian mystical experience, focus turns to the texts of Elizabeth of Spalbeek, whose 
“text” is actually a performance, and then to Marguerite Porete and Julian of Norwich, mystics 
from Lowland regions and England, but all of whose works circulated in some form in late 
medieval England.  The author argues that these mystics are distinctive because they creatively 
manipulate conventions of narrative in order to represent spiritual experience and its potentially 
disruptive, divisive effects on perceptions of selfhood and ontological status.  Evidencing a keen 
awareness of how consciousness and its divisions can be represented in narrative, they turn to 
structures that destabilize the narrating voice or persona, including dialogic discourse that melds 
multiple voices, inverted chronologies that suspend time, and recursive patterns, and use 
narrative form to depict their experiences. 
The study‟s claims proceed from close analysis of the texts in conversation with 
discourses of narratology, speculative theology, performance theory, anthropology, and 
psychoanalytic and philosophical theories of the subject.  The dissertation bridges scholarship on 
narrative and mysticism, and contributes to the history of subject-formation and the medieval 
development of a literature of the self.  
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 GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
   This dissertation argues that, in several late medieval narratives of personal encounter 
with the divine, form becomes content when vocabulary fails; content, therefore, itself becomes a 
means of representation.  In a reassessment of late medieval mysticism that sees a sense of being 
“in-between,” what I will refer to as being liminal, as a central and inescapable feature of 
mystical experience, I suggest that some medieval mystics turn to alternative narrative structures 
to represent their ineffable experience and its effects on perceptions of selfhood and ontological 
status.  Negotiating a conflict between, on the one hand, the desire to describe and reflect upon 
the liminal experience of mystical union and, on the other, the challenge of its inexpressibility, 
they use their texts not only to name, but also to recreate and represent, through a verbal portrait, 
the experience of mystical union. 
The project is, therefore, a study of literary subjectivity, of the narrating and experiencing 
I and the consciousness it represents, that brings together analysis of narrative structure and the 
unique ontological and linguistic circumstances that underlie mystical writing.
1
 And the 
consciousness that we find in the mystical texts is one vividly aware of the I‟s essential 
liminality.  In the mystical texts I explore, the narrating I, what in the terms of narratology we 
can see as a retrospective I recalling events, is one with the experiencing I, a speaker/protagonist 
in the very process of experiencing the effects of mystical union being described.  Moreover, the 
texts force us to reconsider some other basic questions about the possibilities of “narrative”: can 
you narrate a story without knowing who you are as narrator?  How do you tell a story about 
                                                 
1
 Particularly in medieval studies, the phrase “literary subjectivity” was popularized in large part by Michel Zink in 
La Subjectivité littéraire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985).  I draw in part on his definition of the 
terms, but with some important distinctions I discuss below. 
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yourself if you aren‟t sure who you are?  What happens when the available vocabulary cannot 
meet the demands of description, offering only an elementary wordlist for an advanced task? 
Mystical union constitutes a temporary dissolution or loss of awareness of one‟s being as 
distinct from the divine.  The mystic becomes one with God for a moment, a fleeting union of 
identity, but only to return to a jolting recognition of distance from God.   The experience 
therefore creates a sense of being in-between, a perception of ontological instability with 
profound effects on the mystic‟s grasp of who and what she is.  It is a state of being on a 
threshold between the mortal and the eternal, between standing as a distinct being and blending 
into God.   
As I discuss in chapter one, the critical terms “liminal” and “liminality” in current 
scholarly discussion derive from Victor Turner‟s development of the concept, drawing on Arnold 
van Gennep‟s work in the field of anthropology.2  It is important to note at the outset that my use 
of the terms, while at points engaging that discussion and influenced by it, is intended to be 
broader than in that tradition.  My use of the terms has to do with a number of thresholds 
encountered in mystical experience (including the cusps of being and language), but particularly 
what it means to be neither entirely one with God nor apart from him. 
 Signs of such a liminal experience appear in the types of metaphors and images that the 
mystics generate to describe their experiences – melting, swimming, knitting – and also in the 
theological explanations that they provide.  But writers throughout the mystical tradition testify 
that the ineffable nature of mystical union makes it impossible to convey fully in words, even 
with the most dramatic metaphors.  As mystical writers try to articulate such an experience, and 
                                                 
2
 See esp. Victor Turner, “Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites of Passage,” The Forest of Symbols: 
Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1967), 93-11; and idem, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-
Structure (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), esp. 94-130. 
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so negotiate where the “self” ends and the divine other begins, they face the difficulty of 
describing life in a liminal state from the point of view of a soul that questions, as does the 
personified Soul in Marguerite Porete‟s Mirror of Simple Souls, “Qui suis je donc maintenant?”, 
or “Who am I now then?”3   
  Tracing the relationships between content and structure in their texts, I show how the 
mystics in this study creatively manipulate narrative structures and conventions in order to 
communicate their perception of what it is to be liminal.  They turn to structures that destabilize 
the narrating voice or persona in the text, including dialogic discourse that melds multiple 
voices, the simultaneous adoption of multiple personas, inverted chronologies that suspend time, 
and recursive patterns.  And they subvert the very structure of “narrative” by producing non-
linear personal stories without resolution, without conclusion. 
The texts therefore reveal a provocative paradox: experiences that risk self-loss actually 
produce narratives that are richly self-reflective and remarkably self-aware.  The mystics in this 
study, unlike many of their contemporaries, were not writing for patrons or an academic 
audience.  Driven by the challenge of expressing inexpressible spiritual experience, but with 
freedom to experiment with form, the text and its shape become a space of self-reflection.  And 
the mystics‟ innovations demonstrate a keen awareness of how consciousness and its divisions 
can be represented in narrative.  Examining how they do so not only can help us better 
understand the mystics‟ distinct projects, but can offer new contributions to long-standing 
debates regarding whether and how medieval narrative structures represent consciousness and 
internal division. 
                                                 
3
 Marguerite Porete: Le mirouer des simples âmes / Speculum simplicium animarum, ed. Romana Guarnieri and 
Paul Verdeyen, Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Mediaevalis 69 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), 294.3-4. 
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I focus on the texts of three mystics from the Continental Lowland regions and England, 
but all of whose works were written in or translated into Middle English and circulated in late 
medieval England: Elizabeth of Spalbeek‟s Passion performance, in which the “text” is actually a 
public dance; Marguerite Porete‟s allegorical dialogue The Mirror of Simple Souls; and Julian of 
Norwich‟s Revelation of Love, an account of visions and her decades of meditation on them. 
Taken together, the project‟s core texts represent a trinity of modes – a performative text, a 
dialogue, and a visionary text – with strikingly similar pressures, concerns, circumstances, and 
resulting experimentation manifesting across them.   
In the cultural and theological milieu of the late Middle Ages, writing about how one 
dissolves into God entails a great deal of risk – including the danger of perpetrating heresy, or at 
very least, theological misunderstanding – and in the worst case for Marguerite Porete, it meant 
her death as a heretic.  But the risk that most concerns me here is destabilization: the risk of 
unstable ontology in the liminal experience of mystical union, the narrative risks of a spiraling 
rather than linear story, and the assumption  – indeed, the embrace – of an unstable narrating 
identity in and through language. 
 
Critical Context and Methodology: Reconsidering the Narrative 
Although scholarship has often tried to compartmentalize mystical texts, they are 
themselves liminal: spiritual memoirs relying heavily on artistic forms of expression, and 
therefore between genres.  To analyze layers of influence on these texts – how religious 
experience, with its unique psychological aspects and linguistic challenges, intersects with 
literary developments of the ages of Guillaume de Lorris and Chaucer – I engage discourses and 
methods of narratology, performance theory, speculative theology, psychoanalytic and 
13 
  
philosophical theories of the subject, and even anthropology from which the critical construct of 
liminality derives, as I proceed through a close reading of the texts.  Such a broad and varied 
methodology, a holistic approach, begins a synthesis of scholarship on narrative and the genre of 
mystical literature and best brings to light what these texts reveal about late medieval literature 
of the self and understandings of how to represent mystical experience with words.  
Previous studies of personal narrative and of mystical language have rarely overlapped.  
Modern narratology, when it attends to medieval texts at all rather than to the novel, tends to 
focus on the fictional tales of authors such as Chaucer.  On the other hand, study of mystical 
language is usually concerned with categorizing approaches, vocabularies, or writers‟ maneuvers 
to assume authority.  The present study brings these two branches of scholarship into 
conversation, but because of their traditionally disparate realms, the first question to address is 
whether and how mystical texts can be read as narratives, and how such a reading can expand 
our understanding of narrative strategies for representing the self and individual experience in 
both mystical writing and the work of other medieval narrative writers.  My use of the label 
“narrative” is broad, incorporating texts with ambiguous narrators and without a clear plot 
progression.  But it is precisely this breadth that allows new inroads in understanding both 
medieval approaches to mystical union and ideas for how spiritual (and self-defining) experience 
could be put into words.   
The key figures of twentieth-century narratology established the “narrator” as the sin qua 
non of “narrative.”  Scholes and Kellogg emphasized that narrative requires “a story and a story-
teller,” a standard that excluded materials such as drama.4  Käte Hamburger pointed to process 
and used a comparison to visual art to explain how literary narrative “does not exist 
                                                 
4
 Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Nature of Narrative (New York: Oxford UP, 1966), 4. 
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independently of the act of narration”: painted art and its figures are the products of a visual 
artist, and likewise a narrative and “persons of a novel” come into being by having been 
narrated.
5
 The narrow definition that a proper “narrative” must have both a story and a narrator 
remains dominant in German narratology today;  however, more generous definitions of what 
can constitute a “narrator,” such as Seymour Chatman‟s development of the narrator of visual 
media (e.g., ballet, drama, film, etc.), have gained traction in the English-speaking world.
6
   
 In medieval studies, debate is ongoing as to the type of narrator, and more specifically the 
type of narrative consciousness, that can be ascribed to texts of the medieval period.  A few key 
markers can be illustrative of the discussion.  French scholarship in the 1980s, drawing on 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, argued that medieval texts were marked not only by narrative self-
consciousness, but a consciousness that could be divided, an author‟s perspective infused in a 
character/narrator‟s.  Michel Zink‟s seminal study La Subjectivité littéraire saw thirteenth-
century French literature coinciding with a growing cultural awareness that art “held no other 
truth than the subjectivity it embodied.”7 Thus literary texts of the period “can be read as 
attempts to fix in language – and, it must be acknowledged, possibly on language – a 
subjectivity‟s desire, and its representations”; these were signs of growing awareness that an 
                                                 
5
 Käte Hamburger, The Logic of Literature, 2
nd
 ed., trans. Marilyn Rose (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1973), 136. 
A. C. Spearing offers a thought-provoking reading of this analogy in Hamburger‟s work, and ultimately suggests 
problems in applying Hamburger‟s theories to the context of medieval literature. See his Textual Subjectivity: The 
Encoding of Subjectivity in Medieval Narratives and Lyrics (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), esp. 19-23, which I discuss 
in greater depth below. 
6
 See Monika Fludernik, An Introduction to Narratology, trans. Patricia Hausler-Greenfeld and Monika Fludernik 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 4-5, which analyzes this contrast between German and Anglophone scholarship, and 
sees the latter following the path of Seymour Benjamin Chatman‟s Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in 
Fiction and Film (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1978).  In another interesting variation from Hamburger that I would add here, 
Chatman contrasts narrative with painting, suggesting that in the former “the number of plausible immediate actions 
or properties is virtually infinite” (29). 
7
 Michel Zink, The Invention of Literary Subjectivity, trans. David Sices (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999), 10-
11.  Originally published as La Subjectivité littéraire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985).    
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author asserted himself in his text.
8
  Michel de Certeau similarly describes the rise of “the 
presence of the subject as a speaker in the text,” associating this shift with the twelfth-century, 
and the age of “the troubadours and Dante.”9  Evelyn Birge Vitz‟s analysis of the Roman de la 
Rose and other medieval French narratives argues for a medieval awareness that a narrating 
subject could be multiple and yet “harmonized,” for instance be both dreamer/character in the 
text and a narrator standing outside it, although she asserts that this is not an attempt to represent 
the psychic life of an individual.
10
  For Zink, “literary subjectivity” is that which “marks the text 
as the point of view of a consciousness.”11 I adapt, but do not entirely adopt, this definition of 
“literary subjectivy” in the present study as I try to trace a unified narrating and experiencing I 
and examine what constitutes it.  In my approach “consciousness” is the real experience of the 
mystic and her awareness of a liminal, split, ontological status.  
In scholarship on Middle English texts, H. Marshall Leicester Jr.‟s study of The 
Canterbury Tales further developed the discussion of medieval literary subjectivity by 
challenging the critical tendency to analyze the tales through the General Prologue descriptions 
or assume Chaucer fitted tales to stock figures.  He encourages analysis of the speaking I of the 
individual tales and the characters‟ processes of telling their tales, arguing that several characters 
show signs of “disenchantment,” an awareness that they are negotiating a social system; they are 
endowed with a self-consciousness that allows them to stand outside their society and see it for 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 11, 21.   
9
 Michel de Certeau “Mystic Speech,” Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. Brian Massumi (1986; reissued 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota P, 2006), 93-94.  Also see Sarah Spence, Texts and the Self in the Twelfth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), who sees the twelfth-century as a key transition for thought about texts 
and subjectivity.  
10
 Evelyn Birge Vitz, Medieval Narrative and Modern Narratology: Subjects and Objects of Desire (New York: 
New York UP, 1989), esp. chapters 2-3. 
11
 Zink, Invention of Literary Subjectivity, 4.  
16 
  
what it is.  Thus Leicester suggests that Chaucer was aware of assigning not just a narrator but a 
consciousness to each tale.
 12
 
 Recently, A.C. Spearing countered by critiquing analyses that automatically view literary 
texts as “the utterance of a speaking subject” and assume that in them “a human consciousness is 
given a voice.” 13 Spearing argues that this is not entirely applicable to medieval texts because 
the association between narration and the representation of human consciousness was just 
beginning in the Middle Ages; his reading implies that the approaches of S.-Y. Kuroda, Scholes 
and Kellogg, Roland Barthes, and others are incompatible with medieval narrative.
14
 In this 
model, analyses such as Leicester and Zink‟s would fall into anachronism.  In Spearing‟s view, 
Chaucer‟s fourteenth-century perspective of narration was a reverse of our own: he claims that 
whereas “for us, the notion that every text must have its speaker, every narrative its narrator, may 
be beginning to dissolve; for late medieval writers…it was a new discovery, just beginning to 
crystallize.”15 
 Mystical writing, its varied forms of narration, and the purposes of those forms have 
rarely been part of this discussion, and revisiting the debate with consideration of the narrating 
and experiencing I in mystical texts is overdue.  My reading shows that the texts in this study 
offer evidence as early as the mid-thirteenth-century of not only narrative self-consciousness, but 
concerns with representing psychological and ontological dilemmas in creative ways.  They 
illustrate a striking awareness of how consciousness itself and its divisions can be revealed in 
narrative.   It demonstrates a vibrant medieval concern with such representations and expands 
current debates by bringing a new realm of texts into evidence. 
                                                 
12
 H. Marshall Leicester Jr., The Disenchanted Self: Representing the Subject in the Canterbury Tales (Berkeley: 
University of California P, 1990), esp. 10-13, 24-28. 
13
 Spearing, Textual Subjectivity, 1. 
14
 See ibid. esp. 24, 29, which specifically address Kuroda and Barthes; on Zink, see 31. 
15
 Ibid. 30. 
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 In my reading, the I in the texts is associated with the author/creator of the narrative, and 
thus a consciousness existing not only in an imagined world of the text, but also a real world of 
lived experience.
16
  Elizabeth‟s performance, Marguerite‟s dialogue, and Julian‟s visionary text 
are all stories of first-hand spiritual experience, accounts of the experience of mystical union and 
the conflicts, namely the sense of liminal being, that it engenders.  They have not always been 
read in this way.  Perhaps only Julian‟s record would qualify as unambiguously the personal 
history of a first-person narrator interspersed with theological reflection.  Elizabeth‟s 
performance has generally been approached as an act of imitatio Christi, a form of worship or 
devotion, rather than as an attempt to express personal experience.
17
 There is debate as to 
whether it is appropriate to identify the Mirror‟s multiple speaking subjects with the author.18   
 This is one place where “mysticism” begins to live up to its name, where things are 
obscure, hidden, and indistinct.  This is where some might dismiss the texts in this study as not 
strictly “narrative” with a clear and present narrator at all.  But it is also precisely where we can 
see innovations in response to the unique needs of recounting inexpressible spiritual experience 
and its disruptive (however glorious) effects on the self.  One branch of medieval mystical 
writing, often associated with Marguerite and the beguine mystics such as Mechthild of 
Magdeburg and Hadewijch, relies on multiple allegorical figures to narrate the text, and the 
reader must determine whether and how they represent the experience of one speaking subject.  
As Zink points out, such strategies are not new to narrative: from ancient literature “allegory was 
                                                 
16
 Cf. Fludernik‟s recent textbook definition of narrative as, “a representation of a possible world in a linguistic 
and/or visual medium, at whose centre there are one or several protagonists of an anthropomorphic nature who are 
existentially anchored in a temporal and spatial sense and who (mostly) perform goal-oriented actions (action and 
plot structure)” in Introduction to Narratology, 6. 
17
 For instance, see Jennifer N. Brown, Three Women of Liège (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 191-217 on what she 
refers to as Elizabeth‟s “Performatio Christi,” and Ellen M. Ross, The Grief of God: Images of the Suffering Jesus in 
Late Medieval England (New York: Oxford UP, 1997), 110-117. 
18
 On the issue of an ambiguous authorial voice in the Mirror, see esp. Amy Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame P, 1995), 90ff. 
18 
  
the favoured mode of expression for the relationship of the soul with the universal principle and 
with God.”19 Marguerite‟s use of allegorical dialogue for personal narrative, however, deserves 
special attention.  In Elizabeth‟s case, she adopts the personas of other individuals as she 
narrates, sometimes telling a story as Elizabeth, and sometimes telling the Passion story from the 
point of view of Christ, Mary, or scripture.
20
 For Elizabeth, this becomes her own story.  In all 
these texts that convey “secret knowledge of God,” special insights from an encounter with God, 
what can be said is neither entirely controlled nor owned by the mystic narrator: these insights 
are both God‟s story and the mystic‟s, divine words in the mystic‟s voice.21  We have a narrator 
who is two entities at once. 
Michel de Certeau saw this blending of the mystic‟s voice with God‟s as the very “locus” 
of mystic speech.  The mystical text, then, is an engagement of the mystic with God in a moment 
in which there is a “disappearance of the actors (the lover and the loved one, God and man).” He 
quotes Eckhart to capture the sentiment: “God and I are one in the transaction.”22 It is a struggle 
to determine a common language, and to find the Other in it:  “a dialogic discourse: I and thou 
seeking one another in the thickness of the same language.”23 
It follows that one way to express an experience of blending into God is to draw attention 
to multiplicity in the narration of “secret knowledge,” to draw attention to a narrator who is 
already destabilized by mystical union (and often further by speaking God‟s speech), and then go 
a step more – to revel in the instability of overlapping and interpenetrating voices, to make this a 
                                                 
19
 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, 122. 
20
 Such a narrative stance has a relationship to devotional lyrics on the Passion, in which sometimes the speaking 
voice shifts from an onlooker‟s perspective to Christ‟s or to Mary‟s. See especially the Middle English devotional 
lyric “Stond wel, moder, under rode,” based on the Latin “Stabat juxta Christi crucem,” a dialogue between Christ as 
he hangs on the cross and his mother Mary as she watches below, and the Harley lyric “In a vaile of restles mynd,” 
which I discuss in greater depth in chapter four. 
21
 Here I draw on David Knowles‟ oft-cited definition of mysticism, deriving from Pseudo-Dionysius, as attainment 
of “secret knowledge of God.” The English Mystical Tradition (London: Burns & Oates, 1961), 2. 
22
 Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 99. 
23
 Ibid. 90. 
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symbol of mystical union with God.  This is one of the key innovations that the mystics in this 
study achieve, particularly evident in the texts of Elizabeth and Marguerite. 
 Lasting union with God is the mystics‟ ultimate goal; the story of getting there is the 
action – the plot – of their narratives.  It is a story of individual experience, and for those 
attempting to describe mystical union, it is a story of living in a liminal state.  For this reason, in 
modern narratology‟s distinction between the narrative or “story” and “discourse,” the texts have 
a “story” to analyze, and the distinction itself is a useful concept in beginning to articulate the 
narrative dimension of the mystical texts.  The division between histoire and discours, the 
distinction between a tale‟s “action” and the “discourse” that is its modes, aspects, and tenses, 
was developed by French narratologists such as Gérard Genette and Tzvetan Todorov, and also 
elaborated by the Russian formalists.
24
 Chatman further developed the concept as he expanded 
the forms that narrative can take, seeing “discourse” as “the class of all expressions of story, in 
whatever medium possible to it (natural language, ballet, “program” music, comic strips, mime, 
and so on),” a range of modes of expression.25  
Given what I argue is the mystics‟ central concern with liminality, their stories are largely 
stories of “not progressing,” stories of being stuck on a threshold.  The action is that of an 
encounter with the divine, and being ensnared in semi-union.  Far from plots that progress 
through conflict to resolution, they are stories about the impossibility of resolution, about how 
the soul cannot escape liminality until permanently uniting with God after death.  But they are 
“stories.”  
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 See esp. Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 
1980), esp. 27; Tzvetan Todorov, “Les Categories du récit littéraire,” Communications 8 (1966): 125-151; and 
Todorov‟s introduction to structuralist approaches in his translation of essays by the Russian formalists, Théorie de 
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 Chatman, Story and Discourse, 27. 
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As personal stories, we can situate them as part of the dramatic late medieval rise in first- 
person narration and a renaissance of the idea of selfhood as a central concern in literary texts.  
The rise of autobiographical writing in twelfth-century France, for instance in the 
autobiographies of Abelard and Guibert of Nogent, and in which “attention [was] given to the 
subject itself, not merely as witness,” has been associated with thirteenth-century literary 
developments in first-person narration such as the Roman de la Rose.
26
 In England, the crucial 
stage of literary developments was the fourteenth-century, the age of the self-reflective dream 
vision.  It is the age of Pearl, one of the earliest Middle English texts to sustain and consistently 
develop the limitations and interests of a first-person perspective, of Chaucer‟s Book of the 
Duchess, which features a dreamer arguably engaging with an alter-ego of himself; perhaps most 
notably of Piers Plowman, which as Anne Middleton argues, evidences a “strong insistence on 
the first-person as the necessary locus of…meditation,” as what allows access to knowledge of 
spiritual matters and modes of true piety, with the personal narrative of self-discovery being the 
beginning of understanding one‟s place in the world.27 Such developments also open the way for 
more explicit self-reflection and reflexive writing in Hoccleve, whose autobiographical My 
Compleinte focuses on negotiating the difference between an internal, private self (aware of his 
madness and subsequent recovery) and an external, public self in order to meet the expectations 
of his social position.
28
 Among mystical literature written in fourteenth-century England, Julian‟s 
writing, alongside that of Richard Rolle, is one of the most vivid reflections of this movement. 
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 Zink, Literary Subjectivity, 154.  Also see Vitz‟s assessment of Abelard‟s Historia calamitatum and the Roman de 
la Rose in Medieval Narrative, chapters 1-3. 
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 Anne Middleton, “William Langland‟s „Kynde Name‟: Authorial Signature and Social Identity in Late 
Fourteenth-Century England,” Literary Practice and Social Change in Britain, 1380-1530, ed. Lee Patterson  
(Berkeley: University of California P, 1990), 78.   
28
 For one excellent analysis of this split self phenomenon in Hoccleve‟s writing, see Matthew Boyd Goldie‟s 
reading in “Psychosomatic Illness and Identity in London, 1416-1421: Hoccleve‟s Complaint and Dialogue with a 
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The mystical texts in this study also raise important issues on the level of “discourse,”  
issues of what gives shape and power to these narratives.  If the text is a forum in which union 
with God both occurs (in the act of mystic speech) and is expressed, what it is about the text‟s 
modes that allow this to happen – what underlies and permits, what makes available, the stories 
of liminal existence that they offer?  
While such distinctions are useful as a starting point for analysis, my reading of the 
mystical texts ultimately reveals that they challenge a strict structuralist distinction between 
“story” and “discourse.” The division breaks down in situations in which form and content are 
one, and the distinction proves inadequate for addressing the unique composition and goals of 
these texts.  Jean-François Lyotard writes that Augustine‟s “poem” of his experience of God in 
the Confessions “does not give testimony, it is the testimony,” and such a phenomenon proves to 
be the case in the texts I consider here.
29
 The writing of the text, and the engagement in its 
unique modes of operation, is part of the spiritual experience itself, not only the trace of it.  It is 
for this reason that I refer to both the narrating and experiencing I in these texts, challenging a 
traditional separation; in my reading the I, the speaking subject, indeed fits both of these 
narratological categories: the mystic reflects on experience in the past, and simultaneously 
develops a sense of self in the present, the self that is still in the process of becoming one with 
God by speaking to and about him.
30
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Friend,” Exemplaria 11.1 (1999): 23-52.  Also see Ethan Knapp, The Bureaucratic Muse: Thomas Hoccleve and the 
Literature of Late Medieval England (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania UP, 2001). 
29
 Jean-François Lyotard, The Confession of St. Augustine, trans. Richard Beardsworth (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
2000), 7. Lyotard offers this description in the context of discussing the form of union, the “embrace of the inner 
man,” which Augustine identifies as the essence of what is loved in the act of loving God.  Lyotard‟s statements 
suggest that in his analysis this “inner human” is both the witness of God and is the “singular witness” provided in 
the poem, the poem being the manifestation, extension, and/or production of the “inner human.” 
30
 On the traditional distinction, see the discussion of the “experiencing self” in Fludernik, Introduction to 
Narratology, 152. 
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 If narratologists have overlooked the complexity and richness of medieval mystical 
narratives, scholars of mysticism are hardly less at fault.  Much scholarship on medieval 
religious literature, including literary dream visions, has considered problems of expression and 
particularly the problem of ineffability in attempts to describe God or mystical experience.
 31
 
There is a long history of Christian writers grappling with this linguistic dilemma, and 
scholarship on mystical language is often determined to situate texts within either the apophatic 
or cataphatic traditions.  The apophatic path involves approaching the ineffable divine through 
negation of words and images, and is usually traced back to Pseudo-Dionysius‟ treatises on the 
naming and knowledge of God (ca. 500).  Writers who have recourse to metaphors and 
synesthesia as a means to circumvent the problem of inexpressibility are usually associated with 
the opposing cataphatic tradition of verbose, even repetitive affirmation of God‟s nature. 
Numerous studies focus on erotic metaphors drawing on the imagery of the Song of Songs 
and/or, particularly in late medieval women‟s mysticism arguably influenced by the ethos of 
courtly love, and themes and images of fine amour.
32
 Often scholars‟ determination to fit texts 
into one of the categories ends up overlooking the breadth and variety of medieval mysticism.
33
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 On the dream vision Pearl, for instance, see Ann Chalmers Watts, “Pearl, Inexpressibility, and Poems of Human 
Loss.” PMLA 99, no.1 (1984): 26-40; J. Allan Mitchell, “The Middle English Pearl: Figuring the Unfigurable.” 
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Hawkins and Ann Howland Schotter (New York: AMS, 1984). 
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Among the primary texts in this project, the text most often analyzed in this way is Marguerite‟s Mirror.  For some 
examples of such treatments of her text, see Barbara Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania P, 1995), esp. 137-167 and eadem, “The Mirror and the Rose: Marguerite Porete‟s 
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mystical texts and their distinction from traditional bridal mysticism.  Also see Peter Dronke, Women Writers of the 
Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), esp. 218-220 on distant love and tests of love in Marguerite‟s text, 
and Amy Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame P, 1995) on the 
conventional image of the absent lover in Marguerite‟s text.  Analyses of the erotic are also common in studies of 
the performative elements of medieval women‟s mysticism; for instance, see esp. Nancy Partner, “Reading the Book 
of Margery Kempe.” Exemplaria 3.1 (1991): 29-66.  Sarah Salih offers an important reminder that mystic speakers 
may be stretching for expressions to encapsulate their experience “as a gesture to the unrepresentability of the 
divine,” rather than mirroring the literalism of our modern age. See “When is a Bosom Not a Bosom?  Problems 
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 Still worse, there is a tendency to dismiss as mere topoi religious writers‟ protests about 
the ineffability of their experiences.  This is a scholarly shrinking that, as Nicholas Watson puts 
it, “is to resign any possibility of writing a real account of the text.”34  I take seriously the 
mystics‟ frequent claims about inexpressibility as part of what drives their experimentation with 
narrative form.  Taking them seriously means facing the challenge of getting, as Watson says, 
“involved in theological questions of language and the divine,” and I would add getting involved 
in theoretical questions about language itself and what the narrating and experiencing I can 
represent.
35
 But only by taking their stated problem seriously and trusting their search for a 
solution do we see mystics‟ theological understanding of the power of language to connect one 
with the divine (in prayer and mystic speech) and how to manipulate representations of the 
speaking subject and her consciousness.   
Surprisingly few scholars working from either literary or theological approaches to 
mysticism (or for that matter, religious texts more broadly) have taken on the issue of what 
happens to the narrating and experiencing I in texts of mystical experience.  When studies turn 
attention to a speaking I, their focus is usually on the writer‟s self-positioning to claim a voice of 
authority, particularly in the case of authors writing in the vernacular.
36
 These are increasing 
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work is that of Denys Turner, who argues that the tradition dominates Western mysticism throughout the Middle 
Ages.  See esp. his The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), 
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 Nicholas Watson, Richard Rolle and the Invention of Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), 2. 
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 Ibid. 
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Among contributions in this area, no doubt also of great value to medieval studies, see Watson, Invention of 
Authority; on gender and authority more specifically, Lynn Staley, “Julian of Norwich and the Late Fourteenth-
Century Crisis of Authority,” The Powers of the Holy: Religion, Politics, and Gender in Late Medieval English 
Culture, ed. David Aers and Lynn Staley (University Park: Pennsylvania State University P, 1996): 107-178;  
Michael G. Sargent, “The Annihilation of Marguerite Porete,” Viator 28 (1997) 253-279; on scribal manipulation of 
mystic authors‟ status, Sarah Poor Mechthild of Magdeburg and Her Book: Gender and the Making of Textual 
Authority (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania P, 2004); Katherine Zieman‟s Singing the New Song: Literacy 
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analyses about status in a literary and devotional milieu, about who has the right to speak about 
God and in what circumstances, and fewer about momentary identification with God and the 
effects this has on perceptions of selfhood. The issue of potential empowerment in taking on a 
pseudo-clerical role or inhabiting the divine voice is about negotiating a position within an 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, not about negotiating one‟s ontological status, the nature of one‟s being 
in terms of spiritual existence and order.   
But new writing on mysticism is emerging and raising new questions.  Very recently, the 
work of Carmel Bendon Davis turned attention to how medieval understandings of space were 
entwined with understandings of God, and how the period‟s mystical texts imagine intersections 
of a space of the soul with the space of God and of creation, and various spaces in which they 
meet.  Davis points toward mystics‟ liminality, dwelling visibly in a space in-between that most 
of their contemporaries could not reach.
37
 Although my study does not share Davis‟ concern with 
space in precisely the same contexts, and I do not see the mystics‟ liminality as a mediating 
phenomenon in the way she does (this project is concerned with crises in an ontological liminal), 
Davis‟ attention to concepts of the liminal and spatial in mysticism are important steps forward 
toward scholarship beginning to address the complexity of mystics‟ conceptions of selfhood. 
Robert McMahon has recently explored “meditative structure” and “texture” in medieval 
writings of the soul‟s ascent, beginning to break down some of the barriers between the “literary” 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Liturgy in Late Medieval England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania P, 2008), was an important step 
forward in analysis of  liturgical reading and devotional speech as “re-presentation” of the voice of God, but is 
primarily concerned with how these issues relate to authority. 
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 Carmel Bendon Davis: Space and Spatiality in the Works of Richard Rolle, The Cloud of Unknowing Author, and 
Julian of Norwich (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America P, 2008).  For her discussion of liminality, see 
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and the “philosophical,” the form and the philosophical and theological ideas being conveyed.38  
It is my hope that my analysis of mystical texts, with attention to the divided self seeking a voice 
and inspiring experimental narrative, moves us further toward understanding the complexity of 
medieval ideas of selfhood and shifting ontological status, the degree of awareness of that status, 
and its means of representation. 
 Two additional notes on my method are necessary here.  My understanding of a “self” 
that is revealed in mystical narrative proceeds from recognition that the fundamental concern of 
Christianity is an ontological one, not a moral one: the project of the Incarnation, the central 
event of Christianity, is not merely to change man‟s bad behavior, but to give him eternal life, to 
so alter the relationship between God and man on the ontological level as to restore the unitive 
relationship present at creation, or indeed, in one‟s pre-existence.39 Thus to speak of the “self” in 
the Christian mystical context is always, at least to some degree, to speak of one‟s status in a 
cosmic order.  For the Christian mystics, this “self” is synonymous with the immortal soul on its 
way to recovering its initial being.  While I assume that the I of the text stands for the lived 
experience of the mystic, based on my reading of the narratives within a specific Christian 
context, my use of the word “self” refers to the mystic‟s internal self-concept and awareness as 
an entity undergoing this process.  As theologian Tarjei Park has recently put it, “what exactly is 
meant by self and God in Christ is to be understood by analysis of self as process in relation to 
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 Robert McMahon, Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent (Washington DC: Catholic University of 
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the Trinity.”40 Accordingly, my references to “ontological status” are a means to address and 
name these transitions of the soul.  The question of how ontological status is portrayed in the 
texts is a question of how the mystics represent a soul‟s place on this path of transformation. 
While “ontology” can be defined broadly as the science or study of being, I am concerned with 
“being” from Christian theology‟s perspective on the soul.41 
 
Text Selection and Textual History: Spiritual “Stories” in England 
 I have chosen Elizabeth‟s dance, Marguerite‟s Mirror, and Julian‟s Revelation for their 
differences as much as their similarities.  The three mystics use three very different narrative 
modes for expression of their experiences – a body performance, an allegorical dialogue, and a 
visionary text – at the same time that they share concern with the boundaries of the self.  The 
selection allows analysis of three different manifestations of the same core experience of 
liminality.  Beyond diversity in mode, I aimed to examine texts that present direct experience of 
mystical union and that found an audience in the devotional milieu of late medieval England. 
 Because my concern is with personal narratives that report a direct encounter with the 
divine, I do not consider texts that are primarily didactic, such as texts designed to instruct others 
in devotion or contemplative ascent to mystical union.  For instance, Bonaventure‟s Itinerarium 
mentis in Deum (ca. 1259), which addresses “the six progressive illuminations by which the soul 
is disposed…to pass over” into God, is concerned with the soul‟s potential and limitations in 
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trying to achieve union with God through ascent of the mind, a union in which one is eventually 
“transported to God, and transformed into Him.”42 But Bonaventure‟s goal is to provide a guide 
to this process, not to convey personal experience of union and its effects on his perception of 
selfhood and ontology.  In fact, his program is an interpretation of Saint Francis‟ vision of the six 
winged seraphim as a symbol of contemplation.
43
  For similar reasons, I exclude The Cloud of 
Unknowing, which again is a work of instruction in how a soul can, theoretically, be united with 
God, but not a verbal portrait of what that union looks like.  Walter Hilton‟s Scale of Perfection 
and Nicholas Love‟s Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ fit the same category of the 
didactic.  Yet because the Itinerarium and Cloud do provide insight into influential medieval 
concepts of mystical union and (especially in the latter case) mystical language, they are part of 
the context in which I situate the texts in chapter one. 
 A second parameter was to focus on texts that were part of the devotional milieu of 
medieval England in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.  The texts were all 
composed or translated during the rise of the English vernacular as the language for literary 
pursuits both secular and religious.  A focus on narratives circulating in Middle English allows 
for comparison of terms used to describe the self, the soul, union, and aspects of direct 
experience.  The continuity of word choices among the texts yields insight into how a particular 
culture articulated these issues.  Commonalities among these few texts circulating within one 
medieval culture is a starting point: this study addresses a microcosm of the broad world of 
mysticism, and as such is a sort of prelude to addressing conceptual questions that are worthy of 
a larger, comparative study.   
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Of the three main texts considered here, Julian is the only native English mystic.  
Elizabeth and Marguerite require some introduction of their place in a study of mystical texts in 
England.  The record of Elizabeth‟s performed narrative comes down to us in her Latin vita, 
originally composed by Phillip of Clairvaux in the mid-thirteenth-century after visiting the 
chapel where Elizabeth lived at Herkenrode near Liège.  The vita seems to have enjoyed some 
popularity in late medieval England, particularly among Carthusian houses but possibly also 
among other orders and devout lay readers.  Of the ten known surviving manuscripts of Phillip‟s 
Latin account, half have been found in England.
44
  One of these, Oxford, St. John‟s College MS 
182, presents Elizabeth‟s vita together with the lives of two other women from Liège, Christina 
Mirabilis and Marie d‟Oignies, and was owned by the Carthusian house at Witham.  The 
manuscript was among the books given to the house by John Blacman in the gift of his personal 
library to the monastery.
45
 Elizabeth‟s vita was probably used for contemplative reading by the 
brothers at Witham, but given Blacman‟s interesting possession of the text prior to his entry, it 
seems to have circulated at least among some clerical readers outside the monastery, even if only 
within a small, elite circle. 
 A Middle English translation of Elizabeth‟s Life, probably early fourteenth-century,  
places Elizabeth‟s story firmly in the hands of an English audience of vernacular literature, and is 
the version that will be my focus.  The one extant copy appears in the fifteenth-century Bodleian 
MS Douce 114 alongside Middle English translations of the lives of Elizabeth, Christina 
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Mirabilis, and Marie d‟Oignies, collected with Stephen of Siena‟s Life of Catherine of Siena and 
the Middle English translation of portions of Suso‟s Horologium sapientiae under the title 
Tretyse of þe Sevene Poyntes of Trewe Love and Erlastynge Wisdom.
46
 Douce 114 therefore has 
a clear relationship to St. John‟s 182, the only surviving Latin codex that specifically links the 
same three mystics from Liège, and common variants in these two versions further suggest a 
common source.
47
 
A notation at the end of Douce 114 states that the manuscript belonged, at least at one 
point, to the Carthusian house at Beauvale in Nottingham, although the later hand of this note 
leaves open the possibility (perhaps even suggests) that the manuscript may have been produced 
elsewhere.
48
 Jennifer Brown has recently proposed that although the surviving text of the English 
lives was owned by the Carthusians of Beauvale, the translation more likely originated 
elsewhere, perhaps the Augustinian priory at Thurgarton.
49
   
Seeming transcription errors in Douce indicate that this one surviving English version is 
likely a copy rather than the original translation, suggesting a possibly wider audience and 
circulation.
50 
 Moreover, the apology of the “Englisshe compyloure” that appears in Douce 114 
offers further evidence that the English texts circulated beyond Carthusians houses.  His 
reference to “alle men and wymmen that in happe redith and herith this Englyshe” opens the 
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possibility of an intended lay audience.  A subsequent (although arguably conventional) plea that 
clerks, if they should read the text, “wol be fauorabil” is additional evidence of broader 
circulation.
51
 As Brown notes, at very least, the “compiler” (who could be the translator, selector, 
or scribe) seems aware of a potentially shifting audience.  The wide popularity of Marie 
d‟Oignies in England is evident in Margery Kempe‟s adoption of the saint as a model.  
Margery‟s Book records how her priest and scribe better understood Margery‟s excessive tears 
after reading about Marie‟s weeping, and it has been suggested that Margery‟s knowledge of 
Marie could have come from the same English translation that appears in Douce.
52
 
 Elizabeth‟s Middle English Life itself provides clues of a relatively wide circulation.  The 
translator states that he has undertaken the task for the “edificacyone of deuoute soulles þat are 
not leeryd in latyn tunge.”53 The category of “devout souls,” instead of a more specific term 
referring to brothers of the house, suggests a broader audience was probably intended.  
Carthusian Nicholas Love‟s Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ, his English reworking of 
the Meditationes vitae Christi, is contemporaneous with Douce 114 and uses similar terminology 
to describe the intended audience.  Love states that he has written “at þe instance & þe prayer of 
some deuoute soules to edification of suche men and women,” having noted the need in current 
times for meditations on Christ‟s life not only in Latin but “also in Englyshe to lewde men & 
women.”54  
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 One of the main adjustments made to the English version of Phillip‟s account of 
Elizabeth is a reduction of the scholarly apparatus found in the Latin original: the translator 
eliminates many of the scriptural references with which Phillip glosses Elizabeth‟s actions as 
well as some of his related commentary.  The translator explains in his preface that he took this 
step to ease transmission and understanding of the text for the less learned English audience: he 
notes that while he tried not to add to, cut from, or “chaunge ϸe substaunce of ϸe story,” his 
translation process required “leuyng legeauns and auctorites of holy writte, þat wolde be ful 
dymme to vndirstonde, if þey were turnyd in to englisshe with oute more declarynge of glose.”55 
The translator‟s fear that readers would not grasp scriptural references without elaboration 
further suggests an intended readership beyond the walls of Carthusian communities.  And again 
the basic sentiment expressed here is comparable to one offered by Love in his Mirror of the 
Blessed Life.  In addition to truncating and eliminating some material from his original, Love 
repeatedly stresses the public necessity of “deuovte meditacions of cristes lyfe more pleyne in 
certeyne parties þan is expressed in the gospell of þe foure euaungelistes.”56 His prologue 
highlights that “simple creatures” require “pleyn sentence to comun vndirstondyng,” and he 
employs the traditional metaphor from 1 Corinthians 3: 1-3 to stress the necessity of feeding 
beginners in the spiritual life with only “mylke of lyȝte doctryne & not with sadde mete of grete 
clargye & of [hye contemplacion.]”57 Thus there are several clues that Elizabeth‟s translator and 
Love present their texts for the same type of audience.  Love‟s audience eventually became 
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devout laity, which is suggestive, even if it cannot prove that Elizabeth‟s Middle English Life 
was intended for and embraced by devout laity. 
 The Mirror of Simple Souls, originally written in French ca. 1300, has a most intriguing 
textual history.  The author, identified in her trial records as “Margarita dicta Porete,” a native of 
Hainaut, perished in defense of her text in 1310 when she was burnt at the stake for perceived 
heretical teachings in her book.  This was a sort of finale: a culmination of public clashes with 
ecclesiastical authorities over the course of several years, during which Marguerite had refused 
to stop circulating her book even after it had already been pronounced heretical and burnt in her 
presence.
58
   
Despite ecclesiastical attempts to eradicate the Mirror, copies of the French text not only 
survived but spread, and by the fifteenth-century there was a translation into Middle English, two 
into Italian, and two into Latin, including one Latin version based on the Middle English text.  
The Middle English translation survives in three fifteenth-century copies of Carthusian origin, 
with dating of the translation ranging from the mid-fourteenth-century to the early fifteenth-
century.
59
 Although the identity of the translator is unknown, he left behind a clue by signing his 
glosses to the text with the initials “M.N.” Beyond these facts, and M.N.‟s mention that the 
surviving text represents his second attempt at translation, we know little more about the 
translator and transmission of the English Mirror. 
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Because none of the accessible copies appears to present entirely precise renderings of 
Marguerite‟s original, choosing any one as a base text means confronting a set of textual 
surmises, omissions, and alterations of some sort.
60
 Most analyses of the Mirror rely on the one 
nearly-complete accessible French copy in the late fifteenth-century Chantilly Musée Condé MS 
F.xiv.26 (hereafter Chantilly).  The question of a “best text” is ongoing, but the Middle English 
version is worthy of much more consideration than it has received.  In fact, scholarly attention to 
the Middle English Mirror is more warranted and timely now than perhaps ever before, 
following Robert Lerner‟s recent persuasive and detailed case that the Middle English may in 
fact be our best witness of what Marguerite originally wrote.  Lerner suggests that, 
notwithstanding that it is a translation, with regard to both specific details and the general spirit 
of text, M.N.‟s Mirror appears to derive from an earlier and more pristine exemplar than does 
Chantilly, which seems to have undergone numerous alterations.  He offers the most thorough 
case for this to date, incorporating Hasenohr‟s discovery of the Valenciennes chapters alongside 
his own readings, and elaborating her initial link between those chapters and the Middle English 
translation.  Particularly thought-provoking is Lerner‟s analysis of portions of the Middle 
English that seem to preserve more daring framings of Marguerite‟s theology. 61 This is a 
conversation that is sure to continue. 
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For the aims of the present study, the Middle English version is particularly valuable 
because the choices and glosses of M.N., one of the few medieval readers beyond Marguerite‟s 
inquisitors to leave behind his detailed impression of the text, aid in exploring Marguerite‟s 
understanding of mystical union and her use of dialogue to represent it.  Moreover, some 
distinctive elements in the less-examined Middle English version point to the tensions in the text 
(as well as M.N.‟s apparent awareness of them) that I wish to bring to light here; this is 
especially true with regard to the alternate ending present in the Middle English version and its 
resonance with the text‟s larger project of representing liminality through narrative structure. 
For all of these reasons, I adopt the Middle English as my base text for this project with 
reference to other versions where notable differences occur.  The Middle English is not a perfect 
text, but as renewed discussion of the Mirror continues to evolve, I hope that my reading may 
draw additional attention to what the Middle English text does and does not offer for our 
developing sense of Marguerite‟s project.  It will be clear, however, that my core thesis about 
Marguerite‟s innovative dialogue does not depend on that version alone, and I am speaking to 
Marguerite‟s literary techniques more broadly.  My intention is not to debate the relative 
integrity of the texts, a debate I leave to those more skilled in textual criticism and philology, but 
to open the Mirror to new forms of analysis; part of that involves my close attention to narrative 
structure, and part involves taking a broader perspective on the surviving material at hand. 
  In the corpus of mystical writing in medieval England, there are certainly other texts that 
report first-hand experience of mystical union and a sense of being liminal.  But not all of them 
reveal the type of experimentation with narrative evident in the core texts of this study.  A 
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striking example that might seem to fit the parameters of the study as well as add a male writer‟s 
work to the discussion is Richard Rolle‟s Incendium amoris, or Fire of Love, written in England 
in 1343 and translated into Middle English by Richard Misyn in 1435.  Much of the text is a 
personal account of direct experience of God and mystical union, most notably the prologue 
which opens with Rolle‟s famous description of heat within his chest, an experience so intense 
that he reports repeatedly touching his chest to make sure that he is not literally on fire.
62
 He 
describes how the soul‟s ecstatic inner song actually transforms the soul into the God of whom it 
sings: the soul that is in “a peace that sings and loves and burns and contemplates…is altogether 
ablaze with heavenly fire.  And he is transformed into the likeness of him in whom is all melody 
and song.”63 These are only two images in a text thoroughly concerned with describing mystical 
union, and we also find evidence of a liminal experience when Rolle describes alternating 
between union and longing.
64
 
 Rolle certainly thinks that he is moving into new narrative territory in the Fire, trying to 
explain an experience that he says he has “never found in any learned writing or…heard 
expounded, namely that this song will spring to his very lips, and he will sing his prayers in a 
spiritual symphony of celestial sweetness.”65 And in several ways he is: the text melds together a 
remarkable number of genres, including autobiography, ecstatic prayer, estates satire, pastoral 
instruction, and treatises expounding various subjects.  Rolle‟s innovation in bringing together 
diverse theological discourses and practices of speaking about God has also received some recent 
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scholarly attention.
66
  But for all Rolle‟s ecstatic prayer and lyrics, the Fire is not primarily an 
experiment in form that illustrates, through the text‟s very structure, an experience of mystical 
union.
67
 He is writing for a Latinate, academic audience more than using the space of the text for 
free reflection. These already would be a few reasons to exclude the Fire from the present study, 
although the narrative structure created by Rolle‟s alternating discourses and recursiveness 
deserves further critical attention.  Above all, I omit the Fire here because its inclusion would not 
add a distinct, additional mode to my discussion of the performative, dialogic, and visionary. 
My analysis aims to trace narrative structures in the most innovative and creative 
attempts to portray mystical union and its effects, which are ultimately a minority of mystical 
texts.  It is not an argument that these writers, whose texts all seem to have had rather limited 
circulation, ushered in sweeping changes in the way that writers reflect a self in transition.  My 
objective is much smaller in scale: to reveal what a few medieval writers realized they could do 
with narrative in order to represent liminality.  This is evidence of how at least some medieval 
individuals conceptualized the self, the nature of mystical union, and the narrating and 
experiencing I in literary representations; it is an indication of medieval subjects with an 
awareness of these pressures of description and how consciousness and its divisions could be 
represented in words.  Applied in future to a wider scope, it may further inform our reading of 
how other narrative writers such as Chaucer and Langland may have viewed narrative form itself 
                                                 
66
 Watson attributes this variety to Rolle‟s attempt to find an appropriate voice and structure for this book, his first 
work that does not stem from explanation of a biblical text.  See Invention of Authority, esp. 113-119.  Denis 
Renevey sees Rolle engaged in another form of adaptation, namely creating a new language to describe God for his 
audience, adjusting and adopting metaphors used by the exegetical tradition, and in so doing reconciling the 
language of amor carnalis and amor spiritualis.  See Renevey, Language, Self, and Love: Hermeneutics in the 
Writing of Richard Rolle and the Commentaries on the „Song of Songs‟ (Cardiff: University of Wales P, 2001), esp. 
67, 83. 
67
 Similarly, most of Rolle‟s English writings are primarily didactic and composed for patrons or those under Rolle‟s 
spiritual direction, with little innovation in terms of creative form. 
37 
  
as a representation of experience.  But it is not a claim that these narrative techniques and modes 
were necessarily dominant or even widespread. 
 The mystics in this study are in fact exceptional in several ways.  Unlike many of their 
contemporaries, they all composed their texts, as best we can tell, by themselves: they were 
writing neither with a collaborator or amanuensis  (as were, for instance, Margery Kempe and 
her model Angela of Foligno) nor for patrons (as Rolle was in most of his vernacular works) 
Under these circumstances, the textual space – and indeed, the shape of discourse – was entirely 
their‟s as a forum for reflection and experimentation.  Whether or not their texts would even be 
understood by audiences seems to have been a minimal concern.   
Marguerite announces several times that she does not expect all readers to understand her 
book, especially not scholastics but not even beguines either; and of course, most of the 
establishment did not.  Still, she stood by her book to the death, and although she appears to have 
sought approval from sympathetic scholars after the first condemnation, she refused to defend it 
at her trial or even to take the oath that would allow a trial to proceed.  In essence, she would not 
condescend to answer questions from “Holy Church the Little,” the Church of Reason, even 
when her life was at stake.  Elizabeth attracted an awe-stuck audience with her performance, yet 
notably the performance itself appears to have been entirely her own creation.  There is no 
indication that she adapted any of it to suit a particular audience or visiting ecclesiastic such as 
Phillip.  Julian appears certain that the message of her revelations is meant for her to share with 
all Christians.  The twenty years of meditation on her “showings” is a personal quest for 
understanding, and indeed, she could take so long in producing her final text precisely because 
she was answerable only to self and God rather than any human patron.  Moreover, she 
recognizes that readers will not understand some aspects of her experience, and sometimes 
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distances herself from the responsibility of conveying meaning; in a few moments that prefigure 
what Barthes would observe of literary meaning in the modern world, she leaves it to her 
audience (with God‟s grace and help) to complete the text‟s meaning.  These are among the 
reasons why the texts may stand out in their experimentation with narrative. 
Ultimately, however, I am not interested in tracing a history; although my analyses 
proceed in the chronological order of the texts, I am not charting a chain of influence or 
development.  While I stop short of Rudolf Otto‟s assertion that it is entirely “immaterial to us 
how mysticism historically arose,” the issue is largely immaterial to this project, and I agree that 
an analysis of the “essential nature” of mysticism cannot be done solely through “inquiry into the 
genesis of [the] thing,” or for that matter, through inquiry into the genesis of its stock images and 
forms.
68
 The mystics undoubtedly draw on other writers and their common theological context 
and devotional practices.  Like all texts, medieval mystical texts “appropriate signs operating 
within a cultural coding or langue,” as Park puts it, and there is value in recognizing those 
signs.
69
 But when it comes to analysis of the human experience of ontology across eras and 
generations, a phenomenological core, a view of the narratives primarily through a narrow lens 
of path of influence, or even genre, risks an accordingly narrow set of discoveries.
70
 To try to 
standardize or explain away peculiarities of the texts, to try to arrange them in a neat line, 
overlooks what they wish to tell us and underestimates these mystics who use the forum of the 
text to explore personal spiritual experiences, even if their next move is to try to share them with 
others or try to generalize their applicability. 
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The Study’s Narrative 
The chapters move from the questions that I am asking to the narratives that unfold their 
implications.  Chapter one establishes liminality as both a central component of medieval 
Christian mystical experience and a valuable critical concept for understanding what the mystical 
narrative strives to represent.  To illustrate the pervasiveness of liminal elements in mystical 
writing and explain their origin, I trace the overlap between epistemological, ontological, and 
linguistic concerns in contemplative literature and theology of the medieval Christian West with 
a special attention to the writings of Augustine, Bonaventure, and Julian of Norwich as central 
examples.  After establishing how problems of knowledge and ontological confusion contribute 
to the mystics‟ “in-between” condition, I analyze the mystics‟ situation through modern theorists 
of liminal concepts, tracing them from Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner to Julia Kristeva 
and Jacques Lacan in order to delve further into the unique psychological factors of such a state 
and better understand its need for a means of expression.  Finally, preparing for the mystics‟ use 
of narrative, I explore medieval Christian understandings of how language can both draw souls 
to God (e.g., in prayer discourse or dialogue), and still fail to represent the effects and emotive 
power of such relationships.  In the last section, I examine mystical texts as a forum in which the 
above tensions are negotiated and represented, and explore alternative modes of narration that 
transcend these tensions. 
In terms of the narratives themselves, I move from the most visibly experimental to the 
most subtle.  Chapter two turns attention to a performance text, the cyclical Passion performance 
and representation of the love of Christ performed by the thirteenth-century mystic dancer 
Elizabeth of Spalbeek.  Although our only access to Elizabeth‟s narrative is indirect, through the 
description of her performance captured in her Latin vita and its later Middle English rendering, I 
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analyze what we can reconstruct of Elizabeth‟s performance as a mystical text that she narrated 
through the medium of her dance.  I demonstrate, first, how clues in the vita reveal that Elizabeth 
and her original audience “read” her performance as a text.  I then argue that Elizabeth‟s 
movement in and out of what her hagiographer calls “ravishment,” along with her cyclical and 
simultaneous adoption of various roles in the Passion story, uses the body to tell a story of 
crossing ontological boundaries.  In so doing, Elizabeth exceeds the seeming physical limits of 
the body, and makes it a means to represent transition and the transcendence of time.  
Comparison of her narrative with both medieval art and the work and commentary of modern 
body performers provides further insight into how the structure of Elizabeth‟s narrative 
represents liminality.  
Chapters three and four work in concert with one another and turn to Marguerite Porete‟s 
Mirror of Simple Souls.  Chapter three analyzes tensions in the Mirror between ineffability and 
the irrepressible drive to narrate the personal experience of mystical union.  This conflict 
emerges as the allegorical personification of Soul both proclaims aspects of union and critiques 
her own speech for its inadequacy and for its negative consequence of distracting her attention 
from God.  But I show that ultimately the Mirror dramatically puts its “stakes in language,” to 
borrow Michel de Certeau‟s terms, as a means to both express the experience of, and create a 
bridge to, union with God.
71
   
Chapter four argues that the dialogic structure of the Mirror is a partial answer to this 
dilemma of ineffability.  The dialogic form represents the transitory nature of experiences of 
mystical union, and the psychic division that the experience enacts on the subject.  For even as 
the dialogue helps to represent mystical union, it also makes clear that Soul is caught in a liminal 
                                                 
71
 The phrase is taken from Michel de Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. Brian 
Massumi (1986; reissued Minneapolis: University of Minnesota P, 2006), 92. 
 
41 
  
position, a transitory state in which she is both herself and not herself, split between a former self 
and a self in union with God.  As the text‟s structure moves between distinguishing Soul‟s voice 
and commingling it with others  – including allegorical representations of the divine – it portrays 
the union possible between God and a soul, a union necessarily incomplete as long as the soul 
remains in mortal life.  I further propose that M.N., the translator of the Middle English text (the 
version that emerging research suggests may best preserve what Marguerite wrote), recognizes 
and takes up these concerns with particular fervor in his reframing of the text.  This indicates an 
intuitive awareness (perhaps from familiarity with a shared devotional culture or understanding 
of narrative) of what Marguerite wants to convey and how she adapts her narrative to convey it. 
The fifth and final chapter returns to Julian of Norwich‟s Revelation of Love, the text with 
which I begin the exploration in chapter one, and pursues a closer reading of Julian‟s 
preoccupation with ontological status and its articulation.  Julian is the most visibly liminal of the 
mystics, reportedly having experienced her revelations while literally (in her illness) on the 
border between life and death, and in her later anchoritic lifestyle participating in a form of 
living death.  But her text also charts a liminal existence as she looks toward future union that 
has already been partially attained but not yet fulfilled – a form of Christian theology‟s “already 
but not yet.”  She reveals a sense of entrapment in visionary experience itself, struggling to 
express what she sees and the nature of the human soul‟s potential union with the divine, and 
repeatedly returning to revisit the moments of her visions.  Julian‟s attempt at narrative becomes 
an endeavor as ensnaring as attempts to know God: neither can be fulfilled in her current life.  I 
argue that this shapes her recursive, non-linear text, and creates a portrait of liminal experience. 
 My conclusion reflects on the insights gained when, now informed by developments in 
critical theory over the past decades, we actually return to the starting point of considering these 
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mystical texts on their own terms – namely, in light of their concerns with ontological status and 
Christian concepts of the self in the process of becoming one with God – rather than through 
forced categorization of the texts in terms of modern genres or distinctions such as “women‟s 
mysticism.” By doing so, we unveil the literary mastery of these “writers,” their striking trust in 
narrative forms despite the limitations of human language, and the creativity of late medieval 
portrayals of an experiencing and narrating I.  The conclusion looks hopefully toward the field of 
comparative mysticism to explore these phenomena across not only cultures and religions but 
eras.  It emphasizes that while these texts invite readers into contemplation, their audience may 
well be the narrating self. 
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CHAPTER 1 
POINTS OF INTERSECTION 
 In the middle of the long text of her Revelation of Love, the late fourteenth-century 
English mystic Julian of Norwich writes,  
And thus I saw fully sekirly that it is ridier to us to cum to the knowing of God 
than to knowen our owne soule; for our soule is so deepe groundid in God…we 
may not cum to the knowing therof till we have first knowing of God, which is 
the maker to whom it is onyd.  But notwithstondyng, I saw that we have of 
fulhede to desiren wisely and treuly to knowen our owne soule, wherby we are 
lernid to sekyn it wher it is, and that is in God.
72
 
For Julian, the epistemological problem of her inability to know God is linked with the 
ontological problem that the soul is one with that God.  Knowledge of one‟s “owne soule” is 
desirable, something we wish to know “wisely and truly.”  This type of self-knowledge – 
complete knowledge of one‟s own being – is only possible through knowing God, but Julian has 
established earlier in her text that full knowledge of God is impossible during mortal, 
“transitory” life.  The point of knowing God, also the point of full understanding of the self, can 
only occur after death.
73
 For now, God can only be known in brief insights, “privy tuchyngs.” 
This initiates a problem of language: because Julian cannot yet know and therefore cannot 
describe what God is, she cannot know and describe the soul in its ontological state of union 
with God. 
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This chapter explores the overlap between epistemological, ontological, and linguistic 
concerns in medieval mystical writing.  Such concerns are interwoven in Christian mysticism: 
they bring about and reinforce one another.  To analyze the way that mystical texts narrate 
liminality is to consider one nodal point where these concerns converge.  We can see it this way: 
the mystic‟s ontological problem of union with God, which traps her in a liminal state, creates a 
problem of expression; the linguistic problem is in turn fed by an epistemological problem.  As 
Denys Turner has put it succinctly, “it follows from the unknowability of God that there is very 
little that can be said about God.”74 For the soul that is “onyd” to its creator, the problem of 
God‟s inexpressability reaches a new level: a breakdown in description of the God to whom she 
is joined is likewise a breakdown of possible description of the self.   
To look for signs and effects of these phenomena in mystical writing is not simply a 
metaphysical question or a study of this overlap in the abstract.  It is, rather, one way to approach 
the lived experience of an individual negotiating these problems, trying to give voice to them, 
and trying to understand and describe the boundaries of him/herself.  To analyze these issues in a 
text is to study discursive space, to examine how the text itself becomes an arena for these 
negotiations, for confronting limits of knowledge and expression, and for the attempt to 
transcend them.  It is, therefore, to study the act and art of representation.  Before moving on to 
analyze how texts represent these conflicts, this chapter parses the problem itself: the mystic‟s 
liminal condition and the interrelated circumstances that produce it.  
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Problems of Being: Union 
I stated in the introduction that my use of the term “mystical union” signifies loss or 
dissolution of awareness of one‟s being apart from God, a sense that one‟s state of being, or 
ontological status, does not, or more accurately cannot, stand entirely distinct from the divine.  It 
is a view with a long and winding history in Christian thought, and that underwent a particular 
period of development in the high and late Middle Ages.  It was then that the concept of 
“mystical union” as most Christian theologians define it today, as a merger intrinsically related 
to identity, was largely codified.  The roots of the concept run far deeper.  This idea of unio 
mystica is present in the Greek scriptures, particularly in Johannine and Pauline writings, and yet 
further back in Greek philosophy‟s commentary on the soul‟s relation to God, the First Principle 
and Highest Good.  Plotinus, whose philosophical writings became one of the influential forces 
on the Church fathers and developing Christianity, writes specifically of union (employing the 
term henosis) “as merging or essential identity.”75  
But it would be the twelfth-century, as previous scholarship has well documented, that 
saw a marked investment in the further development of theories of mystical union.  Writers such 
as William of St. Thierry and Bernard of Clairvaux promoted “the idea that union with God was 
the basic way to describe the immediate experience of God.” 76 For these writers, the issue is one 
of access, more epistemological than strictly ontological.  William, Bernard, and Bonaventure as 
well viewed “union” primarily as a contemplative state of the mind, not necessarily a 
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commingling of the soul with the divine.  Still, these writers offered an important contribution to 
the history of mysticism by conceiving of “union” as something that can be experienced.   
Thirteenth-century Continental mysticism took a step further, reviving Neoplatonic 
concepts of “the union of identity or indistinction.”77 Scholars frequently point to the writings of 
the Flemish beguine Hadewijch, the German beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, the French writer 
Marguerite Porete following them around the turn of the century, and Meister Eckhart soon after, 
as characteristic of the period‟s concern with the soul‟s rediscovery of its essential, ontological 
link to God.  In contrast to a concept of union concerned with the soul‟s potential elevation 
through contemplation or transcendence of the limits of the mind, in this type of union the 
subject directly confronts the complexity of the boundaries of the self, recalling the soul‟s origin 
in God.  To say the soul can perceive a return to that origin, or can somehow reinhabit that 
origin, raises questions as to where the self ends and the divine other begins.  To perceive the self 
as wholly united to God leaves little or no place for status as creature apart from creator. 
Daring framings of such union gave rise to the Continental debates over deificatio. Those 
writers who were less careful to clarify (as, for instance, Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard of St. 
Victor had done explicitly) that such experience of ontological union was only temporary or only 
“appeared” to unite the soul to God in such a way that the two were indistinguishable risked a 
dangerous slip into heterodoxy.  Such formulations would, as Nicholas Watson has detailed, 
simultaneously spread and “hereticate” the early concepts of Christian Neoplatonism. 78 The 
official Church position, and likewise dominant opinion among theologians in medieval 
England, held that if such a union occurred, it was only for a brief moment and did not dispel 
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one‟s human nature.79  For example, Carthusian Richard Methley, who translated the Middle 
English version of Porete‟s Mirror of Simple Souls into Latin, counseled his readers to “beware 
lest you believe that the creature, through rapture, loses essentially its own essence and is 
converted into its Creator, for to feel or to say this is not of grace but of blasphemy.”80 Because 
rash word choice to describe union could easily drift into a heretical position, the question of the 
potential fullness of union, and appropriate ways to talk about it, were inherently fraught topics. 
In many ways, such tensions have come to define “mysticism” in the modern era.  In the 
early twentieth-century, as commentators on mysticism worked to define the genre and formulate 
a canon of classics, attention turned again to the question of union as an experience and how to 
clarify its potential means and degrees of completeness.  A concept of mysticism as a direct 
personal experience and a claim of some union with the divine (through knowledge or being) 
became the dominant definition.  Evelyn Underhill‟s famous definition of mysticism as “the 
science of ultimates, the science of union with the Absolute, and nothing else,” is primarily 
concerned with the merger between the soul and what paradoxically transcends it.
81
 Rudolf 
Otto‟s study of reported encounters with the “numinous” (in practice, the divine) argues that 
such experiences result in, on the one hand, a self-depreciation, “an estimation of the self, of the 
personal „I‟, as something not perfectly or essentially real,” yet also an acknowledgement of 
union with the holy as “identification, in different degrees of completeness, of the personal self 
with the transcendent Reality.”82 Both are concerned with the loss of a former self-awareness in 
the perception of mystical union. 
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In the example from Julian‟s text, tension arises at the point of recognition that “union” 
cannot be entirely complete, for even if no longer entirely separate from God, she cannot 
completely join with him either.  She is, therefore, both part and apart from God.
83
 This sense of 
being caught “in-between” is the core of what I will refer to as liminality.   
 
Problems of Instability: Liminality 
A sense of liminality is intrinsic to the Christian framing of human experience in which 
one‟s mortal journey is a type of exile.  Men are, in the words of the Letter to the Hebrews, only 
“pilgrims and strangers on the earth.”84  They are in-between, on their way to another state of 
being.  Similar sentiments fill medieval theology and contemplative writing.  Bernard of 
Clairvaux claims that through development in the spiritual life, the soul united with God enters 
an interior “New Jerusalem,” a sort of consolation for the temporary inability to meet him in the 
celestial city, which one can only enter after death.
85
 The author of the Meditationes vitae Christi 
similarly considers the tension of perceiving the self to be in two disparate places at once, 
between continuing earthly pilgrimage and momentary access to what is beyond it: sometimes, 
he or she explains, “a fullness of inner sweetness” can cause one to remark “ „Lord, it is good for 
us to be here.‟ Clearly not this trouble-filled pilgrimage where he is detained in body, but in that 
sweet and salvific pondering which has taken possession of his heart.”86 Bonaventure urges in 
his Itinerarium mentis in deum that through contemplative ascent, “the soul, entering into itself, 
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enters into the celestial Jerusalem.”87 A partial “transport” can be induced by the mind 
contemplating God in the world, within itself, and finally beyond itself.  Bonaventure closes by 
citing Pseudo-Dionysius, asserting that by abandoning world and intellect one can enter “union 
with Him Who is above all essence and all knowledge.”88 Yet this, Bonaventure qualifies, is not 
union in its entirety, but only “in so far as it is possible in our state as wayfarer,” in our present 
ontological state.
89
 Even after an ideal ascent through the levels of contemplation and brief 
access to an experience of union, this union is not a sustainable state for the soul still living on 
earth and in the body: the soul is instead trapped in a liminal condition.  
For many mystical writers, the fleeting nature of the experience of union only serves to 
make boundaries of the self more indistinct, and “liminal” becomes an even more accurate label 
for the subject as she alternates between the temporary unified state and distance from it.  
Throughout the tradition, union is described as a momentary feeling of access; as Augustine 
claims in describing his spiritual ascent at Ostia, it is “touched...in a small degree by a moment 
of total concentration of the heart.”90 The author of the Middle English Cloud of Unknowing 
reminds those who would work to scale the heights of contemplation that “ravisching,” the goal 
of the work, occurs on God‟s schedule, only at moments one cannot control.91 Jean-François 
Lyotard encapsulates this element of Augustine‟s complaint and Christianity‟s promise by 
summarizing belief that God‟s door will be opened, “it will be crossed, entry will be had, for 
certain, it‟s a promise – for those at least who are the elect.  But it is for tomorrow, it still lies in 
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the future, one has to be dead already, once time is over.”92 The subject is caught alternating 
between his ordinary state and the one he glimpses beyond it, or even more specifically, 
glimpses of a state beyond that is yet to come.  His state is therefore liminal.  
It is not my intention to judge the orthodoxy of writers‟ descriptions of union and the 
theological risks they take.  I will allow those questions to stand.  My concern is with the 
expression of experience, of the real feelings and problems of being in any way “in the middle” 
or “in-between” within the mystics‟ descriptions of union in its various forms and degrees; my 
concern is with description of being in a liminal state.  It is a state in which the subject negotiates 
being between “self” and “deified,” a state in which the very boundary between “self” and 
“other” is unclear.   
Several modern theoretical perspectives have approached the issue of liminality and 
boundaries of the self, specifically as regards being or becoming something else, becoming (in 
part) Other.  Some of these approaches provide a conceptual schematic and vocabulary that is 
helpful for a discussion of liminality and complications of self-understanding that emerge in the 
context of mysticism.  To better frame my own use the concept of liminality and its distinctions 
from other critical discourses, I turn now to a brief review of the concept‟s history in critical 
discourse and in a few of its main permutations, all with an eye to the ways that such 
constructions of liminality – drawn from anthropology, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology – 
can ultimately help theorize the liminal ontological position that characterizes mystical union.  
 The concept of liminality in modern critical discourse initially gained wide recognition 
through the work of British anthropologist Victor Turner.  In his study of social ritual in pre-
industrial cultures, Turner drew upon but also revised Arnold van Gennep‟s tripartite model of 
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“rites of passage.” In a seminal 1908 study, Van Gennep had argued that three stages of 
progression are evident in most ceremonies by which an individual changes social rank or 
position, such as rituals surrounding puberty: these include a rite of separation from one‟s social 
role (rite de separation), a transitional rite that occurs between established roles (marge or 
limen), and a rite of reincorporation (agrégation) in which one assumes a new role in the 
established social order.
93
  Turner drew special attention to the middle, transitional stage, which 
he referred to as “liminal,” and suggested that at its core the “liminal” is about ambiguity:  a state 
of not having a specific position in the social order.
94
   
Those occupying the liminal state, “threshold people,” are in-between positions and 
identifications, and “elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate 
states and positions in cultural space.”95 A boy undergoing a rite of transition to adulthood, for 
instance, could for a time be considered to have no status at all, neither that of a boy nor that of a 
man, a “not-boy-not-man.”96 To represent this, individuals undergoing the liminal phases of rites 
are often stripped of all markers of social identity (including markers of sex, clothing that 
indicates social position, sometimes even names) to reflect “a limbo of statuslessness.”97 Turner 
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later usefully expanded his concept of the liminal, eventually applying it to “all phases of 
decisive cultural change” and coining “social drama” as a term for society‟s response to such 
changes. The liminal is, he argued, “not only transition but also potentiality, not only „going to 
be‟ but also „what may be.‟”98 The situation is not altogether unlike Augustine‟s waiting to 
change states, or the Cloud Author‟s surrender to God‟s timing for moments of ravishment. 
Turner‟s primary concern is with the potential flexibility of social position, with the 
circumstances under which such positions are ambiguous as opposed to fixed.  His focus on 
social identity differs from my concern with ontological status of a soul as it melds with the 
divine, experiencing a form of liminality in the process.  But Turner‟s theory certainly helps lead 
us to questions of ontology not yet fully explored.
99
 Turner‟s view of a state in which an 
individual not only shifts in status but has no identifiable position is essentially about recognition 
of a shifting ontological status.  The boy undergoing the liminal phase of his puberty ritual lacks 
not only an established position in the tribe, but any clear state of being.  He is literally in-
between states, and in-between modes of experiencing reality: as a boy and as a man.  The 
situation of the mystic, caught negotiating between two states of being – one as a creature 
distinct from the divine and a new state of being in which she has lost awareness of the self apart 
from God – mirrors the boy in Turner‟s liminal stage. 
The mystic who experiences brief moments of mystical union and then is left, as Julian 
puts it, “evermore to leven in swete prayor and in lovely longyng,” finds it impossible to return 
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to her prior state.
100
 Like Turner‟s “liminal personae („threshold people‟),” she lacks a fixed 
identity, retaining a former sense of self but having to reconcile it with a perception of a self 
inextricably linked to God.  And as discussed in the previous section, she must negotiate the 
degrees of “completeness” of that link.  Even if union is seen as a reunion with God who is the 
source of being, or a circular return to one‟s virtual existence in the mind of God, the process is 
the same: an understanding of the self as distinct must fade, and a new understanding of the self 
in union must develop.   
An important difference from Turner‟s “threshold people” is that the mystic‟s situation is 
not quite one of total “statuslessness,” but rather too many identities as once, competing states of 
being.  Caught in-between, still in the process, she is partially stripped of a previous identity and 
partially inhabiting a new one.   
Mystical union that so blurs the boundaries of the self might be seen as an invasion by the 
divine Other.  It potentially creates, on the one hand, a sense of fluid identity, but along with this 
comes the disturbing prospect of destabilization.
101
 This is the uncanny aspect of liminality: to be 
neither whole nor static, to be cut off from wholeness, to be internally divided.  Here one 
relevant theory of invasion and consequent division in the subject is Julia Kristeva‟s theory of 
abjection, in which a threat opposed to the I places the subject “literally beside himself”; in her 
framing of subjectivity, it is the move to expel that threat, and thus create an opposition, that 
allows (or rather forces) the I to come into being.
102
 In the Christian paradigm, according to 
Kristeva, this threat comes from within as the inborn inclination to sin, an Other inside the self 
that notably (not entirely unlike the mystics‟ experiences with their texts) emerges and is 
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“reabsorbed” in language, in confession of its presence.103 In her formulation, the abject is a 
negative, that which is repulsive.  It may seem the opposite, really, of the presence of God for the 
Christian mystic.  But I turn briefly to her formulation here because its relative concreteness –  
before I begin to address intangible souls and more abstract states of being – helps articulate how 
recognition of a foreign entity within oneself can split the subject and make him “henceforth [a] 
divided and contradictory being.”104 The core of the abject is that which “disturbs identity, 
system, order.  What does not respect borders, positions, rules.  The in-between, the ambiguous, 
the composite.”105 Although Kristeva does not draw from him directly, this is in essence a 
version of Turner‟s liminality, a state in which discrete identity is destabilized and ambiguity 
reigns instead; although here, closer to the unique drama of the mystics, it is invasion by another 
presence that destabilizes the subject.  
Perception that such an invading force is a good one, even divine, does not shore up the 
subject against a psychic split.  Augustine‟s writing is again an example that illustrates the 
phenomenon quite clearly.  His effort to understand himself and his own mind, an issue 
developed most explicitly over the course of his Confessions narrative, is famously complicated 
by the recognition of God not in the world, but within him. “You were within,” Augustine 
laments to God, “and I was in the external world and sought you there.”106 This spurs meditation 
on “where in [Augustine‟s] consciousness” God dwells, but also a conflict between God‟s 
perfection and Augustine‟s various ways of falling short; as Augustine exclaims, “because I am 
not full of you, I am a burden to myself.”107 Here in the Confessions, much more than in 
Augustine‟s attempt to parse the human mind as an image of God in his treatise On the Trinity, 
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we see struggle and division.  An internal split derives from encounter with God and recognition 
of God moving within.  From the “shattering visit of the Other,” as Lyotard has put it, we find 
that while Augustine is “delighting with [God‟s] presence in such sudden ecstasy, he feels more 
dissociation from himself, cleaved, alienated, more uncertain of what he is than usual.”108 Unable 
to merge self and Other smoothly, Augustine notoriously becomes “a problem to himself.”109 
The liminal position is anything but comfortable. 
 Both Kristeva‟s formulation and the problem of an ambiguous identity also resonate with 
psychoanalytic theories of the process of subject formation, which further address the role of 
desire in the subject‟s “becoming.” At a basic level, psychoanalysis postulates a subject who 
comes into being through the recognition of relationship to that which the I is not (cannot fully 
be, but again only “i     f      it is     ib e”) and desires to rejoin.  In the Lacanian 
formulation, this is the chief result of the “mirror stage,” in which the infant comes into being as 
a subject and has its borderlines established as a result of observing its image in a mirror, and 
also discerning that that image is “other,” an ideal outside of the limits of what the subject can 
be. Thus the I is organized, but this necessarily enacts a loss of the former self, or more 
specifically, of the former potential for a multitude of selves.
110
 Thus this subject in progress is 
always caught looking backward and forward at the same time, a condition I view as liminal in 
that the subject does not accept stasis and instead pursues a continuous project of becoming.  
One of the best summaries is offered by Aranye Fradenburg: 
To be a “me” I have to not be other things – I have to not be, at the same time, 
“you.” Desire is the result.  It is my response to the fact that “I” can come into 
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being only by being differentiated from everything else, which “I” now feel that I 
“lack” (and which I can never recover).111  
To be one I is necessarily not to be another I.  The condition is not unlike that of Augustine and 
the medieval mystics in union who are “both/and” rather than “either/or,” and trying to reconcile 
a former self with a new one.  
There are of course some important differences.  The psychoanalytic subject desires, but 
does not achieve, his desired (re)union, whereas “both/and” status is precisely the problem for 
the mystic.  The psychoanalytic subject seeks a lost sense of wholeness and will seek in vain to 
recover it; the mystic‟s position in the mortal world makes it temporarily impossible to obtain the 
wholeness of complete union that is to come, but she believes that it will come.  In many ways 
the medieval religious subject and the subject theorized by psychoanalysis are incommensurable, 
but as Fradenburg points out in her influential comparison of the two, both cases involve a 
tearing away from identities.
112
 Both feature a subject remade through sacrifice and having an 
aim of pleasure, though this goal is jouissance in psychoanalysis and union with God in 
religion.
113
 Ultimately both are cases of a subject left hanging in-between, and psychoanalysis 
articulates processes of “becoming” driven by a desire for union and wholeness, a desire to 
reconcile competing portions of the self.  Therefore it can help advance an analysis of liminality 
beyond the “limbo of statuslessness” theorized by Turner precisely because it speaks to the pull 
of contradictory forces on the subject. 
Augustine‟s “dissociation” and confusion as to the nature and boundaries of the self 
occurs upon recognition of God‟s presence within him.  His status as a convert, or any subject 
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moving into deeper intimacy with the divine, poses additional difficulties.  In his converted state 
there is no longer one but now two voices competing for expression.  As Lyotard divides them, 
now present are old Augustine and newly converted Augustine, the grace-filled soul and the 
former appetitive, sensuous self; and “what a scandal, the other flesh, the other voice parasiting 
his own voices, what an aversion, the conversion,” writes Lyotard, interpreting the result as 
turmoil and confusion of voice which precedes alienation and confusion of self.
114
 Kristeva, too, 
notes the ambiguity of the speaker in the case of Augustine‟s warring good and sinful natures.115  
Even further, in such circumstances the speaking voice is divided.  By this I mean to refer 
not only to the Lacanian observation that one cannot speak about (or listen to) the self without 
becoming divided, for “the signifying chain imposes itself, by itself, on the subject in its 
dimension as voice,” but to a lack of clarity as to who the speaker is.116 Once Augustine (or any 
mystic, for that matter) has found a new union with God, there is a question as to what degree his 
words are divine and to what degree they are the mystic‟s own.  For all his use of the vocative 
and banter with God throughout his narrative, Augustine‟s addresses acknowledge a debt of 
words.  “You hear nothing true from my lips which you have not first told me,” he laments to 
God, noting that all his own knowledge has been conveyed through scripture and mystical 
insight.
117
  
Potentially, to speak with one voice is necessarily not to speak with another: to convey 
God‟s words threatens the mystic‟s autonomous words, and so as Michel de Certeau has 
poignantly phrased the problem, the mystic speaker “inhabits the torture, ecstasy, or sacri-fice of 
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a language that can say the absolute, endlessly, only by erasing itself.”118 The mystic‟s speech 
must, to some degree, undercut itself.  Two voices blend as the mystic attempts to convey 
anything of the nature of God, or any knowledge given by God.  And thus speech becomes both 
a means of expression and a means to achieve union.  The purpose of mystic speech (that speech 
which takes shape as the mystical text) is to engage the subject with God; and as Certeau goes on 
to detail, the text itself functions as a site of union and interchange with the divine, a merger that 
takes place through words. 
Here psychoanalytic theory can be helpful again, having as one of its foundational 
concepts the idea that unconscious processes, as well as their manifestations, depend upon 
language.  It is drawing on this foundation that Lacan could offer not only his famous claim that 
“the unconscious is structured like a language,” but also its corollaries: that subjectivity occurs in 
relation, and that the I, the ego, is really a position in a chain of meaning.  Just as all the elements 
in a sentence‟s syntagmatic chain depend on each other and putting thoughts into language 
necessitates choice and dependency (basic conditions Lacan draws from linguistics), the same is 
true for the Lacanian subject who comes into being through a system of absence and presence, 
self as opposed to Other.  Again, it means that something must be given up, as discussed above 
in relation to the mirror stage, or as Lacan puts it elsewhere, “presence as absence connotes 
possible absence and presence.  As soon as the subject himself comes to be, he owes it to a 
certain non-being on which he raises his being.”119 The I signifies one subject precisely because 
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it does not signify another.  This is a tenuous situation that depends on the I not slipping, not 
marking another place instead, and on the subject‟s identification with the I.120  
Just as Certeau reminds us of the unique situation of the mystic‟s voice intermingling 
with God‟s, so psychoanalysis reminds us that to some degree the I and whether it can represent 
the subject (grammatically as well as in terms of conscious identification) is always a problem 
from the start.  Together they affirm how unstable the I and what it signifies can be in any first-
person narrative, but this is especially true in mystical discourse in which the I opens itself as a 
channel for divine words.  And both ultimately return us to the liminal, the place in which the 
nature of the self and what is signified by I is in question, by definition unclear. 
We could say then that the I of mystical discourse is unstable because it adopts various 
stances.  The work of Richard Schechner, who took Turner‟s concepts of liminality into 
discussion of theatrical performance, illuminates this potentiality.  Schechner‟s theory of the 
simultaneous “me,” “not me,” and “not not me” addresses how the adoption of a stance as 
“other” can divide a performer.  His classic example is of an actor playing Hamlet who is thus 
not the actor alone, for he is also Hamlet, but he is also “not not” himself because he is not only 
Hamlet.
121
 For Schechner, such enactments divide the performer and essentially make him 
liminal.  The schema seems to capture the “both/and” element of mystical union, but relies on 
conscious adoption of roles more than the continuous, liminal identity of the mystic. 
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Even as mystical union between subject and God potentially blends voices and 
destabilizes the speaker – whether by invasion, conscious adoption, or a combination of the two 
–  it also initiates a spiral of other linguistic complications.  There is, first of all, the question of 
exactly who is speaking.  But there is also the problem of describing the self when the self is an 
Other, or in the liminal state between the two.  And the situation is exacerbated when that Other 
is ineffable.  Here narrative production meets the problem of engaging and representing 
liminality and the unique circumstances of spiritual experience.  And language is already a 
charged arena. 
 
Problems of Description: Language 
Nearly every religious tradition assigns a crucial role to language in encounters with the 
sacred.  As Steven Katz puts it in his comparative study of mystical language,  
in all the major mystical traditions, recognizing their real and undeniable 
phenomenological diversity, language as a psychospiritual means of radical 
reorientation and purification is present.  And its presence points to the inherent 
linguistic element in spirituality: language is integral to mystical practice.
122
 
In many traditions, language is a psychological tool used to focus concentration or alter 
consciousness, as in the use of mantras or the paradoxical koans of Zen meditation that aim to 
extinguish thought.  Such language, as Katz notes, is intentionally non-descriptive: “Om does not 
„say‟ something, does not „tell‟ something, but does something.”123 It induces a different state of 
awareness.  Language  sometimes fulfills this function in the Christian mystical tradition as well, 
the fourteenth-century Cloud author‟s suggestions for monologic prayer being one example; he 
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suggests repetition of the words “love” and “God” not as means to contemplate the divine nature 
that they signify, but to suppress active thought.
124
 
Additionally, Christianity has long viewed language as a means to knowledge of God and 
also a reflection of union with the divine; the former view is shared by several traditions, the 
latter largely a distinctive element of Christianity.  The notion of language as a means of 
knowledge is obvious in the central role of scripture.  Gregory the Great, for instance, describes 
scripture as God‟s “condescension” to reach humanity through its forms of language, a means by 
which limited human understanding can achieve “access to divine mystery.”125 At the heart of 
Christianity is the assertion that God has expressed himself through the “Word made flesh”; 
indeed, the bold assertion of an incarnate divine is what most fundamentally sets Christianity‟s 
view of “word” and God apart from other traditions.  One of the most poignant, condensed 
summaries of this doctrine has been offered by Ewert Cousins: 
The Trinity is primarily the mystery of the divine self-expression...from all 
eternity the fecundity of the divinity wells up in the person of God the Father and 
expresses itself in its perfect Image and Word, who is the Son…Thus we can say 
that the Son is the linguistic expression of the Father…One can say that at its very 
apex and center – on the level of the absolute – reality is linguistic.”126  
At least two key points extend from this.  First, because it is a reflection of God‟s own actions, 
human language is therefore not “merely functional,” a mere practicality, but grounded in the 
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divine.
127
 The second is the idea of creation as God‟s expression through language.  The 
thirteenth-century Franciscan writers were particularly keen to develop this branch of theology.  
Bonaventure, for example, asserted that humans‟ own use of language was a reflection of the 
Trinity in man and a sign of man‟s ontological link to God, that this link could be brought into 
conscious awareness, and that (like the Trinity‟s capacity for expression) it could manifest 
through giving expression to internal thought.
128
  
Cousins has suggested that such a perspective on religious discourse, an authentic 
adoption of Bonaventure‟s view, leaves room for us to understand “mysticism based on the 
Logos as the objective ground of truth or of the forms of language participating in the divine 
Logos itself.”129 Narrating an experience of God can be seen as a manifestation of union with the 
divine on two levels, namely in the basic act of expression and in the narration of particular 
feelings. It is a circular process: the expression of union itself becomes a means to strengthen the 
link between God and man.  Language is a location of union, for it is a means of revelation and 
participation in the divine.  And if to speak of God is not only to affirm him, to celebrate him, 
but to participate in his being, language and ontology are inextricably linked.   
But as evident in the example from Julian‟s text, the limits of language can also be an 
obstacle for the mystic, and this problematic side of language is prominent in the Christian 
mystical tradition.  While the structure of language may approximate, imitate, or reflect God‟s 
communication, it can fully address neither his divine nature nor the blurred boundaries of the 
subject in union with God.  The struggle for language that adequately signifies, and in the 
process approaches the divine is a central tension in the writing of Pseudo-Dionysius (ca. 500).  
His treatise The Divine Names discusses how one may use conceptual labels to assert the 
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qualities of God (“The Good,” Beauty,” “Light,” etc.), although he concedes that this approach 
to the reality of God inevitably falls short.  His Mystical Theology alternatively approaches God 
by negations, the embrace of silence and “unknowing” and the negation of all ascriptions, 
including all linguistic signifiers.
 
  
These two alternatives represent the two methods of approaching God in language that 
would be taken up by later medieval mysticism.  On the one hand is the cataphatic path of 
verbose metaphor and analogy, synesthesia, and anaphora, a method which inevitably exhausts 
itself in the attempt to describe the ineffable.  On the other hand, the apophatic path, “apophasis” 
in its Greek etymology referring to that which is negative or a way of negation, recognizes that 
“in the face of the unknowability of God, [language] falls infinitely short of the mark.”130 Both of 
these channels (“channels” being an appropriate conceptualization for these rhetorical modes that 
try to convey divine nature) exert a marked influence on later medieval Continental and Insular 
mysticism, wherein the challenge becomes one of also describing ineffable experience of God, 
describing the perception of union.   
Many writers employ both channels simultaneously, a paradox that has received 
surprisingly little critical attention; the tension between these modes, even more than 
straightforward regret about the limits of language, demonstrates just how fraught language is for 
the mystic.  The two collide very vividly, for instance, in the writing of the fourteenth-century 
English mystic Richard Rolle.  Rolle demonstrates a dramatic use of the cataphatic mode as he 
strives to explain the soul‟s experience of God, employing synesthesia and traditional metaphors 
in his Fire of Love to describe the soul‟s experience of divine union.   He writes that such a soul 
is “taken into the sweet, warm caress of God…overwhelmed and enriched with the most intense 
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ardour through his unique consolation, and carried on his glorious way.”131 This jubilant soul is 
purified and simultaneously experiences both the “warmth” and “sweetness” of an embrace.   
Yet Rolle frequently undercuts his own language.  Among his passionate metaphors, he 
laments that the joyful soul in union “is unable to express what he is savouring of heaven.”132 He 
reaches for a traditional trope to describe the impossibility of putting such joy into language, 
comparing it to the task of emptying the sea drop by drop.
133 
He turns at points to outright 
negation, admits he must simply “give up” description of the soul‟s experience of internal song 
because of “the limitations of [his] sense.”134 Still, he demonstrates a drive to give voice to his 
experience. Indeed, he claims that the soul can do nothing but shout in response to union with 
God, that he will simply “burst out with splendid song.”135 Here the cataphatic drive to 
exhaustion meets apophatic negation.  
Both approaches also point to further connections between language and ontology.  As 
evident in Rolle, the cataphatic path attempts to capture experience in language.  The apophatic 
path often promotes annihilation of the self that is distinct from God just as it advocates the 
negation of words and images.  The Cloud author, probably the most devoted propagator of the 
apophatic way in late medieval England, exemplifies this tendency when he claims that a 
conscious awareness of oneself as a being distinct from God can stand between the soul and its 
access to God.
136
 He advises that one attains contemplative union by elevating the mind to the 
“darkness” of non-knowledge, a darkness accessible by erasing (as noted in the discussion of 
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monologic prayer) conceptual knowledge.
137
 Ultimately, to enter into “unknowing,” one needs to 
move beyond images and intellection, the same movement that is at the heart of the Mystical 
Theology.  Similarly, thoughts of a distinct self must (like all thoughts) be negated, or rather 
transcended.  “A naked wetyng and a felyng of thin owne beyng,” the Cloud author advises, it 
“behovith alweis be distroied.”138  
The Cloud author offers a Middle English example (one of the first English vernacular 
examples) of this concept, although he echoes earlier texts that similarly characterize the final 
step of contemplative ascent as a transcendence of the mind itself.  Again, the seventh stage of 
Bonaventure‟s program is one such example.  Bonaventure invokes Pseudo-Dionysius on this 
goal when he advises his readers, “oblivious of yourself, let yourself be brought back, in so far as 
it is possible, to union with Him Who is above all essence and all knowledge.”139 Another 
example of this element of contemplative experience is Augustine‟s vision at Ostia described in 
the Confessions: looking out a window, the minds of Augustine and Monica ascend beyond the 
corporeal, turn to enter into their minds themselves, and eventually ascend “beyond them” to the 
“inexhaustible abundance” of divine truth.140  
As for Julian‟s words at the start of this chapter, this is not without consequence: to 
ascend beyond one‟s own being requires abandonment of a prior ontological status and the prior 
sense of self that accompanied it.  As I explored above, in a loss of awareness of oneself as 
distinct from God, no “self” is left to describe but that which is one with God, who is himself 
ineffable.  
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The situation is further complicated for the liminal mystic whose loss of a distinct self 
may be a momentary loss.  Can the self in these circumstances ever be described if the liminal 
subject is unsure how to mark, much less narrate, its boundaries?  To try to narrate the 
experience of being in these circumstances, to describe the ontological status of the self in such a 
position, is to try to represent amorphous boundaries of the self, boundaries that are ever 
changing. 
We return again to the crux: where the attempt to narrate an experience of liminal being 
and shifting identity comes up against the limitations of language.  It is here that the unique 
issues of mystic speech stand apart from general negative theology and the problems of human 
expression later articulated by Derrida and the deconstructionist critique of language and its 
instability.  Here, the problem is first the liminal ontology of the speaking subject, exacerbated 
by the incapacity of language to describe that status.
141
 The face-off between the two key 
problems (of self and speech) frequently crystallizes in the seemingly contradictory, even 
hypocritical, movement toward “annihilation” of the self (illustrated in the Cloud author‟s 
warning) and simultaneous exclamations of personal experience (as in Rolle‟s Fire) that would 
seem to affirm that self.  The problem is taken on in some form by all the texts in the current 
study, and is in essence a problem of expressing relation: of defining one‟s relationship to God 
and of the ability to represent it in language.   
In discussion of the potentially shifting I and Christian emphasis on language as 
participation in the divine, I have already gestured toward the idea of the mystical text as a 
location for encounter with God.  Modes of discourse itself, in their movements, can be both 
representation and location.  The subsequent chapters argue that the work of the mystical text is 
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to represent in form as much as in content – indeed, that in these matters of representing 
ineffable liminality, form becomes inseparable from content.  In preparation, the remainder of 
this chapter begins to set out some of the ways in which the mystical text itself, functioning as a 
location of interaction, can open the way to this. 
 
Problems of Location: The Text and Encounter 
To engage the divine through language is to enter into an exchange.  Dialogic interaction 
is prominent in the Hebrew scriptures and inherent to the Judeo-Christian concept of a personal 
God.  Yahweh speaks, and Abraham, Moses, and the prophets respond: there is a call and a 
response, the beginning of an ongoing exchange.  God declares Jeremiah a prophet, and Jeremiah 
protests that he is a child; God rebukes and advises him, and they begin a conversation about 
what Jeremiah sees.
142
 Dialogic movement is also prominent in the back and forth exchanges that 
fill the psalms.  The speaker (“David” to the medieval reader) engages God in a conversation, 
offering up praise, repentance, pleas for help, and notably, questions.  Sometimes these are asked 
of God, and David receives a response.  Sometimes David addresses and answers himself. “But 
be thou, O my soul, subject to God,” David instructs first himself and then the people of Israel in 
Psalm 61, continuing, “Trust in him, all ye congregation of people.”143 Another notable example 
is Psalm 14; David poses the question of the opening line, “LORD, who shall dwell in thy 
tabernacle? or who shall rest in thy holy hill?” and either God, David, or God-through-David 
responds by answering that such a one is “he that walketh without blemish and worketh 
justice.”144 
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For the Christian with his personal God, any knowledge or access, and certainly any 
attempt at an active relationship with the divine, begins from this point.
145
 As Merold Westphal 
notes in a recent study of the phenomenology of prayer, Christian prayer cannot be entirely 
apophatic.
146
 It relies on receiving messages, reaching out to another (usually through language, 
but always a gesture of reaching out), and on anticipating a response.  Westphal notes that even 
Pseudo-Dionysius, whose Mystical Theology eventually advocates moving beyond all words and 
concepts for God, opens his text with a prayer to the Trinity; this extension to the divine grounds 
the author‟s endeavor in the God whose nature he wants to celebrate.147 Such actions, however, 
present a challenge to the wisdom of the apophatic tradition.    
In the realm of contemplative literature, as Certeau points out, “invocatio has long been 
the first moment of religious knowledge,” the beginning of more profound access.148 
Epistemological concerns may precede ontological questions; invocations are often an attempt to 
know the divine.  But such interactions are about relation: such moments render visible the 
perceived distance between God and the human soul, but paradoxically also bridge the two by 
uniting them in an exchange of words. 
The English monk Anselm of Canterbury begins his Proslogion by “rousing” his own 
mind to turn to the divine.  “Come now, insignificant mortal,” he begins, “...just for a little while 
make room for God, and rest a while in him.  Enter into the chamber of your mind…Speak now, 
my whole heart: say to God, „I seek your face; your face, Lord, do I seek.‟”149 Embedded within 
                                                 
145
 Although in the Christian context, of course, God is always the initiator of contact and the exchange.  This occurs 
most visibly in creation and the Incarnation, which as discussed above can be seen as God‟s language.  
146
 Merold Westphal, “Prayer as the Posture of the Decentered Self,” The Phenomenology of Prayer, ed. Bruce Ellis 
Benson and Norman Wirzba (New York: Fordham UP, 2005), 20. 
147
 Ibid. 
148
 Certeau, “Mystic Speech,” 89. 
149
 Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion and Proslogion with replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, ed. and trans. Thomas 
Williams (Indianapolis, IN: Hacket, 1995), 97. Gloss omitted.   
69 
  
is an address to Anselm‟s own heart about how to frame his words to God; before reasoning 
comes an address to himself about how to begin a dialogue with God, and even more, a gesture 
of opening himself for dialogue and awaiting response.  Anselm goes on to explore what he has 
come to understand not only to God and his readers, but to himself as well, a representation of 
the steps of his internal thought processes.  I begin with Anselm here in part because of his 
canonical position and the enduring influence of his works in late medieval England, but even 
more because of his clear passion for reasoning, his use of written meditations as an arena in 
which both thought and feeling can flow freely.
150
  Even his Monologion is in fact a sort of 
dialogue as well.  Anselm describes it as a “meditation on the rational basis of faith, adopting the 
role of someone who, by reasoning silently with himself, investigates things he does not 
know.”151 Contrasting it with the Proslogion, he notes that the Monologion‟s title “means a 
speech made to oneself.”152 Both texts privilege back and forth exchange as a way to progress in 
understanding of God.   
 Ever present in this process is the invocation of the divine beyond the self: “Come now, 
O Lord my God,” Anselm continues in the Proslogion, “Teach my heart where and how to seek 
you.”153 It is typical of Anselm (though not unique to him), to alternate passages of argument 
with prayer that offers up one half of an ongoing dialogue between Anselm and God.  After 
issuing the central claim of his Proslogion, asserting that being “cannot be thought not to exist,” 
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there immediately follows an address in the second person with Anselm declaring, “And this is 
you, O Lord our God.  You exist so truly…that you cannot be thought not to exist.”154  
And there is a response: these gestures are not empty apostrophe, for it is God who is 
behind the turns of reasoning and even many of the words that comprise the text.  Anselm 
declares in one of his addresses to God, “what I once believed through your grace, I now 
understand through your illumination, so that even if I did not want to believe that you exist, I 
could not fail to understand that you exist.”155 It is God‟s intervention that allows Anselm‟s 
understanding and, as Anselm frames it, allows production of the text itself.  The text is therefore 
not only Anselm‟s treatise, but like mystic speech defined by Certeau, represents a union 
between the voices of Anselm and God.  It is a type of overlapping that we will see particularly 
in Marguerite‟s text.  The soul‟s relationship to God, here explored through Anselm‟s questions 
about the link between human thought and God‟s existence, is both described and enacted 
through the movements of the text. 
 One model for similar layers of dialogue can be found in Augustine (among other 
patristic writers), one of Anselm‟s inspirations.  The Confessions similarly alternates between 
invocation and analysis, prayer and examination.  Indeed, the opening pages of the Confessions 
are both an invocation and a meditation on whether and how it is possible to call upon God and 
for God to enter the soul, epistemological and ontological questions emerging at the start here 
again.  Augustine confronts the conundrum of knowledge of God, asking, “But who calls upon 
you when he does not know you…but surely you may be called upon in prayer that you may be 
known.” Yet he goes on to remark that invocation and the opening of a dialogue is the first step 
not only of reason but of union.  “Surely when I call on him,” Augustine asserts, “I am calling on 
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him to come into me.  But what place is there in me where my God can enter into me?”156 
Therefore, reasoning is a gift from God, but also calls God‟s presence into Augustine. 
 Anselm and Augustine offer examples of hybrid writing: human and divine voices meld 
in the narration of these texts.  In both cases, the underlying dialogue in an ostensibly first-person 
text destabilizes the speaker‟s voice: the turns of reasoning that form the core of Anselm‟s 
analysis of being or Augustine‟s recognition of God present within him are voiced through 
human narrators but originate in God.  Augustine‟s voice we can see as “the voice through which 
I call upon your voice to come and speak within me.”157 The texts, comprised of Anselm‟s 
reasoning of what can exist and Augustine‟s making sense of his life, each take shape in the gaps 
between voices, from the space in-between God and the speaking soul, from the liminal space in 
which they overlap and intermingle.   
Or to reverse this, the text offers not only content about union, but a representation of 
union.  The interplay that brings understanding also reflects intimacy, that even when standing 
apart, God and the speaker are not so far apart, and in fact bridge their distance through the 
exchange.  The treatises reveal one model of dialogic discourse, one precedent from which to 
draw, available to later mystical writers wishing to represent interaction between God and a 
human soul.   
The phenomenon of a dialogue representing union is perhaps nowhere more striking than 
in the Song of Songs.  The Song features two speakers, a bride and her desired lover seeking one 
another.  It was an especially beloved text of the Western Middle Ages, a focal point of medieval 
monastic exegesis in the pre-scholastic period, crucial to the development of mystical narratives, 
and its influence manifests even in secular love poetry.  Read allegorically, the two speakers and 
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their discourse of desire were thought to represent Christ‟s love for the Church.  This was the 
most widespread medieval reading, rooted in Jewish exegesis about the relationship of God to 
Israel, but undergoing numerous shifts of interpretation.  Read tropologically, a view expanded 
during the twelfth-century‟s embrace of mystical contemplation, the Song was thought to typify 
the love between Christ and the human soul.
 158
 Emblematic of this tradition is Bernard of 
Clairvaux‟s tender and elaborate commentary, and from a slightly different angle, the writings of 
the Augustinian Canons with their concern for the soul‟s morality amidst the temptations and 
stresses of worldly experience.
159
   
The Song became one of the most influential texts on medieval mystical narratives 
because it provided a scriptural language of desire and longing, as well as a form to give voice to 
it.
160
 And the structural form of the Song is, crucially, that of a dialogue.  Narrated in the first 
person, it flows from I to thou and back, and features what E. Ann Matter has aptly called an 
“immediate verbal nature.”161 The storyline of the lovers‟ search is largely represented by two 
voices circling one another.  Theologians seized upon this “dialogical mood” by inserting rubrics 
to label the voices in the text.  The practice was popular with medieval commentators on the 
Latin Bible, who frequently labeled the perceived voices of “Christ” and “the Church” and 
presented the Song as a drama.
162
 Such readings suggest that, narratologically, the “story” in fact 
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only becomes apparent when the text is viewed as a dialogue.  In addition to their emphasis on 
allegorical meaning, the rubrics demonstrate one “interpretative strategy through which the text 
achieves a narrative coherence.”163 Actually, “story” and the mode of “discourse” come together 
here.  Even more, the intimacy between the soul and God is represented by the interplay of the 
dialogue.  
For many medieval interpreters such as Bernard, the intimacy implied by the dialogue 
was the Song‟s central element.  The first sermon of his commentary on the Song describes it as 
personal verses unfit for the public arena, and declares that “only the singer hears it and the one 
to whom he sings – the lover and the beloved.”164 In it the lover, God, is “intimately present” 
even though “incomprehensible,” made present in the dialogic exchange. 165 Indeed, as Ann 
Astell observes, in Bernard‟s commentary the bride‟s love is God‟s love to begin with: “that 
love, poured out into our hearts, comes from God...and urges our return to him.”166 Most 
important for our purposes, the love between God and the soul is made visible, given a form, by 
the dialogue. 
This love, however, is not union: it is the continuous desire for union still unattained.  It 
represents the liminal condition of a soul consumed with love and no longer distinct, yet still 
unfulfilled.  The Song illustrates this most vividly: even if rubricated, the fact is that the narrative 
closure – the lasting, uninterrupted union of the lovers – is missing.  It must be missing in order 
to reflect by its absence the impossibility of attaining union during mortal life.  In so doing it 
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creates a verbal portrait of that reality, a strategy similar to what the mystics adopt as they blend 
form and content and create an image through narrative structure. 
My exploration above considered how a mystic speaker‟s voice alternatively  
blending into and receding from God‟s voice can reflect a liminal subject.  The shifting I of 
mystical discourse is sometimes the mystic subject, sometimes God, sometimes both (Certeau‟s 
“empty space,” Lacan‟s place in the “symbolic order”).  This “empty space” functions as an echo 
chamber: as the I utters words that are both the I‟s and the Other‟s, the words of God are 
reiterated again for the mystic.
167
 The textual forums that I have examined in this section – 
Anselm‟s Proslogion, Augustine‟s narrative, the Song – offer another light on the same drama, 
this time occurring in the structure of the discourse.   
In all these cases, mystic subject and God enter into a unique space of interaction.  They 
enter what Certeau would call the rules of communication to which they ascribe, union through 
speech being made possible by three requirements: an ability to speak in the present, an “I that 
addresses a thou (the allocutionary relation),” and established “conventions” between the mystic 
and God, speaker and allocutor.
168
  As is the nature of dialogue, these interactions are circular 
rather than linear: they lack closure, reflecting that in fact there can be no closure if the mortal 
subject continues to yearn for the divine.  By using dialogue to create a portrait of an intimate yet 
fraught relationship, the texts offer one partial solution to the limitations of human language for 
conveying the ineffable experience of mystical union.  In so doing they offer a model for 
expressing the shifting boundaries of the self that are part of the mystic‟s liminal condition. 
*** 
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In making an ontological assertion about who and what she is – a claim to a status –  
Julian comes right up against the limits of knowledge and language: our substance is in God, but 
we “knowith not what ourself is…we may never full know ourselfe into the laste poynte; in 
which poynte this passend life and manner of peyne and wo shall have end,” writes Julian, and 
so her narration faces a paradox.
169
 Issues of knowledge, ontology, and language are ultimately 
inseparable, as interwoven as, to borrow a figure from Julian, the human soul is “knit” to God.  
From the point where issues of ontology meet the complications of expression come a special set 
of pressures and benefits that the mystic must balance in any narrative of her experience.  But I 
have also walked through some varieties of narrative movements and elements of discourse that 
attempt to reconcile or circumvent these conflicts so that representation of liminal experience can 
emerge, even if imperfectly.  These strategies differ in each of the three texts I examine in the 
following chapters, but they are different means to the common goal of expressing liminality.  I 
begin with a dance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
“A NEW AND UNHEARD OF MANNER”: 
 
ELIZABETH OF SPALBEEK‟S PERFORMED NARRATIVE  
 
In the middle of the thirteenth-century, Abbot Phillip of Clairvaux wrote a Latin record of 
the activities of Elizabeth of Spalbeek, at the time a twenty-year-old woman who lived alongside 
a chapel built for her near the Cistercian Abbey of Herkenrode, to which Phillip was making 
pastoral visit.  Sometime after 1266, a Middle English translation of Phillip‟s account was 
completed and began to circulate among a relatively diverse readership in late medieval England. 
According to Phillip‟s account, Elizabeth was a stigmatic, and among other remarkable abilities,  
regularly acted out the events of the Passion, doing so largely through a day-long sequence 
coinciding with the set hours of the liturgical office.   
In the case of Elizabeth, a body performance is the primary means of narration, the means 
by which she “speaks” about spiritual experience, and an outward expression of Elizabeth‟s 
closeness to God.  Her performance likely had several functions, including being her own form 
of devotion and worship, and a means to encourage others in deeper devotion to God and 
contemplation of the Passion.  But it also presents a story about experience, an exercise and 
expression of forms of being in relationship with God.  Part of that relationship is the mystical 
union that makes ontological status, and the narrating I that attempts to represent it, ambiguous.  
This chapter concerns what Elizabeth‟s body could and did “say” in this context, focusing 
on the narrative that her performance presents.  Because her representation of being “in-
between,” being in the world and yet united to God, relies on the physical body, Elizabeth‟s 
performance is the most concrete demonstration of liminality in this study, and therefore a 
logical starting point.  It is not so much a narrative about moving from one state of being to 
77 
  
another, but about the blurring of the boundaries between them; it is not a narrative of progress 
and clarification, but circularity and ambiguity.  In using the physical body to adopt and overlap 
ontological and temporal states, Elizabeth‟s performance offers the most readily observable 
challenge to narrative linearity. 
It is also the clearest illustration of experience and text being united.  Elizabeth‟s daily 
actions, the proceedings of her everyday life, are inseparable from her narrative.  While for 
Marguerite and Julian also the process of composing a text is inextricably linked to the 
experience of mystical union it tries to represent, an engagement with God through the realm of 
language (as was the case in the examples of Augustine, Anselm, and scriptural passages I 
discussed in the previous chapter), out of all of these writers it is Elizabeth who most clearly 
lives her narrative.  What she does in her daily performance is her text, and she writes it with the 
use of the body in which she experiences the world, including both her experiences of materiality 
and her spiritual life.  In this way, she offers the most concrete starting point for analysis of a text 
that, “does not give testimony [but] is the testimony,” a text in which experience and expression 
are also one as form and content become one.
170
 
We know rather few biographical details of Elizabeth‟s life, but she has left behind a 
teasing trail of brief appearances.  Her name, age, and location come down to us in Phillip‟s 
account.  It has become standard for scholars to refer to her as a beguine.  This assumption is 
based in part on the manuscript circulation of her vita alongside those of Christina mirabilis and 
Marie d‟Oignies, the latter often considered the foundress of the beguine movement.  Elizabeth, 
like Christina and Marie, lived in the Continental Low Countries, the birthplace of the beguine 
movement, and her piety has much in common with beguine practices in that area, particularly in 
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its apparent independence from a traditional rule.  However, neither Phillip nor the Middle 
English translator ever refer to Elizabeth as a beguine, and as Jennifer Brown notes, Elizabeth‟s 
dwelling in a cell alongside a chapel actually suggests a lifestyle more akin to that of an 
anchoress than a beguine.
171
 Phillip mentions that Elizabeth was attended by her mother and 
sisters, but it is unclear whether this refers to her biological family or members of a religious 
community; a mention that neither her mother nor father would accept gifts suggests the former.  
Moreover, medieval usage of the term “beguine” was slippery: it could refer to a member of a 
bona fide beguine community or, quite often, any woman who pursued an independent form of  
devotion outside of a traditional order.
172
 Elizabeth certainly seems to have pursued a distinctive 
and independent form of devotion, although under the supervision, according to Phillip, of a 
nearby Benedictine abbot who also happened to be her cousin.  Her association with several 
religious orders is perhaps another sign that she was not a vowed member of any particular one.  
There is evidence that a local cult developed around Elizabeth and was active for several 
centuries.  A chapel still standing at Spalbeek (near Liège in modern day Belgium) appears to 
honor her and contains wall paintings that seemingly memorialize the girl‟s piety.173 Also 
suggestive of her local popularity is Phillip‟s comment that he first heard about Elizabeth by 
word of mouth while visiting the area.  She must have gained some notoriety as far as the French 
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Court and been known for prophetic gifts, as Phillip III tried to seek out her council regarding 
plots of court intrigue.
174
 Elizabeth was popular in some circles until at least the seventeenth-
century, and particularly among the Cistercians.
175
  
Analysis of Elizabeth‟s narrative must begin by recognizing the layers of inscription at 
work in the text that comes down to us.  First, there is Elizabeth‟s Passion enactment, a text of 
the body to be read visually by the original witnesses of her acts.  Second, there is Phillip‟s 
written account of her activities.  The written text chronicles the body‟s story, which in turn tells 
the Passion story of redemption (even warranting, we will see, near-scriptural status from 
Phillip) in the course of telling Elizabeth‟s own story.  And because I will be focusing largely on 
the Middle English text that sets Elizabeth before an English vernacular readership, there is 
another layer of production in the Middle English translator‟s reframing of Phillip‟s account.176 
These layers are in many ways inseparable.  We cannot access Elizabeth‟s performance is 
anything like a pure form.  But in the name of trying to reanimate and explore her complex and 
interesting narrative of liminality, I try to access her performance and possible motivations as 
best as possible.  And in fact, at many points the layers of intervention, which provide clues to 
how Elizabeth‟s performance was received, can help illuminate her narrative.   
 
Elizabeth’s Narrative: Performance as Text 
Elizabeth‟s performance begins with her rising at Matins to enact the initial events of 
Christ‟s Passion.  Yanking at her clothing, she drags herself from side to side, alternatively 
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bending forward and back, to represent Christ‟s violent arrest.  She extends her arm to make a 
fist, adopts a grim countenance, and then brandishes her fist and makes the motions of one who 
is “wrooϸ and angry.”177 She then proceeds to beat her cheeks, shoulders, and the back of her 
head with what is described as “wondrous” force that even causes her body to bend back at the 
strokes.  She then proceeds to strike her head against the ground, sometimes pulling herself by 
her hair to do so.  She continues to hit herself, and among other torments, gouges her eyes and 
cheeks.
178
 
With her performance continuing to coincide with the hours of the daily office, at Prime 
Elizabeth joins her arms and hands as though bound behind her back, and paces through the 
space of her chamber, “as a þeef were openly taken and his handes bounden ladde to the barre or 
to þe galous; representynge all the space of þat oure how oure lorde Jhesu was ladde fro Anne to 
Cayphas, to Pylate, fro Pylate to Herode, to Pilate aȝen efte.” Following a period of rest, she 
beats herself again.
 
 At Terce she represents Christ at the pillar, her arms extended and joined in 
a circle in front of her as though embracing the pillar.
179
  
Elizabeth then continues her cycle by enacting the crucifixion at Sext, None, and 
Vespers.  At these hours, she stretches herself as though on a cross and remains motionless in 
that position for up to several hours without aids to balance her.  Sometimes she alternates this 
with lying on the ground as though on a cross, and inflicting more violent strokes on her breast.  
While in her vertical position, she is able to incline forward and side to side, remaining still in 
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“þe schappe of the cros” and all without help, actions that Phillip identifies with Christ being 
taken down from the cross.
180
   
During Mass, Elizabeth enacts the crucifixion again. She hears mass from her bed, where 
she remains in an extremely weak physical state for almost the entire time that she is not 
enacting the Passion, and watches through a window in her chamber constructed to allow her a 
view of the chapel‟s altar.181 Immediately upon the elevation of the consecrated host, “anone as 
she seeþ þe eleuacyon of the sacramente, in þe selfe momente of the sighte þere-of,” Elizabeth 
mirrors the sacrifice she sees in the host by springing upright into the position of a cross, and 
remains as if suspended, “hengiþ in þe eyre withouten sterynge.”182 This is an especially 
miraculous act given that she can hardly lift herself at other times, and needs to be propped up 
with pillows in order to view the earlier part of the mass.  When she is going to receive the 
sacrament, her mother and sisters again prop her up in bed and she awaits with tears, “deuoute 
sighynges,” and “goostly greydlynes.” However, upon receiving the host in her mouth she 
freezes in position for a while, remaining elevated and with her mouth clamped closed, and then 
eventually relaxes and reflects a delighted and radiant countenance.
183 
 
During her main cycle, Elizabeth enacts the moment of Christ‟s death by bowing her 
head and moving it from side to side.  She further represents Christ not only in action but also in 
expression and physiological state by going “pale and bloodles.”184 At Compline she enacts the 
burial of Christ by hitting herself while holding her arms folded in front of her chest. 
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As Elizabeth performs, her body takes on the role of a scripture text, narrating the 
Passion story through dramatic action rather than written or spoken word.  So perfectly does 
Elizabeth exemplify Christ in the perspective of her audience that she even becomes a model and 
source of new insights about the nature of the Passion.  Describing how Elizabeth bleeds from 
her eyes and from under her fingernails in addition to bleeding from the more traditional five 
wounds, Phillip seems to view it as a new revelation and explains that all of this possibly 
happened to Christ: “happely felle in þe persone of oure lorde Jhesu for angwyshe & peynful 
bindynge of his armes and handes.”185  
Elizabeth becomes “Word,” then, on several levels as she represents Christ the “Word” 
and the words of scripture that relate Christian history.  In the original Latin vita, Phillip 
solidifies a parallel between Elizabeth‟s body and scripture by glossing several of her actions 
with appropriate verses.  These do not, however, all appear in the Middle English version and 
were presumably among the passages the translator chose to omit for his audience less familiar 
with the references that Phillip takes for granted.  An oft-cited passage that offers the most direct 
indication of Elizabeth functioning as a text occurs only in the Latin vita: 
In sextu etiam virili, videlicet in persona beati Francisci, dudum revelavit 
idipsum: ut sic uterque sextus non solem ex testimonio Scripturarum, sed ex vivis 
exemplaribus conditionis humanæ in cruce Christi inveniat quod honoret, 
veneretur, revereatur, imitetur, amet, et nihil excusationis prætendere possit homo, 
quantumcumque illitteratus aut simplex, quem intemeratæ Virginis partus 
redemit, ut dicat: “Non possum legere aut intelligere tam profunda mysteria, quia 
nescio litteram” vel “quia liber clausus est” cum non in membranis aut chartis, sed 
                                                 
185
 Ibid. 114. 
83 
  
in membris et corpore memoratæ nostræ puellæ, scilicet vivæ et apertæ Veronicæ, 
suæ salvationis vivam imaginem et redemptionis animatum historiam sicut 
litteratus ita valeat legere idiota.
186
  
  
In the male sex, namely in the person of blessed Francis, Christ has already 
revealed himself.  Thus now both sexes, not only by the testimony of the 
Scriptures, but by living examples of the human condition may find in the cross of 
Christ what they should honor, venerate, revere, imitate, love, and so that no man 
whom the Child of the Virgin redeemed, however illiterate and simple, may say “I 
cannot read or understand such profound mysteries because I am illiterate,” or 
“because the book is closed.” In this way the illiterate man can read not in 
parchments or documents, but in the members and body of our memorable girl, a 
living and manifest Veronica, a living image and animated history of his 
redemption as if he were literate. 
Phillip portrays Elizabeth as a visual text of the Passion for the sake of the unlettered.  Those 
who are unable to read the story of the crucifixion can see it manifested through her.  She 
functions like the “text” of devotional art for contemplation. And Phillip has remarkable 
confidence in the accuracy of the information: Elizabeth is a new Veronica, a “true icon.”  
Phillip also frames Elizabeth‟s performances, and particularly her self-inflicted, 
percussive strokes at Matins, as a psalm: they are her means of praise, but also an alternative 
scripture.  Referring to Elizabeth‟s self-inflicted percussive strokes at Matins, Phillip recalls that 
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“hir strokes may be herde acordaunte sowne and cleer. And so in þe steed of psalmes as in 
tymbyrs and wele sownynge cymbals she solempnyȝes þe watches of the firste nocturne.”187 Her 
body becomes both instrument and text of prayer.  Even more specific is the comment that, 
in the steed of salmes, þis newe tymbrer settiþ her flesche for an harpe, and hir 
chekys for a tymber, and ioy for a sawtry, and hir handys and fingers for a wrast – 
þat is an instrument of organsonge – and so with a newe maner of syngynge sche 
folowith forþ wakynges of þe secounde nocturne.
188
   
Each element of Elizabeth‟s performing body – flesh, hands, fingers – literally plays a part in this 
new song.   
At first, Elizabeth‟s narrative may seem like a straightforward, linear retelling of the 
Passion, from arrest to entombment, in its scriptural, chronological order.  Her crucifixion 
performance during Mass is an interlude that mirrors of the sacrifice of the Eucharist, but still 
has a natural placement in the order of the day‟s liturgical events and does not seem, from 
Phillip‟s description, to break the logical order.  However, neither her joy at receiving the 
Eucharist nor the burial enactment construct an “end” of her performance.  Like the daily office 
with which it is aligned, or indeed the liturgical year and other liturgical elements such as the 
rotation of readings, the performance is cyclical: it concludes only to begin again the following 
morning, circling back rather than reaching an end point.   
Even more, within the performance Elizabeth adopts several personas and transitions 
between them with striking seamlessness.  For much of the performance, she adopts two or more 
at once.  For instance, she is both arresting solider and Christ, simultaneously both tormentor and 
sacrificial victim during the self-inflicted beatings at Matins.  This is a wonder to Phillip, who 
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exclaims that “in a newe and vnherde of manere sche schewith in her-selfe booϸ ϸe persone of 
Criste suffrynge and ϸe persone of enmye turmentynge.”189 Here Elizabeth inhabits at least three 
personas at once if we include her status as “Elizabeth.” She adopts the personas of other 
witnesses to the Passion as well.  For instance, she represents “how oure blessyd lady, Crystes 
moder, stood be-syde þe crosse”; modeling iconography of Mary in the period, Elizabeth inclines 
her head and holds her right breast.  In another pose of lamentation, she “shewiþ in an oþere 
liknesse blessyd John Euangelist” by glancing upward while holding her hands clasped 
together.
190
   
At points Elizabeth even exceeds overlapping personas and events, and moves into the 
metaphysical by representing abstract concepts.  She becomes “the gladnes of ϸe resurrexione 
and fruyt of the passyone” through her expression, wherein we might read Elizabeth using her 
face to represent Christian joy or resurrection glory itself, becoming an embodiment of that 
abstract concept.
191
 Indeed, Phillip essentially takes this interpretative step when he writes that in 
her daily routine Elizabeth: 
Figures and expounes not allonly Cryste, but Cryste crucifyed, in hir body, and 
also þe figuratif body of Cryste, þat is holy chirche.  Loo in ϸe distinxione of 
oures she representys þe custome of holy chirche, ordeynid by god.
192
  
Elizabeth, then, is both Christ, a member of the Church, and the whole Church, as well as 
a body whose actions recapitulate Christian history, miracles, and associated sentiments.  She is 
liminal not only in the sense that she adopts multiple personas rather than one distinct figure in 
the Passion story, including the ontological circumstance of being simultaneously “Elizabeth the 
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young woman” and “Christ the God-man,” but in that she becomes non-human and intangible 
entities.  The record continues,  
  In woundes and peynes she affermiþ þe feith of þe passyone, in ioye and   
  myrþe after peyne gladness of þe resurrexyone, in rauishynge þe    
  ascencyone, in rodynes of hir reuelacyouns & spritual lyfe sche figurith þe  
  sendynge of þe holy goost…193     
Thus Elizabeth‟s ontological status starts to become something beyond humanity, beyond Christ, 
and maybe beyond divinity.  Her performance, it seems, can make her into anything.  The 
entities are seemingly endless and unbound: she figures the Eucharist, the sacrament of 
confession, desire for all men‟s salvation, and sorrow at unkindness and the damnation of 
mankind, embodying what we might consider to be the desires of God (an extension of the 
divine).
194
 
So Elizabeth‟s performance is a narrative text to be read.  And if we look closely at 
exactly what that text narrates, it is an experience of being radically in-between, transcending 
any one particular identification, position, or ontology.  It is a narrative of liminality.  
 
Elizabeth’s Liminality: Performing the In-Between 
The distinction between “showing” and “becoming” Christ clouds in the course of 
Elizabeth‟s narrative.  The nature of the performance makes it increasingly difficult to view even 
her physical body as solely that of the girl Elizabeth.  The ambiguity that haunts the performance 
brings her liminality to the forefront.  It is not clear that her audience considered Elizabeth to 
merge with Christ just in spirit or also in her body, a co-mingling in flesh, Christ becoming 
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present and visible in her as in the Eucharist.  Her ecstasies and her bleeding suggest both.  What 
is clear is that the line between “Elizabeth” and “Elizabeth as something other” (Elizabeth having 
merged with the divine) blurs continuously.  That it blurred in Phillip‟s perspective as well is 
evident in the difficulty he has articulating her states of being.    
Much of the confusion surrounds the issue of what happens to Elizabeth when she is 
taken up into ecstasy (“surgat rapitur”).195  There are several overlapping and sometimes 
contradictory indications.  Her supposed rapture occurs, first, at the beginning of each hour, with 
Elizabeth being “rauisched a good while, alle starke as an ymage of tree or stoon, wiþ-outen 
felynge or mouynge and brethe, as hit were a deed body.”196 Such moments evoke Augustine‟s 
commentary on ecstatics whose bodies go lifeless, “senseless though not yet really dead,” while 
the soul is swept into a direct encounter with God.
197
 We might presume that these are moments 
of mystical union.  Elizabeth reportedly claimed that she was carried off at times and that during 
some moments of “ravishment” she had contact with a young woman named Mary, a mystic 
living in another town whom Elizabeth had otherwise neither met in person nor heard about.
198
 
Phillip‟s word choice suggests Elizabeth being carried off, somehow taken away.199 But the 
representation of changing ontological states is much more complex than alternating between 
                                                 
195
 Vita Elizabeth, 364.3 
196
 “Life of S. Elizabeth,” 108. 
197
 Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, trans. John Hammond Taylor (New York: Newman, 1982), 223. 
(Book 12, Chap. 32). 
198
 “Life of S. Elizabeth,” 117.  Phillip asserts that he is familiar with the said Mary from his visitations in Flanders, 
and testifies that Elizabeth‟s knowledge of Mary and her great sufferings is accurate.  
199
 Brown further argues that Phillip‟s word choice is intentional and suggests that “pain and violation are encoded 
within Elizabeth‟s ecstasy.” See Brown, Three Women of Liège, 207.  In their study of Elizabeth through the lens of 
anthropology, Susan Rodgers and Joanna Ziegler point out that transportation to another place and/or into a distinct 
“traveling self” that separates from the body is a common element of trance in the rituals of many religions, and 
Elizabeth seems to fit this model well.  See Susan Rodgers and Joanna E. Ziegler, “Elisabeth of Spalbeek‟s Trance 
Dance of Faith: A Performance Theory Interpretation from Anthropological and Art Historical Perspectives,” 
Performance and Transformation: New Approaches to Late Medieval Spirituality, ed. Mary A. Suydam and Joanna 
E. Ziegler (New York: St Martin‟s, 1999), 313ff.   
88 
  
lifelessness and performance.  Although “ravishing” initiates Elizabeth‟s performance, it also 
recurs throughout it.   
During other periods of “ravishing,” far from lying lifeless, Elizabeth has the great 
strength to endure her self-inflicted torments and enact the Passion.  These moments are 
specifically contrasted with times in between rapture when she does not even have strength to 
move.  The account emphasizes that “whanne sche commith to hir-selfe or is lafte to hir-selfe, 
[she] wantys bodily strengthes.”200 It is as though her body is at points invaded, taken over by 
another force that allows for its miraculous actions (suspension, levitation, endurance, etc.) and 
miraculous signifying potential such as her stigmata, the ability to represent the glory of God, 
sorrow, etc. 
Third, some moments suggest that Elizabeth‟s soul is caught up into divine union while 
she is frozen in an immobile state – not quite lifeless, but not enacting the Passion.  Phillip here 
again seems to consider her to be somehow absent from the body, experiencing ecstasy in the 
pure sense of standing beside the self, having been thrown out of the self.  For instance, he 
describes Elizabeth as “ravished” when she grasps a diptych with the image of Christ crucified 
and freezes in place.  She holds it so fiercely that if someone tries to shake the tablet, she does 
not loosen her grip, but moves her entire body back and forth with the motion of the tablet.  
Phillip then discusses a return of her spirit:   
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Þen þe spirite, turnynge ageyne fro þe contrey of goostly ioyes, quykenes þe 
body, gladith the mynde, lightsomnes þe semblaunte and bishines hit with a 
gracious cleerte.
201
 
In this interpretation of the performance, Elizabeth‟s own spirit, though one renewed and 
delighted by divine encounter, returns and is present again when she appears glad and 
enlightened.   
Phillip reasons that her spirit returns from “the country of spiritual joys” and reenters and 
re-enlivens her body, suggesting that during the ravishment her spirit was elsewhere, presumably 
united to God.  She is said to have tasted momentarily the “unspekabil swetnesse.”202 The 
English lacks a line in the Latin that claims by concentration on the diptych Elizabeth is “raised 
to contemplation of truth,” an interpretation that suggests an ascent of the mind similar to the 
models of Augustine and Bonaventure I discussed in the previous chapter.
203
 Elizabeth‟s whole 
manner changes when she returns to herself, suggesting a new, altered presence in the body. 
Phillip himself may be grappling with how to best understand Elizabeth, perhaps 
struggling to fit her into categories of rapture and vision outlined in Augustine‟s Literal Meaning 
of Genesis, which addresses Paul‟s confusion as to whether he was “caught up” into the third 
heaven in body, soul, or both.
204
  The reader is left as confused as Phillip.  Ultimately there 
seems to be no static pattern as to when and why Elizabeth changes states.  What can be said is 
that, during these continuous transitions (whether through contemplative ascent or another 
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spiritual transportation), Elizabeth appears to experience some form of mystical union, possibly 
multiple forms and levels of identification with God. 
The descriptions of “returning” to the self, as though from another state or location of the 
spirit, echo throughout the text despite the lack of clarity as to exactly what returns and from 
where.  Elizabeth “turn[s] agayne to hir-selfe” just before some of the Passion enactments.   This 
is mentioned in the accounts of Matins and Prime, and also twice in the discussion of her actions 
during Mass.  Elizabeth is said to collapse from her suspended cross position and “turniþ ageyne 
to hir-selfe” once the priest removes his chasuble, and to “commith agayne to hir-selfe” when her 
body relaxes from its immobile position some time after she receives the Eucharist.
205
 The latter 
two examples seem to correlate Elizabeth‟s “return to herself” with a normal, baseline state of 
being as distinct from rapture, but it is still not clear exactly what she is when she is “not 
herself,” in a union with God that makes her “not herself.” 
Yet Elizabeth is also “not not herself,” to adopt Richard Schechner‟s terms for 
performance dynamics.
206
 That is, an identity as “Elizabeth” is never entirely obliterated even if 
it is occasionally transcended by her union.  Although at points in the performance she adopts 
other personas, there are (sometimes simultaneously) signs that she maintains self-awareness as 
Elizabeth for much of the time, and thus she alternates between being self and other.  This 
awareness is particularly evident in her reported confessions.  At these moments, distinct from 
her periods of rapture, she is self-aware enough to accuse herself of not loving and thanking 
Christ perfectly.  Her confession thus demonstrates a consciousness of her distinction from 
Christ, despite how she might seem to slip into identification with him for much of her daily 
ritual.  She appears not to consider herself completely dissolved into God, deified, or 
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indistinguishable from God.  She does not seem to think herself to be Christ, Mary, or John 
instead of Elizabeth, or at least not permanently and continuously. 
A conscious identity as Elizabeth, lover of Christ, is sometimes present even in the midst 
of her Passion performance.  She engages in affective devotion and also adopts an eroticized 
sponsa Christi role.  Lying on the ground while fiercely grasping the tablet with an image of the 
crucified Christ, she speaks to the image, exclaims “sweet Lord, sweet Lord,” and then proceeds 
to kiss the feet of the image.
207
 The description conveys the apparent depth of emotion and the 
potential eroticism of Elizabeth‟s actions with the image, palpable in the text and most likely in 
its original performance.  Among the kisses, “she makiþ fro hire priue herte rotys large, depe, 
iocunde & lufsum sighes wiþ a clere stirynge of breste and þroot and with a swete sounynge 
whysperynge of her lippes.”208 Here she is distinctly not enacting Christ: there is a clear distance 
as Elizabeth relates to the image, something external to herself.  The distinction recalls the 
distance she maintains between herself and the Eucharistic host at Mass regardless of how she 
springs to mirror it by assuming the bodily position of the crucified Christ.  However she may 
impersonate Christ, her worship of and sexualized attachment to the diptych draws a dividing 
line between prayerful subject (the girl who shows devotion by caressing the image) and the 
worshipped Christ who is represented by that image.  
Still, the states overlap.  Moments of ravishment, of being swept up to the country of 
spiritual joys, alternate and sometimes coincide with moments of Elizabeth enacting the role of 
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lover, as well as with her moments of enacting Christ‟s arrest, torture, and crucifixion, during 
which she figures Christ, various saints, and the Church itself.  Even during her actions with the 
diptych, she freezes in place just as she does before the scenes of the Passion, and again has 
miraculous strength.  Her miraculous grip on the diptych suggests she is again “outside” her 
baseline self, or inhabited by some spiritual power, and this comes just after the moment in 
which she was so clearly “Elizabeth” as she kisses the image.  It is difficult to determine, 
especially without Elizabeth‟s direct testimony, exactly when she may slip into a lack of 
awareness of her distinction from God.  But this much is clear: her narrative represents an 
unstable ontological status, one that shifts between standing apart from God and experiencing a 
closer union, and sometimes encompasses both at once.  The one place we can situate her is on 
the borderline. 
Herein lies perhaps the greatest paradox of Elizabeth‟s performance: when she is at her 
most physical and concrete, reaching even beyond her own body and incorporating elements of 
the material environment such as the diptych, she most transcends the body and its limits.  
Theater scholarship has long noted that props used in performance are not only semiotic in 
function, but ground the performing body in the materiality of a scene.  As Stanton Garner 
explains, “props extend the body‟s spatializing capacities and its projective operations…by 
extending and physicalizing the body‟s operation on its material environment, props situate the 
body more firmly within it.”209 Yet it is while both adoring the image of the crucified and 
enacting crucifixion herself that Elizabeth‟s one body seems to most exceed physical limits by 
signifying two distinct entities at once.   
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To sum up the complexity of Elizabeth‟s apparent ontological status: cyclical and fluid 
movement between positions, a sort of layering of identifications, is central to her performance.  
Vacillation between the stances of Christ and Christian is also continual:  as the account notes, 
“O while sche representiþ wiþ signes and berynges of hir lymmes oure lordes passyone, and 
oþere while she schewith in weymentacyouns & turmentȝ hir owne compassyone boþ of herte 
and of body.”210 This phenomenon also manifests in her alternate positioning as Mary and John 
in the midst of her crucifixion performance, and perhaps even more poignantly when “in a newe 
and vnhearde of manere” she simultaneously embodies both Christ and his tormentors during the 
arrest and pillar reenactments.
211
  Her Passion cycle as a whole notably necessitates a fluid 
movement in and out of status as male, female, human, and divine.  Further, Elizabeth‟s 
transitions are never complete, but begin anew, cyclically at the start of each day and at each 
holy hour.  And finally, her spirit participates, according to Phillip, in a cyclical movement in 
and out of the body that enacts all this.  Put another way, from a narratological rather than a 
phenomenological perspective, these shifts and multiplicity are the shape or discourse of her 
narrative. 
The best way to describe this situation is to say that Elizabeth is, on several planes, 
liminal – existing in-between states, categories, personas, locations – and all of these forms of 
liminality fall under one essential type, which is the liminality of being united to and apart from 
God.  This is the story of her narrative: the tale of Elizabeth expressing what she is in mortal life, 
a mortal reaching toward, and occasionally experiencing a glimpse of, the union that can only be 
attained in death.   
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Working from the dual perspectives of anthropology and art history, Susan Rodgers and 
Joanna Ziegler have compared Elizabeth‟s “trance” moments – their term for her moments of 
rapture – to the in-between states of non-personhood that frequently feature in rituals of tribal 
cultures, applying to her Turner‟s theory of the liminal.  As I have, they observe that at points in 
her performance Elizabeth is neither one thing nor another, a situation comparable to what 
occurs in many rites of passage of pre-industrial societies.  Rodgers and Ziegler are right to see 
in Elizabeth a “chaotic personhood,” one consonant with a “selfhood...in transition toward its 
climatic union with her vision of Christ.”212 
But there are important differences from Turner‟s model.  One is that Elizabeth is 
offering a narrative.  Second, in the narrative that she presents, Elizabeth never permanently 
crosses over to become that “something else,” to permanent union, and seems to have no 
expectation of doing so.  Elizabeth is in fact caught in a perpetual in-between as 
Christ/Elizabeth, Soldier/Elizabeth, Mary/Elizabeth, and even between locations of the spirit – 
present in her body that stands before the audience, in spiritual conversation with Mary of Lille, 
and in the “country of joys.” Thus Elizabeth‟s narrative expresses a paradoxical stasis of 
“transition” or “becoming” in one mortal, physical body we might consider invariable.  Phillip 
clearly reads her body as an extraordinary object.  His labeling of her simultaneous embodiment 
of multiple individuals as “new and unheard of” implies his surprise. In the discussion of the 
multitude of concepts (Christ, Christ crucified, the body of Christ that is the Church, etc.) that 
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Elizabeth can represent at once, we find the exclamation that her “lyfe is alle mirakil, ȝe moor-
ouer alle hir-selfe is but myrakil.”213  
We can view her as a liminal speaker, a destabilized narrator, for it is from the threshold 
between earthly experience and the union with God that lies beyond that she “narrates” through 
her performance.  In fact, we lose a clear experiencing and narrating I as she moves through her 
cycle and becomes a range of people and things.  Here in the encounter with the divine, which 
for Elizabeth means various forms of merging with God through the body and by the spirit‟s 
rapture, “the I explodes.” 214  
 
Precedent and Experiment 
 The innovation of Elizabeth‟s narrative becomes clearer in comparison to medieval 
precedents for her actions.  Locating where and how Elizabeth departs from and adapts 
devotional and hagiographical models can move us closer to understanding the purpose, as well 
as uniqueness, of her narrative structure.
215
  Elizabeth‟s use of the body as a means to identify 
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with Christ‟s suffering is in line with traditions of imitatio Christi and affective piety that were a 
part of her devotional milieu.  Her abilities in enacting the Passion are undoubtedly exceptional, 
even a “miracle” in Phillip‟s view, but there are precedents for the type of exercise she pursues.  
She lived during the rise of forms of devotion focused on Christ‟s humanity, forms particularly 
popular in England in the early fifteenth-century, the time of the Douce‟s manuscript‟s 
production, and that would have been recognizable (if extreme) to English readers of her Life.   
The early centuries of the Church through the late antique period had emphasized 
imitation of Christ‟s divinity as the model of sanctity, proposing a goal of deification “in the 
sense of the recovery within man of the image of God and assimilation with God after death.”216 
Such ideas persisted into the twelfth-century, and in discussing his “deifying vision” (deifica 
visio) in On Loving God, Bernard of Clairvaux (founder of Phillip‟s own order and monastery) 
asserts that “What is made will at some time conform itself and be united with the maker.”217  
But also in the twelfth-century, and even in the writings of Bernard, a change began to 
place in the type of imitation of Christ encouraged by the Church.  There is a well-documented 
shift in the twelfth-century toward identification with Christ‟s humanity and personal 
participation in the events of his earthly life, particularly the Passion.  This is particularly visible 
in the spirituality of the Francisans, whose order was developing during this period and began to 
spread its characteristic piety through the preaching of its traveling friars.  In their special 
devotion to the person of the incarnate Christ, whose poverty and humility Francis emulated in 
his own life and modeled for the order, the Franciscans saw themselves identifying with Christ.  
They advocated meditation on Christ‟s life and especially the Passion, including imagined 
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engagement in particular scenes and moments such as the Nativity.
218
  Sometimes this meant 
adopting the role of a bystander and sometimes adopting the role of Christ himself.  In his On the 
Perfection of Life, for instance, the Franciscan Bonaventure instructs nuns under his direction to 
contemplate the Passion “incessantly”; he advises that, aligning themselves with Christ‟s 
suffering, they ought to “wish for no consolation other than to be able to die with Christ on the 
cross.”219 Francis, to whom Phillip compares Elizabeth, was the first well-known figure to 
manifest stigmata of supernatural origin, a visible identification with Christ‟s suffering.  During 
the twelfth-century, the terms “stigma/stigmata” would shift from referring to a mark of 
servitude to an explicit association with suffering, and by the mid-thirteenth century the term 
“stigmata” usually referred specifically to Christ‟s wounds.220 Another of the clearest 
manifestations of this shift in the ideology and practice of devotion are changing representations 
of the crucifixion, which gradually place more emphasis on Christ‟s suffering instead of 
depicting him as “victorious king.”221  
Numerous women mystics on the Continent engaged in extreme acts of devotion to honor 
or identify with Christ‟s humanity and suffering.  Among the most striking of Elizabeth‟s 
predecessors and thirteenth-century contemporaries are Angela of Foligno, Beatrice of Nazareth, 
and Dorothy of Mantau, whose canonization proceedings defended her self-mortification by 
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claiming it is a higher ideal to imitate Jesus‟ suffering than his actions.222 The other women 
profiled in the Middle English Douce 114 manuscript, Christina Mirabilis, Marie d‟Oignies, and 
Catherine of Siena are additional examples of this type of piety.
223
 Marie imposed the stigmata 
on herself.  One anonymous early fifteenth-century French work of devotional instruction 
advises its laywoman reader to rise at midnight to pray, weep, prostrate before God, and notably, 
“stretch [her] body out on the ground or standing, as on a cross, in great compassion.”224 This 
analogue to Elizabeth‟s self-crucifixion, though here in a context of private devotion and without 
Elizabeth‟s miraculous abilities, demonstrates that comparable devotional acts were part of the 
sphere of popular piety.  Such imitative gestures were often intended to create a link through 
physicality, a link between the suffering of one‟s own body and that of Christ.  
Paramystical experiences involving the body – e.g., states of trance, levitation, seizures, 
elongation, rigidity, ability to subsist on the Eucharist, spontaneous lactation, and mystical 
pregnancy – are also common occurrences in medieval hagiography.  Indeed, Elizabeth‟s case 
appears precisely during a great rise in such phenomena in Continental vitae.  Examples include 
Marie d‟Oignies‟ unstoppable tears, and later in England, Margery Kempe‟s reportedly 
uncontrollable (and suspiciously similar) bouts of weeping.  Some paramystical phenomena 
associated uniquely with the female body, such as miraculous lactation, were first reported in 
Elizabeth‟s devotional milieu of the Low Countries in the first part of the thirteenth-century.225 
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One way to read these acts is as a means of access, even communication, with the divine.  Like 
imitation of Christ in affective devotion, they are in Caroline Walker Bynum‟s terms examples 
of “behavior in which bodiliness provides access to the sacred.”226 However, in these cases the 
body is not only a means to experience Christ‟s suffering, but to be overtaken by a foreign 
presence.  The abilities of Elizabeth‟s body, for instance, are not those of the normal body, but a 
body possessed.  She becomes, in part, Other. 
 Although some paramystical phenomena draw on the unique capacities of female bodies, 
women‟s acts of imitatio Christi generally require (as does Elizabeth‟s) a crossing of gender 
boundaries as the women attempt to identify with the suffering body of Jesus.  In so doing they 
indicate a surprisingly fluid understanding of gender when it comes to figuring or communing 
with Christ in this particular context of affective devotion.  And here we find some precedent not 
only for Elizabeth‟s basic acts of imitatio, but also her smooth movement between categories as 
she embodies both herself and Christ‟s male body, sometimes at once.  Phillip is strikingly 
delighted to draw the reader‟s attention to the fact that, in Elizabeth, Christ has now made 
himself visible in a woman‟s body: her depiction is a valid “Veronica,” a true icon of Christ.  
Bynum‟s studies of the medieval treatment of “Christ‟s flesh as female,” particularly in its 
“salvific functions,” can perhaps contextualize Phillip‟s matter-of-fact acceptance of Elizabeth‟s 
stigmata and Christ-like body.
227
  Proposing one explanation for such surprising fluidity 
compared to medieval society‟s strict division between the sexes, Bynum argues that, 
Women could fuse with Christ‟s body because they were in some sense body, yet 
women never forgot the maleness of Christ.  Indeed, exactly because maleness 
was humanly superior, the God who especially redeemed and loved the lowly 
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stooped to marry female flesh.  Hildegard of Bingen saw ecclesia as both Christ‟s 
bride and Christ‟s body.  Julian of Norwich…never ceased to refer to “Christ our 
mother” with the male pronoun…But women mystics often simply became the 
flesh of Christ, because their flesh could do what his could do: bleed, feed, die, 
and give life to others.
228
 
The dynamics are visible in iconography as well, for instance in images that align Christ‟s 
bleeding side with Mary‟s nourishing breast.  Such metaphors may not necessarily reflect social 
practices, but are evidence that “medieval thinkers used gender imagery fluidly, not literally.”229 
 Many hagiographers describe holy men as nurturing mothers and holy women as “virile,” 
considering women to be man-like if they are able to control their sexual impulses and maintain 
a state of virginity.
230
  
 Elizabeth‟s performance reveals many similarities with these contemporary practices, but  
it is difficult to align it precisely with the goals in the above analogues and precedents.  Portions 
of her narrative detail the brutality of the crucifixion and seem to suggest an attempt at union 
through shared suffering.  Indeed, her stigmata is the most literal of identifications with Christ‟s 
suffering body.  At the same time, however, her serene suspension before the Eucharist and the 
reflection of resurrection joy on her face reference the crucifixion but do not emphasize 
suffering.  They suggest, instead, union with Christ‟s divinity and glory.  Elements such as her 
transportation and her spiritual conversations with Mary of Lille are not characterized by 
affectivity at all.  Her enactment of scenes from the Passion and placing herself in the positions 
of Mary, John, and others also evokes the tradition of meditative engagement in the scenes of 
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Christ‟s life characterized by texts such as the Meditationes vitae Christi; but Elizabeth exceeds 
this model as well by taking on multiple positions at once. 
What emerges again as the fundamental and most visible element of Elizabeth‟s 
performance is fluidity – a life lived in a transitional and ontologically ambiguous state, or at a 
liminal point – to be all of the above, “both/and” rather than “either/or” at any given moment, 
and an attempt to represent that situation.  Standing out in this way, her performance raises 
semiotic and narrative issues: How can a performance that relies so much on the body appear to 
transcend the limits of one body?  How is it that a body performance so tied to materiality, to the 
physical body of one specific individual in time and space, counterintuitively narrates the story 
of being liminal? 
The remaining sections of this chapter try to reconcile this by examining the narrative 
potential of the body and the relationship between body performance as discourse and the story 
of liminality.  I approach this from three related angles: the paradoxical disembodiedness of 
Elizabeth‟s performance, her ability to represent transition and process, and ultimately 
Elizabeth‟s gesture toward the intangible and her narrative‟s transcendence of time. 
 
Transcending the Body 
Like her female mystic contemporaries, Elizabeth reappropriates  (arguably redeems) her 
potentially risky, female, and abject body.  The barely averted risk of her sexuality, Elizabeth‟s 
place on the verge, is written into the vita by Phillip‟s almost constant emphasis on her chastity.  
He stresses that despite all her vigorous movement there is “no ϸinge vnsemely nor no ϸinge ϸat 
may displese mannes syghte.”231 She redirects sexual desire to the diptych; her body is made 
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available to embody Christ in her stigmata and in her Passion performance.
 
 In this way, we 
could say that Elizabeth uses the potentially abject, the potential for sin that according to 
Kristeva‟s formulation “disturbs identity,” in a way that draws her closer to the divine. 232  From 
this perspective, Elizabeth‟s actions begin to reflect what Lochrie has observed of women 
mystics who achieve transcendence when the “excess of drives - those heaving powers of the 
flesh – topples over into the love of God.”233 
But to leave the explanation of Elizabeth‟s body performance here, with an analysis of 
reappropriating the distinctly female body (which is where studies of women‟s mysticism tend to 
leave such analyses), to see Elizabeth‟s performance as another instance in which the woman 
mystic‟s body can become, in Bynum‟s words, “not so much a hindrance to the soul‟s ascent as 
an opportunity for it,” seems too simple, perhaps even too easy, for the ontological messiness of 
Elizabeth‟s performance.  Elizabeth most recalls Kristeva‟s formulation of the abject when she 
takes on characteristics of “the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite,” and in her case this 
involves the seeming invasion of her body by the presence of Christ and the other entities she 
figures, the adoptions that make her liminal.
234
   
Elizabeth relies on the body to signify all of this, to represent liminality.  But through her 
body she presents a surprisingly disembodied narrative.  At the same time that she uses the body 
for representation, Elizabeth actually creates a narrative about moving beyond it through the very 
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 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: Columbia UP, 1982), 
4.   
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 See “Language of Transgression,” 128-129.  Tracing these dynamics in Angela of Foligno, and in an analysis 
influenced by Kristeva‟s theory of abjection, Lochrie suggests that for Angela the “taboo” of the open and accessible 
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Visconsi, “She Represents the Person of Our Lord: The Performance of Mysticism in the Vita of Elisabeth of 
Spalbeek and The Book of Margery Kempe,” Comitatus 28.1 (1997): 76-89. Drawing on Lochrie and Bynum‟s 
work, Visconsi observes a distinctive feminine imitatio Christi in Elizabeth, one related to the “disorderliness of the 
female flesh” (79) and its openness. 
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act of adopting a range of positions and states of being.  She appears to transcend, if not her 
physical body itself, at least many of its limits of signification.  Elizabeth‟s transcendence of any 
one identification or figure or abstract concept, her embodiment of all of them in the course of 
the cyclical narrative (and sometimes at the same time), is an exceeding of the body and a 
breaking down of its limits.   
This is perhaps an instance in which we should heed Amy Hollywood‟s warning that the 
frequent scholarly claim of a medieval “ideal of sanctity as grounded in bodily experience, 
asceticism, and their mystical correlates” may not reflect women‟s actual experience or 
perspective.
235
 In some ways, the structure of Elizabeth narrative makes the most sense if she 
was less, rather than more, conscious of the specific boundaries of her body, however 
counterintuitive this may at first seem.  A lack of self-consciousness of her own body may be 
what allows the fluidity of her narrative, the embodiment of other “bodies.”  Phenomenology 
reminds us that while “embodiedness” constitutes and ensures the borders of the human being, it 
need not always be present to consciousness.
236
  
Elizabeth‟s performance itself may have been a means to break away from the body, an 
attempt to alter consciousness not just through affective piety or asceticism, but by inducing 
psychological effects through movement.  Scholars of dance and kinesthetics have long 
recognized body movements as a means of moving to another “plane.” They have observed the 
use of the body as a means of spiritual or psychological transportation, a use of the body in 
essence to break free from the body.  In their comparison of Elizabeth to trance dancers in other 
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 Amy Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame P, 1995), 30. 
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 Of particular relevance here is Drew Leder, The Absent Body (Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1990), which 
explores diverse ways in which the body and its functions stand outside conscious awareness, for instance while 
concentration is elsewhere or while the body‟s organs are functioning in a healthy way.  Also see Hollywood, Virgin 
Wife, esp. 13-14, which challenges Leder‟s claims with regard to the female body, but nonetheless argues that 
mystical writers, including women, were perhaps far less conscious of the body in their means of devotion than 
modern scholarship usually recognizes.  
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traditions, Rodgers and Ziegler make such a claim.  They suggest that her percussive blows, for 
instance, may have been a rhythmic means of altering psychological state.
237
 They also fruitfully 
compare Elizabeth‟s dynamic to what Sally Ann Ness observes in her anthropological work on 
traditional Phillippine dances to suggest yet another way in which Elizabeth‟s dance may have 
altered her consciousness: 
[K]inesthetic movement within the dance acts as a sort of memory bridge between 
the individual dancer‟s own self and larger realms of symbolic meaning out in the 
culture as a whole….[after practice] “bodily memory” took over and allowed 
[Ness] to feel the aesthetic of the dance in question, for essentially the first time.  
Elizabeth too may well have reached a state of her dance experience where the 
sheer physicality of her Holy Hours movements may have begun to drive her 
overall apprehension of what was happening in her traces.
238
 
The description will sound familiar to many dancers, and raises the possibility that what Rodgers 
and Ziegler call Elizabeth‟s Passion “trance dance,” and what I would refer to as her “narrative” 
– the story of a relationship with God – could foster a connection with the divine.  It is a path to 
being other things, for to dance in this way is to dance without attention to the specifics of 
movement and therefore the specifics of one set body in time.  I would go even a step further, 
however.  As Elizabeth‟s performance potentially lifted her to another state of consciousness, it 
could have opened new narrative possibilities of the body by releasing her from ties to one 
human body.  Thus the narrative not only represents but furthers and perpetuates her liminal 
condition – the process of storytelling inspires and perpetuates its own story.  
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Representing Transition 
 We have made a start now in thinking differently about Elizabeth‟s body performance, 
moving beyond imitatio Christi.  To explore another way in which Elizabeth‟s performance 
narrates liminality, I want to approach her text from a radically different angle: through a brief 
comparison with the modern body performance artist Orlan.  Comparison with an artist whose 
commentary we can access can help clarify dynamics of Elizabeth‟s narrative first by making 
them more concrete for analysis.  Second, and more importantly, such an exercise forces 
thinking further beyond the hermeneutics articulated by previous scholarship, namely precedents 
of the body‟s role in medieval devotion, affective piety, and as a sign of sanctity in hagiography 
(as I have already enumerated).  Having set Elizabeth against her contemporaries, setting her 
against a modern performer further illuminates the innovation of her medieval narrative. 
Despite some radical differences from Elizabeth, Orlan‟s oeuvre reveals body 
performances that paradoxically challenge materiality.  In the early years of her career, Orlan 
gained notoriety for her impersonations of holy women from the Christian tradition and the 
adoption of the persona “Saint Orlan,” and more recently for her “Reincarnation ” project of 
performative surgery.  Like Elizabeth‟s, Orlan‟s past performances have relied on the body as 
narrative medium, represented pain and trauma through it, contorted the body into new 
personifications (enacting figures of Catholic history and shifting between characters), and taken 
place in the traditionally patriarchal spaces of former abbeys and churches.
239
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 With regard to spaces, I refer specifically here to Orlan‟s “Measuring” performances in which she dragged her 
body along the floors of chosen locales.  This has been interpreted as a critique of the practice of using the male 
body as a standard for measurement in anthropometrics.  See Kate Ince, Orlan: Millennial Female (Oxford: Berg, 
2000), esp. 35-37.  Ince‟s book offers an intriguing reading of the psychanalytic and textual elements of Orlan‟s 
work, which I do not have time and space to explore here in relation to Elizabeth, my primary subject.  The 
comparison with Orlan in this study, and comparison with other modern performers, warrants additional future 
attention. 
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 There are certainly differences between the two women and the contexts of their 
performances.  In addition to their historical distance, they have obviously different relationships 
to the Church and the models of sanctity it raises for imitation.  Orlan‟s critique of feminine 
sanctity as constructed by the Church and its devotional practices is overt and seemingly a main 
goal of her early performances.
 240
 While Elizabeth narrates from the margins of the patriarchal 
Church, challenging those structures does not appear to have been her goal.
241
 
 Yet both present the body as a text to be “read” and interpreted.  Discussing her 
performances and their purpose, Orlan asserts that “Carnal Art transforms the body into  
language and reverses the Christian principle of the word made flesh into flesh made word.”242 
Thus the performances might be considered her “writing,” the equivalent of a language, and 
notably a narrative that is not merely self-expression (which is an element of any art form), and 
not merely an iconic representation for the devotional exercise of others (as we may say of most 
religious art, both medieval and modern).  Rather, she raises the body‟s language to the level of a 
divine act, an alternative incarnation, not unlike Phillip‟s scriptural interpretation of Elizabeth. 
Orlan‟s “Reincarnation” project, begun in the 1990s, consisted of cosmetic surgeries to 
alter her face and body into a composite of identifiable women of Western culture (e.g., Da 
Vinci‟s Mona Lisa, Botticelli‟s Venus, and several others).  These surgeries took place before a 
live audience, and made public the alteration of the body.  As in Elizabeth‟s performance, 
onlookers watch, voyeuristically, a continual transition.  Indeed, the alterations themselves are 
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 This is particularly true of Orlan‟s depiction of Mary and other saints and her radical deconstructions of the 
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the narrative.  Orlan has claimed that she was not interested in the final results of her 
“Reincarnation,” but rather in the process of transformation and the “modified body as a site of 
public debate.”243 Her goal was never “a sequence of fixed identities, but a material exploration 
of the transitional space between them.”244 Among other projects, in the 1990s and early twenty-
first century, Orlan has produced a series of digital “self-hybridization” projects which merge 
images of her face with images of faces from various artworks, cultures, and periods.
245
 
In the case of Orlan‟s work, the form of her narrative is itself “story.”  And it is a story of 
transition, of becoming.  Significantly, this is not “becoming” with an end point in mind.  It is 
not simply a path to permanent transformation.  Rather, it is a perpetual “in-between,” and her 
performances are characterized by the liminality that they allow her to achieve.  While Orlan‟s 
surgical projects did cause a permanent physical alteration, they lacked a definite end point.  
Further, no operation could provide a finale or conclusion by full “Reincarnation” into all 
idealized female models, and most certainly not into any single figure; “open-endedness,” as 
Kate Ince argues, is an essential element of the project, not a side effect.
246
 This is her story, and 
the shape-shifting discourse of the body is the means to tell it. 
For both Elizabeth and Orlan, ontological status is at stake: what constitutes “Orlan” is 
under continuous change; Elizabeth is frequently “outside” herself and becoming other.  Through 
a “Reincarnation” performance or the “hybridizations,” the audience watches a story of gaps, of 
transitional space, not a final product.  The performance emerges as a way to be “in-between,” 
but also expresses what it is to be beyond what any one figure, name, or word can contain, and 
shows the audience a portrait of liminality.   
                                                 
243
 Orlan quoted in Ince, Millenial Female, 46. 
244
 Ince, Millenial Female, 46. 
245
 Examples of the “hybridizations” and some previous projects can be viewed on the “Photo” page of Orlan‟s 
official website, www.orlan.net/works/photo, Accessed July 2011. 
246
 Ince, Millenial Female, 110-111. 
108 
  
And it is the series of figures and positions that creates meaning, something that Orlan‟s 
attempt at a new amalgamate and shifting self brings to light.  The transitions depicted in the 
performance only have meaning as part of a larger narrative, as part of a continuous process of 
becoming multiple entities.  In an even more constructed way in Elizabeth‟s narrative, the body 
may not limit what she can be a “true icon” of, yet the various positions Elizabeth adopts are 
only recognizable as part of the larger cycle: her position as Mary, for instance, is only 
recognizable as a part of the crucifixion scene she enacts, and her moments of “ravishment” gain 
significance from alternating with her “return to herself.”   
There is another distinction: even as both women exceed Turner‟s model of the liminal 
by not transitioning to an end point or new, fixed status, Orlan seems to relish the in-between. 
Elizabeth‟s desire to move beyond it is evident particularly in her longing for the Eucharist and 
in her embrace of the diptych.  Her liminality is one of a yearning soul.  For all her moments of 
ravishment, all her signs, and even imaging resurrection joy, Elizabeth must “return to herself.” 
And the “Elizabeth” to which she returns is a liminal self – one that never remains permanently 
as any of the figures (including “Elizabeth”) that she enacts, and that waits to be caught up in 
rapture again a few hours later.  One way to think of this is as the tragic element of her narrative, 
an expression of longing and incompleteness built right into the structure of her text. 
Elizabeth‟s Christian context and the view of the self it puts forth also take the transitions 
to a different realm of significance and signification.  All the boundaries that are crossed in 
Elizabeth‟s performance – between sexes, between human and divine, between states of being 
generally – are only reflections of the most poignant crossing of all: dissolution into God.  The 
shifting body that visibly transitions between states, positions, and allegorical representations 
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gives a concrete shape to this, but the body is being used to reflect a soul ultimately capable of 
dissolving back into God.   
 
Transcending Time 
 By embodying multiple figures and states of being, cyclically and at once, Elizabeth also 
overturns the standard linear structure of narrative and claims a stance outside of time.  Unbound 
by the limitations of chronology, the performance figures divine transcendence of time.  And in 
doing so it both relies upon and exceeds some of the ways in which her culture looked at time 
and narrative.   
On the one hand, it may appear that Elizabeth‟s narrative is closely tied to temporality.  
Her standardized series of enactments coincides almost entirely with liturgical celebrations and 
the hours of the daily office.  Phillip seems to think about the performance in these terms, given 
that he structures his own narrative chronologically and divides it by the hours.  While his visit to 
the area and Elizabeth seems have been significantly longer, he takes pains to present his account 
as Elizabeth‟s story throughout a typical day.247 The daily performance also forms a complete 
circle in narrating the chronological story of the Passion from arrest to entombment, and it 
generally aligns with the traditional associations between specific hours and events of the 
Passion.
248
  
While all of this seems to situate Elizabeth‟s performance in time, what it ties her to is 
liturgical time, which itself is designed to reflect not only the spiritual and intangible breaking 
into the visual and tangible, but also and inextricably united with this, the eternal breaking into 
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perceived time.  Her narrative takes place in sacramental time, in which the intersection with the 
eternal is figured through physical signs of invisible grace: initiation into an unseen and eternal 
community of Christians through the water and oil of Baptism, or the entry of the eternal God 
into the Eucharistic host.  Both the daily office and Elizabeth‟s performance that coincides with 
it do not merely delineate human time: like the liturgy, they both reflect the atemporality of the 
divine by affirming the continued relevance of Christ‟s redemptive act on human life in the 
present time.  While Brown suggests that Phillip attempts to place Elizabeth in “sacred time,” 
even more complex is how Elizabeth‟s own daily performed narrative seems consciously crafted 
to transcend time.
249
   
As Elizabeth creates a narrative of divine time, she gestures toward a theology of 
atemporality and a view of human time itself being an illusion.  She evokes the perspective of a 
God who is changeless and sees at once everything that appears to humanity as events in time: 
the God of Christian theology who is himself eternal and whose view encompasses all of 
history.
250
  It is a view of time that, as Evelyn Birge Vitz outlines, informs even the linear, 
fictional medieval tales that progress from a problem to a resolution.  She has shown that the 
structure of the récit usually contrasts a human perspective on change with the perspective of 
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God who sees the whole at once.
251
 The adoption of a divine perspective on time is another way 
in which Elizabeth‟s performance represents union with God, for her performance evokes his 
experience of time, and interestingly draws her audience into it. 
Elizabeth‟s representation of atemporality is not an anomaly.  In fact, in this way her text 
seems to be in relationship with several artistic representations of time in the Middle Ages, 
expressions that, like her own performance, also challenge linearity.  Drama is one striking 
analogue.  Through its simultaneous presentation of multiple layers of time and space, medieval 
drama takes advantage of this quality of live theater, as Max Harris has analyzed.
252
  He 
highlights the process, for instance, in the twelfth-century Fleury play of the Slaughter of the 
Innocents: in this play the opening scene is a parade of the “sanctified ones,” a procession of the 
slaughtered children already in their glorified state.  The scene is one of multi-layered “temporal 
mimesis.”253 The play suspends the chronological order that separates the children‟s deaths from 
their later salvation, and the scene also figures mortal and eternal worlds at once.  When the 
figure of “Rachel” enters the scene, she symbolizes at least six historical moments at once: the 
crying of Jewish mothers in anguish for the slaughtered children, earlier Jewish mothers 
lamenting the deportation to Babylon, the biblical figure of Rachel, the sorrowful Mary as she 
flees to Egypt, Mary at the cross, and tribulations of the persecuted church in general.
254
  
Like Elizabeth‟s performance, dramatic representations use the body to create an image 
of timelessness.
255
 However, Elizabeth‟s performance is strikingly unique as a narrative of 
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personal experience, her own love of and union with God, attempting to reflect timelessness.  
She achieves this not only by telling the Passion story, but by melding it with her own story of 
relationship. 
*** 
Part of Elizabeth‟s project, part of her becoming “Word,” may have been to represent 
Christ and the Passion story for others.  As Ellen Ross puts it, the “christomorphized” Elizabeth  
affirms “the ongoing invitation  to respond to the love of Jesus‟ Passion,” and also models that 
response, demonstrating “possibilities of human intimacy with the Divine.”256 But she narrates, 
most interestingly, the radical disruptions to selfhood and ontology that can result when one fully 
responds to that invitation: she models abandonment (by choice or force) of a stable and distinct 
identity in favor of being on the threshold.
257
  And she sacrifices a stable narrating identity. 
As compensation, however, there is unique power in her narrative as well. “Written” 
through the body‟s performance, it actually overflows the limits of the body and time.  In the 
process of figuring her own status, united yet still standing apart from God, she also figures the 
eternal nature of the divine.  In so doing she reaches beyond the tangible and into the intangible.  
By bridging both worlds, that of the finite, physical body and the infinite, she models liminality 
in its essence.  As in Lyotard‟s analysis of Augustine, “time,” along with the narrating I, 
“explodes.”258 
It has been my goal in this chapter to use Elizabeth‟s performance as an initial example of 
what it means to narrate liminality, and as a way to analyze the power of narrative form to 
express a sense of being in-between.  The Mirror of Simple Souls, to which I turn next, is a 
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written narrative, a more traditional “text.” It relies on language (despite its limitations) and 
specifically dialogic exchange, rather than manipulation of the physical body in order to model 
the speaking subject‟s liminality.  While Elizabeth‟s narrative created for her a literal stance in 
the liminal space between positions, eras, and several abstract manifestations of God‟s glory, the 
speaking subject in the Mirror inhabits the liminal space between voices.  Dealing in the realm 
of voice and linguistic expression, the Mirror more clearly confronts the problem of the 
ineffability of God and of the soul united to him. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE STAKES OF LANGUAGE: EXPRESSION IN THE MIRROR OF SIMPLE SOULS* 
 
The Mirror’s Problem 
When the allegorical personification “Soul” in Marguerite Porete‟s Mirror of Simple 
Souls poses the question “Qui suis je donc maintenant?” (“Who am I now then?”), the answer is 
anything but simple.
259
 To our modern eye, it looks quite like an existential crisis.  There is a 
palpable sense of struggle to understand herself, notwithstanding that the term and concepts of an 
“existential crisis” are anachronistic in Marguerite‟s early fourteenth-century France, and Soul is 
an allegory, not an individual.  Still, something has become ambiguous about the “soul” she 
represents.  Something has changed: who she is now, at this point in the text, is different from 
who she was before, opening the question of how her state of being has shifted and why it 
occasions the remark. 
The Mirror‟s history is no less intriguing.  It was not until the mid-twentieth-century that 
Romana Guarnieri reconnected the anonymous mystical text with its authoress by noticing the 
text‟s echoes in excerpts used to condemn a woman in Paris in 1310, a woman the trial records 
refer to as “Margarita dicta Porete,” a native of Hainaut.260 Marguerite‟s burning at the stake was 
a final culmination of clashes with ecclesiastical authorities over the course of several years, 
                                                 
*Portions of this chapter will appear in Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies 42.2 (Autumn 2011) under the 
title “Dialogic Melting: Representing Mystical Union and its Instability in Marguerite Porete‟s Mirror of Simple 
Souls.”  
259
 Marguerite Porete: Le mirouer des simples âmes / Speculum simplicium animarum, ed. Romana Guarnieri and 
Paul Verdeyen, Corpus Christianorum: Continuatio Mediaevalis 69 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), 294.3-4.  All 
citations from the French Mirouer refer to Guarnieri‟s edition based on Chantilly, Musée Condé, MS F.xiv.26 as it 
appears in this volume.  I cite page and line numbers.  Translations are my own. 
260
 Romana Guarnieri, “Lo Specchio delle anime semplici e Margherita Poirette,” L‟O  e      e       , June 16 
1946, 3.  On the details of the trial, including names assigned to Porete, see Paul Verdeyen, “Le procès d‟inquisition 
contre Marguerite Porete et Guiard de Cressonessart (1309-1310),” Re  e d‟hi   i e ecc ésiastique 81 (1986), 47-
94. 
115 
  
during which she had refused to stop circulating her book even after it had been pronounced 
heretical and destroyed in her presence.
261
   
It is hard to ignore such a past, and I am not at all suggesting that it should be ignored.  
But questions of the Mirror‟s heterodoxy and transmission have often preoccupied study of the 
book, and can overshadow the literary innovation of Marguerite‟s allegorical portrait of a soul 
and its ontological state.  It is this portrait that will be my focus in the two-part discussion that 
follows in chapters three and four, which argues that Marguerite uses the dialogic form of the 
Mirror in order to illustrate the transitory nature and instability of an experience of mystical 
union.  This is a liminal experience that, according to Marguerite‟s text, has profound and 
disruptive effects on one‟s perception of who and what one is; and it is an experience that direct 
language fails to describe.  
Marguerite does provide guideposts as to what Soul‟s apparent crisis involves.  The start 
of the book announces that it will be the story of a soul‟s gradual “annihilation,” or dissolution of 
self, through a series of seven stages.  This begins when a soul is touched by God, “Ame de Dieu 
touchee,” an encounter with the divine.  The prologue explains that the soul is relieved of sin in 
the first stage, and with the help of God, eventually ascends to perfection in the seventh.
262
 Given 
the clue about divine encounter and spiritual progression, we can expect the book to be a 
narrative of, in the words of the Middle English translator in his prologue, “hiȝe felynges of ϸe 
werkinges of diuine loue” and their cumulative effects on a soul‟s state of being.263  
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Yet Marguerite‟s book, like Elizabeth‟s performance, is not a linear narrative of 
progression.  It is instead a dialogue between a large cast of personifications.  The featured 
players are Soul, who is our subject, for it is her experience of annihilation that the text follows; 
Love, who assists in Soul‟s gradual annihilation, her abandonment of individual will and 
transformation into a state of “nothingness” in which she can be united to God; and Reason, who 
demands logical explanations for a divine love and union that Marguerite seems to view as 
beyond the realm of rationality. The discussion progresses most visibly through Reason‟s 
requests for explanations and the meditative responses offered by, among others, Love, Soul, 
Truth, and even God appearing in several allegorical guises.
264
  
At the time Marguerite composed her text (ca. 1300), there was already a rich field of 
literary precedent for both religious and secular allegorical dialogues, including The Consolation 
of Philosophy and La Roman de la Rose.  Particularly close to the Mirror in structure and theme 
are the texts of beguine mystics such as Hadewijch and Mechthild of Magdeburg.  Links with 
these texts, as well as a possible connection to the allegorical Règle des fins amans, a rule for 
beguines composed by a French cleric around 1300, have all been explored by recent 
scholarship, and most thoroughly by Barbara Newman.
 265
 And as several modern readers have 
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detailed, Marguerite undoubtedly draws on the language and concepts of fine amour as one of 
her literary techniques.
266
 
However, Marguerite‟s use of dialogue stands apart as a verbal portrait of what she seems 
to think is involved in the liminal experience that results from mystical union.
267
 The Mirror‟s 
dialogic form is not only a vehicle to tell the story of a soul‟s advancement, but itself a 
representation of that experience and the shifting ontological status it entails, a narrative means 
to register that experience.  I pursue this claim through a close analysis of how the text of the 
Mirror proceeds on a narratological level – an immersion in the dialogic world of the text – 
which yields insight into Marguerite‟s use of narrative to represent consciousness, internal 
division, and a self in transition. 
The current chapter begins my investigation with analysis of the problem of 
inexpressibility in the Mirror.  In order to understand why Marguerite needs to experiment with 
dialogic form, an experiment I analyze in chapter four, it is necessary to understand how she sees 
herself up against the linguistic dilemma faced by so many mystical writers and that I explored in 
chapter one: that human language is inadequate for conveying ineffable spiritual experience.  
Marguerite‟s text is marked by a tension between the need to speak about God and the limits and 
consequences of that speech.  On the one hand, there is the issue of ineffability and the fact that 
concerns of the mortal world, including human communication, cause the soul to regress on her 
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path to God.  On the other, narrating spiritual experience can draw the soul into God and 
ultimately create an image of union with God.  Marguerite very firmly places her “stakes in 
language” as a means to both express the experience of, and strengthen the bridge to, union with 
God.
268
 
Unstable Words 
At points in Marguerite‟s text, the reader can feel as though he or she is watching a tennis 
match, as the figure of Soul volleys back and forth, affirming and then alternatively undercutting 
her own language.  In its verbose, cataphatic moments, the Mirror offers some of the most 
radical, most theologically daring framings of union that we find in the entire corpus of mystical 
writing.  Although Marguerite draws on many traditional images of mystical union, she 
frequently presents them in a way that implies little or no substantive distinction between creator 
and created soul.
 269
 She blurs boundaries by asserting that the annihilated soul is melted into the 
Trinity, even so united to God that she herself is inebriated by what her divine lover drinks.
270 
Yet even as Marguerite lays down bold metaphors of union with God, including some 
that risk slipping into heterodoxy, she laments the inadequacy of words to convey divine mystery 
and the experience of union with God.  One of the clearest admissions, a turn toward the 
apophatic approach or via negativa, is when Love offers a disclaimer that, 
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al þat þis soule haþ herd of God and al þat myȝte be seid is not, properli to speke, 
as anentis þat þat is in him, þat neuer was seid ne neuer seid schal be, þat may not 
be seid, and þat is sumþing þat I haue seid may not be seid.
271
   
Language, then, is untrustworthy; it can convey neither the nature of God nor direct experience 
of him.  It limits what can be communicated about the God that Soul comes to know in mystical 
union.  Similarly, there is Love‟s warning (following a definition of paradise as a vision of God) 
that one should “Gloseþ þese wordis and ȝe wole vndirstande it or ȝe schal mysvndirstande it, for 
it haþ sum semblaunce of þe contrarie…and semblaunce is not trouþe, but trouþe is trouþe and 
noþing ellis.”272  
Perhaps the strongest statement of concern about language is Soul‟s seeming disclaimer 
before she begins a series of exuberant verses.  She explains, “For al þat may be seid of god or 
written or in herte may be þouȝt, þat arechiþ to moost seiynges, it is more gabbinges þan it is true 
seiynges.”273 If she cannot conceptualize God in thought, certainly she cannot offer adequate 
verbal description, only a glimmer of truth.  The late Middle English word “gabbinge,” used here 
by M.N. in place of the French “mentir,” to lie or fool (although he also uses it elsewhere for 
“mesdire,” to missay), stresses potential deception.  While it can refer generally to gossip, the 
Middle English term is most specifically associated with lying, deceitful speech.
274
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Thus despite the authoritative and at times elitist tone of the Mirror, the text is 
problematized by its own impossibility, and the reader watches the language unravel.  Even as 
Marguerite‟s images and metaphors stretch to the very limits of language and intellect, she 
exhausts them and falls into paradox and circularity.  For instance, the union of wills she 
describes is a “coniunccion [that] puttiϸ a soule in beynge wiϸoute hir beynge ϸat is beynge,” a 
tangled statement that ends up spiraling into obscurity.
 275
   
Sometimes Marguerite seems to tease the reader with extreme depictions, for instance in 
the account of how Soul “melts” into God when he ravishes her into divine love.  Soul claims, “I 
am ydrent.  Ϸanne is it riȝt ϸat he sustene me of him for I am leid in him.”276 But she hesitates 
and claims that such union cannot be put into words. “Me bihoueϸ to stynte,” Soul continues, 
“for I may not seie.”277 She flirts with a wild metaphor, makes a dramatic gesture, but then 
backtracks. 
The French text in Chantilly includes an additional reflection, partly absent in the 
English, on the human limitations of the book:  
Et si a esté fait par humaine science et humain sens; et humaine raison et humain 
sens ne scevent rien d‟amour denentraine, ne denentraine amour de divine 
science.
278
 
 
  And so this is made by human knowledge and human     
  senses; and human reason and human senses know nothing about    
  inner love, inner love from divine knowledge. 
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The sense here is that human powers can in no way understand, much less address in language, 
divine nature and the experience of the love of God.  Notably for Marguerite, as for Julian in the 
opening passage of this project, at the core of the issue is a problem of knowledge as well as the 
limitations of human language to convey the infinite.  Only God knows the fullness of his being, 
and the created speaker (however united to him) can only make a gesture that is “nothing” 
compared to the full truth, a truth that is both unknowable and (the reciprocal problem) 
unspeakable.  It is in such moments that the Mirror most closely resembles the tenets of Pseudo-
Dionysius‟ apophatic program and its reframing in the Middle English Cloud of Unknowing that 
I discussed in chapter one.  Soul admits that even in her exalted state human powers of 
perception, reasoning, and language are inadequate means of approaching God, and implies he 
must be sought through non-knowledge, or “unknowing,” that English term coined by the Cloud 
author.
279
 
 The text is marked by particular distress when Marguerite comes to explaining liminality, 
the state of the annihilated soul.  Attempting to explain the nine points of the annihilated life, of 
what a soul can achieve and experience, Soul decries the impossibility of description, bemoaning 
her own words: “O, what seie I? seiþ þis soule.  Al it is nouȝt…in regarde of þat I loue in 
him.”280 She cannot say what she wants, cannot explain the mutual love between God and the 
soul, because the language at her command is as if nothing at all.  Her words fall drastically short 
of the task at hand, and she does not even understand the garbled words she utters in desperation. 
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And the Mirror sets out to describe not only Soul‟s potential advancement, but the 
challenges of advancing through all the stages of annihilation.  In fact, it is largely about the 
situation of not advancing and instead being trapped in particular stages along the way.  Taken as 
a whole, the Mirror is a narrative of waiting and yearning.  For all its bold metaphors, it depicts 
the allegorical personification of Soul still awaiting her permanent and complete union with the 
divine.  Generally, the text situates Soul in the fifth stage, the abyss of “nothingness” after 
having abandoned her will, which is the highest state a soul can maintain during moral life.
281
  
From that stage, she is at points raptured into the sixth stage, “ofte into ϸe sixte yrauysched,” but 
does not fall back to the fourth state of will.
282
  An emptying of the self in the fifth stage 
reportedly allows her some sense of union with God and an intimate knowledge of divine 
goodness.  Here we find the assertion that, “Now sche is al and sche is noon, for hir loued haϸ 
made hir oon.” 283 But this oneness is incomplete.  In the fifth stage, the soul stands on a 
borderline with a simultaneous experience of union and an implacable separation from her 
beloved.  Here we might recall Marguerite‟s label for the divine, “Loing-prés,” “far-near,” 
M.N.‟s “fer nyȝh,” a paradox introduced from the start in the prologue‟s framing of a “fer loue” 
that is “so nyȝ,” presented in the language of courtly love and through an exemplum based on the 
romance of a princess and King.
284
 Her divine beloved is both near and inaccessible. 
The fifth stage is therefore a liminal state:  Soul is neither in her glory nor entirely 
distinct from the divine.  From this stage she can occasionally touch the sixth, but only to be 
returned, for access to the sixth stage “is a swift openynge and an hasti schittynge.”285 The sixth 
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stage is the highest stage that a soul can achieve (although not maintain) during mortal life.  
Love explains that it is a momentary access to union with God in his glory: 
And þe sixte is gloriouse for þe openynge of þe swete meuynges of  
 glorie þat þe gentil fer [nyȝ] ȝiueþ.  And þat is noon oþir þing þan sum   
 apparicion þat God wole þat þe soule haue of his glorie self whiche sche   
 schal haue wiþouten ende…þe whiche schewinge is so soone ȝouen þat þe  
 same to whom þis ȝifte is ȝouen haþ of hir ȝifte, in þe tyme, no    
 perceyuynge.
286
 
The sixth stage is thus not a continuous state, but brief glimpses of future glory, granted for a 
moment but taken away so quickly that the soul can barely process it.  Temporarily, the soul in 
this stage “ne seeϸ but God himsilf.” She sees herself in God, God in herself, and nothing else – 
but only for a brief moment before regressing to the fifth stage.
 287
   
M.N.‟s commentary offers an orthodox reading of the text, careful to stress the 
incomplete nature of Soul‟s union with God from the start with his first gloss on the prologue. 288   
No soul, he clarifies, can be “free” during mortal life, though one can have a temporary 
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experience of union with God and freedom from sin.  This lasts only a short time, he explains: 
“As for ϸat tyme of vnyoun, ful litel tyme it is.  And whanne [the soul] comeϸ doun ϸerfro, 
ϸanne is sche ϸralle, fallynge or fadinge.”289 Thus from early on M.N. highlights how Soul 
moves in and out of complete union with God, and that she is standing on the threshold of union.  
It becomes a theme in his glosses.  He similarly clarifies that Soul‟s words suggesting perfection 
during earthly life should be taken to apply only to a fleeting “tyme of rauyschinge and vnyon in 
God.”290 He makes the point again in his fourteenth gloss, drawing on Paul‟s description of 
union and asserting that the soul in this condition loses awareness of herself: “Wherof ϸanne,” 
M.N. queries, “in ϸe tyme of ϸis vnyon, schulde hir inwardnesse fele or sche hirsilf meue? O, 
sche may not do it, for sche is al molten in God for ϸe tyme.” Having melted into the divine, she 
is no longer her former self.  But again, this is temporary: “ϸis blessid oonnesse lasteϸ but litel 
while in ony creature ϸat is heere in ϸis deedli liif, for sensualite of mankynde may not suffre 
it.”291 
M.N.‟s commentary points us deeper into what Marguerite is describing:  it is the 
experience of a subject neither wholly detached from the divine nor wholly in the union she will 
achieve in the future, split between two worlds.  The Mirror‟s debate over linguistic labels for 
Soul is one reflection of this problem, and of the failure of human language to convey perception 
of a shifting ontological status.  She is neither entirely a distinct self nor united to the divine 
Other.  And her in-between status is, much like the liminal state Victor Turner describes, a stage 
of namelessness.
292
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A debate over Soul‟s name begins when Reason asks why Love refers to Soul as “soul” 
as opposed to “spirit.” Even within the allegory, Marguerite resists assigning “the Soul” a firm 
and stable signifier.  Love acknowledges the logic of Reason‟s question, but does not specifically 
answer it; soon after, Love instead offers a list-like name to express several of Soul‟s attributes, 
“pure heuenli spirit of pees.” 293 Moving through a list of conceptual names, the process recalls 
the cataphatic elements of Pseudo-Dionysius‟ The Divine Names, though in this case the problem 
is not only how to label God, but a soul in union with him.  If, as Nicholas Watson suggests, 
Marguerite aimed ultimately to take her readers “beyond words,” this is a natural precursor.294 
Then like Pseudo-Dionysius in the Mystical Theology that follows his Divine Names, Marguerite 
turns to negation when all signifiers fail, and Soul loses her name altogether. 
Soul‟s namelessness haunts the next several chapters, appearing as a central element in 
the commingled liquids metaphor of chapter 82.
295
  The metaphor illustrates union while 
stressing that no name can encapsulate Soul in her new, exalted state.  As Soul rises in 
“soueraynte,” she, 
lesiþ hir name and is draynt and in þis drenching left of him, in him, for him, of 
himsilf.  So leesiþ sche hir name, riȝt as doiþ a watir þat comeþ of þe see, þat is 
clepid Oise or Muese, and whanne sche entriþ in þe see sche lesiþ hir name and 
þe cours of hir bi whiche sche ran in many cuntreis in doynge hir werk and stinteþ 
in þe see.  Þere sche restiþ hir and haþ lost þis labour, and riȝt so sooþeli it is of 
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þis soule…þere haþ sche lost hir labour and hir name.  Sche haþ no name but þe 
name of him in whiche sche is partfiitli ymeued, þat is, in loue…Sche is, þanne, 
þis þat is.
296
 
Just as a body of water loses its previous name as it flows into a larger sea and takes on the name 
of that sea, the same is the case for Soul as she is annihilated.
297
  The English passage above 
declares Soul‟s namelessness five times, one instance more than what appears in Chantilly.298 In 
both texts, the section equivalent to Chantilly chapter 83 begins with a further affirmation, “Now 
is þis soule wiþouten name.”299 The name of the Beloved is no real substitute, for the text 
stresses that he is ineffable and their union is in any case temporary.  The message that neither 
Soul‟s previous name nor any replacement is adequate draws attention to her ontological fluidity 
as well as the limitations of language to convey that fluidity.  Marguerite thus marks Soul‟s 
condition through the operating terms of the discourse.  Once touched by union with God, Soul 
loses a stable identity and, accordingly, a name. 
 
Unstable Progress 
The writing of the book transgresses other boundaries of its own construction as well: the 
text asserts that divine secrets are not only beyond human language to convey, but should not be 
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shared with a wide audience.  Unlike many other mystics of her time, Marguerite reports no 
divine command to write.  The text depicts the opposite, with God specifically warning Soul not 
to divulge secrets revealed to her. The Trinity appears to plead with Soul in a song, “I preie ȝou, 
my deere douȝter…þat ȝe seie no more þe secres þat ȝe wite,” expressing concern that those who 
may read the book without having first attained Soul‟s advanced state may risk condemning 
themselves through it.
300
 This may be Marguerite‟s gesture, or perhaps blow, to those who she 
was sure would misunderstand her words, as many did.
301
 But is also means that the book‟s 
narration transgresses the limits that it establishes for itself.  It crosses another borderline – that 
of what is appropriate and inappropriate to share. 
Moreover, in writing the book, Marguerite (or “þis soule”) allows her desire to witness to 
a relationship with God to rekindle her will.  Under the terms of the Mirror, the same can be said 
for M.N. as composer of the translation, who states his hope that by hearing about divine love the 
souls of readers will “entriþ and walkiþ in þe wey of illuminacion,” “be cauȝt into þe goostli 
influences,” and eventually themselves be “vnyed to God.”302 There is no way around the fact 
that the act of writing the book is an exercise of individual will, and according to the Mirror‟s 
schema of advancement, that will is supposed to have been martyred.  The hallmark of the fifth 
stage of annihilation is for the soul and its will to separate from one another and the will to be 
dissolved and returned to God: in the fifth stage, Soul “aȝen puttiϸ it and ȝiueϸ it and ȝildeϸ it in 
God ϸere it was first.”303  
Amid traditional tropes of ineffability, Soul discusses the foolishness of composing the 
text, comparing the task to trying to enclose all of the sea in one‟s eye and similar 
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impossibilities.  She explains, “I am a more folt þan he þat þis wolde do, whanne I putte so price 
þing in speche þat may not be seid ne write.  I encombre me of þese wordis to write.”304 This is a 
lamentation not only about ineffability, but the detrimental effects of narration on the Soul trying 
to break free from will: she becomes again one of the “encumbered” rather than the annihilated 
and free. 
The same is the lament of the “beggynge” creature, who is also “ϸis soule ϸat ϸis boke 
lete write.”  She wishes that 
hir euen christen fond God in hem bi writings and bi wordis.  Þis is to seie and to 
vndirstonde, þat sche wolde hir euen christen were parfiitli so made as sche 
deuiseþ, specialli alle þo to whom sche haþ good wille.  Þus to do and þus to seie 
is beggynge, for in þis doynge and in þis seiynge & in þis willynge, sche dwelliþ a 
begger – witeþ þis forsoþe – and encombred of hersilf.305  
Soul has an inclination to bring others to God, to make them understand, to bring them to her 
level.  But this means that she desires something other than God, and so wanders like a beggar or 
“mendicant.” She is caught between human cares (even if the goal of those cares is evangelism) 
and the life in God she has already begun to live, and so is caught in another form of the liminal, 
between her desired life and what ties her to her current life.  Stephanie Paulsell poignantly 
remarks that it appears Marguerite “write[s] with a divided heart,” one of the signs of which is 
this opposition between her writing and the spiritual life she advocates.
306
 It would be even more 
accurate to say that she writes from a divided life, or at least that this is the experience of a soul 
that she depicts: a soul standing on two sides. 
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At the same time, however, Soul seems to insist on the necessity of writing the book.  She 
notes that although she exercised will in sharing insights with other Christians, one cannot reach 
perfection without such an act of begging.  She asserts, “Certis, don it þei moste er þei come to 
parfite freedom of alle poyntes.” This important argument is emphatically clear in both the 
English and French.
307
 As begging is inextricably linked with narrating one‟s experience of God 
and secret knowledge of him, that very narration is likewise portrayed as part of the soul‟s 
progress toward union with God. 
It is through the narration of the experience of mystical union that Soul can achieve 
freedom from her former self; it is through its expression that she comes to annihilation, a more 
complete union with God.  Soul refers to writing the book and then continues,  
But þus I take my recourse for to come to my strengþe and socoure and to my last 
crowne, of þe beynge of whiche we haue spoke of þat sittiþ al in freedom, þat is 
whanne a soule restiþ in pure nouȝt wiþouten þouȝt, for til þanne sche may not be 
fre.
308
 
While Soul seeks to be free from her distinct thought and will and dissolve into God,  
paradoxically the path to get to that point is the very narration that makes her exercise her own 
will distinct from God.  And so the narrator, mirroring the condition of a soul in the process of 
becoming one with God but not yet able to achieve complete and lasting union, is caught in a 
liminal position by these two opposing forces: on the one hand moving closer to union by 
indulging the desire to produce the book, to celebrate the soul‟s relationship with God, and on 
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the other, still partly held to the individual will that distinguishes the mortal subject.  To try to 
understand this conflict and how Marguerite negotiates it, the next step is to consider precisely 
what the narration of the book achieves.  
 
Language and Image 
When Soul utters a song about her experience of God, she makes herself a model for 
others.  Soul sings, she explains, “al for hem þat ȝit schulen be free, for þis þat þei may heere in 
þis booke lerne sum poynt of frenesse,” so that others may see something of her experience of 
God and likewise move toward the freedom of being annihilated souls.
309
 Her songs transcend 
the type of thinking that could separate her from God and retain her as a member of “Holy 
Church the Little.” As Soul declares,  
Þenkinge no more is worþ, ne werk, ne eloquence, loue drawiþ me so hiȝe. 
Þenkinge no more is worþ, for his diuine biholding it haþ but oon entent. 
Þenkinge no more is worþ, ne werk, ne eloquence.  Loue haþ made me bi 
nob[l]esse seuene uersis of songe to fynde þat is of þe deite pure wheroff reson 
kan not speke.
310
   
 
Thinking is no longer of worth, nor work nor speech, Love has drawn me so high.  
Thinking is no longer of worth, for divine beholding makes the soul have only 
one intention. Thinking is no longer of worth, nor work, nor speech.  Love has 
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made me find by nobility these verses of a song that is of the pure deity, about 
whom Reason cannot speak.
311
 
 
The verses here do not strictly convey information.  Instead, they model a state of being.   
On the one hand, the song declares that Soul‟s experience cannot be expressed through normal 
description, again a lament of the limits of language.  These verses of the divine cannot be put 
into coherent thoughts and words.  They cannot be “reasoned”; in fact, they take Soul beyond 
thought and beyond all language with its limits of specific meaning. But this is of little 
consequence, for the Mirror glories in the sheer act of singing even without conveying 
knowledge.
312
 Like Augustine‟s ecstatic blazon poems about God, Soul‟s song “does not give 
testimony, it is the testimony”: utterance of these “uersis of songe” represents a form of union 
with God, for the songs are not Soul‟s alone but “of þe deite pure,” a merger of her song with 
his.
313
   
Here the Mirror closely resembles the writing of Richard Rolle, for whom the experience 
of God and expression of the experience become one in the composition of the text.  In Rolle‟s 
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experience of canor, the soul is sent into song, and that singing itself is an image of union.  The 
soul overflows with joy that must be expressed in an utterance, and also becomes like the source 
of joy.  The soul that is in “a peace that sings and loves and burns and contemplates…is 
altogether ablaze with heavenly fire.” In Rolle‟s approach, in the act of releasing praise in joyful 
song, the soul becomes like God who sings continually: “he is transformed into the likeness of 
him in whom is all melody and song.”314  
Did Marguerite intend only to mark the verse song just mentioned, Chantilly chapter 122, 
as divine verse? The French Mirouer includes many sections of lyrical verse scattered 
throughout the text.  I would suggest that the “verses” that have been given by Love refer to all 
the linguistic movements of the text – including all the dialogue that engages Soul with God.  
The prologue‟s opening statement from the figure of “Author” announces that the book will 
illustrate the workings of Love, later identified as the source of the verses, and the text‟s dialogue 
is all a discussion, in essence, of Soul‟s experience of divine love and mystical union, albeit a 
discussion that falters under the impossible task of description.  As for the Middle English text in 
particular, M.N.‟s version includes most of the verse sections of the Mirror, but generally 
renders them as prose without distinction.  It would seem he understood the “uersis” to refer to 
the movements of the entire text.  English readers following his rendering that does not set off 
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verse passages from the rest of the text would also be likely to interpret “uersis” as a reference to 
the whole text.
 315
 
In the prologue‟s exemplum of the princess and her “image,” Marguerite implies that her 
book as a whole is an “image,” one of the relationship between Soul and God.  She writes that a 
princess, “Lete peynte an ymage, þat presentide þat kynges semblaunce as nyȝ as sche 
myȝte…And bi þe siȝt of þis ymage, wiþ oþir usages, sche was eesid; and þus sche apeside 
hirsilf of þe presentacioun of loue, þat sche was updrawe.
316
 And this applies directly to Soul‟s 
experience: 
Soþeli, seiþ þis soule þat þis boke lete write, þis I seie for me: so fare I. I here 
speke of a kyng of greet myȝt þat for curtesie and greet largesse is a noble 
Alisaundre.  But so fer is he fro me and I fro him, seiþ þis soule, þat I kan not take 
comfort of mysilf.  And to clepe me he ȝaue me þis boke, þe whiche presenteþ 
summe vsages of þe loue of himsilf.  But not for þanne I dwelle not in freedom of 
pees, þouȝ I haue his ymage; but I am in a straunge lond fer fro þe pees, where þat 
þese noble louyers of þis lord dwelle þat ben al endid and pure, and bi þe ȝiftes of 
þis lord maad fre, wiþ whom þei dwelle.
317
  
Soul is emphatic and repetitive in paralleling the princess‟ experience and her own, 
particularly in the English version.  The comparison therein includes three first-person pronouns: 
“Soþeli, seiþ þis soule þat þis boke lete write, þis I seie for me: so fare I.”318 The “boke” is the 
equivalent of the princess‟ “ymage” for Soul and for the writer, Marguerite, who is the “soule þat 
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þis boke lete write.”319 The connection becomes explicit when Soul admits that although she has 
“his ymage” she is not entirely at peace.  This is only the “ymage,” not the real thing, and 
ultimately not enough.  As Soul explains, “I dwelle not in the freedom of pees, ϸouȝ I haue his 
ymage, but I am in a straunge lond fer fro the pees.”320 Trapped in mortal life, Soul still remains 
distant and distinct from her beloved.  She does not have a complete and lasting union with her 
beloved, which as the book develops will prove to be precisely the dilemma of the liminal soul in 
the fifth stage.  And here from the start Marguerite offers a clue that the book is intended less to 
convey theological knowledge than as the portrait of a soul‟s experience.321 
Another telling word in the exemplum is “usages,” which ties the book to the 
princess/Soul‟s practices and customs.  The French “usages” is used in Chantilly to describe the 
princess‟ actions, such as viewing the image, that foster her love for the king, and M.N. includes 
“usages” in the same two places: for the princess, “bi þe siȝt of þis ymage, wiþ oþir usages, sche 
was eesid,” and for Soul the book/image “presenteþ summe vsages of þe loue of himself.”  When 
Soul later declares that she has a continual “usage” of a vision of the Trinity, M.N. interprets this 
as a normal practice for Soul.
322
 The “usages” mentioned in the prologue are probably best 
understood as the everyday practices that foster and sustain relationship with God.   
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So this is what, according to Marguerite‟s prologue, the book shows us: an image of God 
and the ways in which a soul interacts with him.  It is an image of her mortal life in love with her 
distant lover.  Its primary purpose is not to lay down meaning.  It is to create a forum in language 
for a soul‟s experience of and with God to manifest.  
 Such are the problems of expression that Marguerite faces in trying to write the 
experience of a soul in mystical union, the condition of the annihilated soul that she wants to 
represent, and her description of her book.  I turn now to Marguerite‟s solution for negotiating 
these challenges and conveying Soul‟s liminal condition: her use of dialogic form.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 SPOKEN “FUL MYSTILI”: MARGUERITE‟S DIALOGIC NARRATIVE OF UNION* 
 
Soul’s Words 
This chapter turns to the narrative structures that, working like a bridge to the “staunge 
lond,” create the portrait of mystical union in Marguerite Porete‟s Mirror of Simple Souls.  I 
argue that dialogue represents Soul‟s experience of mystical union by allowing her to “melt” into 
the divine through the realm of voice.   The union that the text portrays is, like Soul‟s experience 
of God while still in mortal life, a temporary and unstable one: through the dialogic movement of 
the text, Soul‟s speaking voice alternatively melds with and stands apart from the divine voice.  
The dialogue‟s interplay is one strategy to overcome the ineffability of God and of the 
experience of union, but it is still marked by – and designed to reflect – all the complications of 
the soul‟s liminal state, her fraught position “in-between.”  M.N.‟s prologue to the text 
announces that the book will reveal how souls can be drowned in and united to God, “drenchid in 
ϸe hiȝe floode, and vnyed to God,” but also warns that the book is not always clear: “ful mystili 
it is spoken.”323 This proves true as the Mirror‟s portrait of mystical union and its instability 
unfolds through a creative yet subtle union of voices in the text. 
A moment in which Soul pauses to consider her own words – a description of her 
available means of expression – takes us right to the problem of her liminal condition and 
Marguerite‟s structural techniques to represent it.  Soul announces: 
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I synge, seiþ þis soule, þe ton tyme song and þe toþir tyme vnsong, and al for hem 
þat ȝit schulen be free, for þis þat þei may heere in þis booke lerne sum poynt of 
frenesse & what þing hem bihoueþ or þan þei come þerto.
324
 
Soul‟s song is not the stable line of one voice, but an utterance split between “song” and 
“vnsong”: there are lines for two voices, one singing, another engaged in “un-singing,” 
overturning or offering an alternative line as a counterpoint.  We might say that Soul‟s one voice 
paradoxically achieves polyphony.  The French terms for Soul‟s singing, chant/deschant, 
translated as cantu/discantu in the Latin version based on the French, appear to refer to a shift 
between the basic chant line of liturgical song, the cantus firmus of medieval plainchant, and the 
“discant” to which deschant likely refers.325 Discant, from the Latin discantus, “singing apart,” 
was a form of added polyphony or extemporizing which added a second voice to the cantus 
firmus, imposed either in a specifically “note-against-note” counterpoint, by doubling, or simply 
by the addition of another voice or instrument, the ancestor of our modern counterpoint and 
hymn descant.
326
   
M.N.‟s English translation appears to miss the precise musical distinction here.  I would 
suggest, however, that this was not because M.N. misunderstood the concept, but because he 
lacked an English vernacular term for this aspect of chant.  Without an exact English equivalent, 
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M.N. aims nonetheless for a word that specifically sets the discant aspect apart from Soul‟s basic 
song.  His use of the prefix “un-” implies a contrary and captures the tension between Soul‟s two 
modes of utterance, the basic song and its alternative.
 327
  
If we follow Marguerite‟s metaphor as a reference to simultaneous chant and added 
counterpoint, Soul speaks with two voices at once.  Even if we understand it as alternating forms 
of singing, the passage centers on two modes of address and the tension between them.  It depicts 
Soul as singing apart from herself.  The subject‟s voice takes shape, therefore, through 
alternating movement between the two chant lines, between two speaking positions, with Soul 
essentially entering into a dialogue with the counterpoint of her own voice.  M.N.‟s choice of 
explicitly oppositional terms both marks a provocative division and emphasizes it: by both 
singing and not singing, Soul‟s voice inhabits two entirely contrary stances at once.  It is as 
though she speaks as two separate selves, reflecting a split condition. 
What she negotiates here parallels what, according to the text, a soul must negotiate in 
the temporary loss of awareness of self when melted into union with God.  And the theme 
continues.  Much more of Soul‟s discourse, beyond her “song” and “vnsong,” also relies on her 
occupation of two distinct voices.  Another striking illustration of this phenomenon comes in the 
discussion of the debt she owes for having stolen her will from God, when Soul reflects, “A 
seable and vnsuffrable dette, seiþ þis soule, who schal paie þis dette? A Lord, certis ȝe.”328 
Marguerite could have assigned this line to Love, who speaks a few lines earlier and could now 
respond, “The Lord will pay it.” But the text expressly identifies a dialogue between Soul and 
herself as she both poses and answers her own question.   
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A comparable circularity occurs in a later consideration of Soul‟s debt to God, with Soul 
turning back to herself as she begins, “Now, soule, seiþ þis soule to hirsilf, [if] ȝe haue al þis þat 
þis writynge deuiseþ, ne seie we more, but al it is his of dette.”329 Soul‟s statement uses a second 
person pronoun to address a “ȝe” that is also “hirsilf,” a projection that is both self and, at least 
for the moment, other.  The technique is especially striking because Soul continues her narration 
in the first person as she questions this projected self/other about the nature of her own debts.
330
 
It is tempting to think about these processes as a Lacanian realization of discrete identity and its 
effects.  Marguerite seems to dramatize an encounter with a parallel self; here is a subject who, 
like Lacan‟s infant, arguably sees an imago – a potential ideal self.  But the issue is not yet one 
of psychic wholeness or desire.  Here Marguerite casts the problem in terms of knowledge and 
its fulfillment: the split is between a superior “half,” or alternate self consonant with the soul‟s 
enjoyment of momentary union, opposed against one still yearning and questioning.   
These movements evoke texts of the consolation tradition in which dialogue is a method 
used to evaluate thoughts and beliefs and reorient one‟s point of view.331 The Mirror also 
dramatizes introspection in a way that recalls Augustine and Anselm‟s writing and the scriptural 
texts that I discussed in chapter one.  Anselm refers back to his Monologion as a “meditation on 
the rational basis of faith, adopting the role of someone who, by reasoning silently with himself, 
investigates things he does not know.”332 His soliloquy is a dialogue with the self, and at its core, 
so is the Proslogion, originally titled with the Christian philosophical maxim “faith seeking 
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understanding.”333 While this sequel is more explicitly a dialogue between Anselm and God, 
alternating between Anselm‟s arguments and addresses to or invocations of God, the basis is 
essentially a self-reflective process.
 
 Like Augustine in the Confessions, he adopts an 
introspective structure – the posing of a question, sometimes of God but often of the self (e.g., 
“where was I heading and where have I come to?  What was I reaching toward, and what do I 
long for?” and responds to himself, often adopting scriptural verses as the reply (e.g., “I have 
sought the good”).334 Soul‟s dialogue with herself is figured as a means of coming to understand 
atonement, reasoning to try to grasp the soul‟s own debt and contribution (or really lack thereof) 
to its salvation, but it simultaneously gives expression to her split condition.
335
 
A particularly striking analogue in scripture is the structure of the fourteenth psalm 
(Vulgate numbering), which I discussed in chapter one.  The speaker‟s opening query, “LORD, 
who shall dwell in thy tabernacle? or who shall rest in thy holy hill?” is followed by enumeration 
of the qualities of the righteous.
336
 One potential reading of these lines is as a reflexive moment 
of David discoursing with himself.
337
 Marguerite‟s structure has a particular resemblance to 
Augustine‟s perspective on psalm 14 in his Enarrationes in psalmos.  Augustine does not 
comment directly on the dialogic element in the question and response, but frames the psalm as a 
whole as fulfilling David‟s need for introspection.  Noting the psalm‟s superscription as “a Psalm 
for David himself” (which Augustine draws from the Septuagint) he goes on to remark that “this 
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title offers no difficulty.”338 He accepts at face value that the process here is a discussion with 
oneself, whereas when expounding other psalms he clarifies to whom the reader should ascribe 
the speaking voice(s).  For example, he directs readers to understand the following psalm‟s 
superscription (psalm 15) “to David himself” as a song of Christ “in his human nature.”339 
In M.N.‟s late medieval England, Walter Hilton makes a similar point about the 
comparable structure in Isaiah 66:2.  Interpreting the seeming dialogue in that line, he remarks, 
“For oure Lord asketh bi His prophete thus…Upon whom schal My spirit reste?  And He 
answereth Himsilf and seith: upon noon but upon the meke, poverli and contrite in herte and 
dredynge My wordes.”340 Here it is God who questions and answers himself, utilizing the voice 
of Isaiah to do so.
341
   
Familiarity with such passages could have prompted Marguerite to adopt similar 
structures when shaping Soul‟s discourse.  However, if she did have them in mind, she took them 
as inspiration, as raw material, and manipulated them creatively.  In the Mirror – and here it 
stands dramatically apart – Soul‟s reflexive process only occurs through engagement with a 
counterpoint of the self, a dialogue with a second, alternative personification of the soul.  This is 
not just apostrophe; it is not, for instance, Anselm‟s address to his heart or Augustine‟s 
pondering of what he seeks.  The narrating subject divides into two voices, two distinct positions, 
as Soul splits to question herself and offer an explanation to herself.  We do not have a soliloquy, 
but a dialogue that necessitates a reflection of the subject with whom to engage.  As in her 
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singing, Soul‟s questioning conjures an image of an “other” self by giving it a voice.  Even more, 
the speaking subject, the subject as speaker, emerges through the interaction between two 
entities: if we try to locate Soul‟s voice, we have to say that the terms of the text only allow it a 
liminal position –  between “ϸe soule” and “ϸe soule hirsilf,” which both speak for her.  
Marguerite builds a reflection of Soul‟s status right into the structure of the narrative, into the 
way that exchanges circulate in the dialogue.  It is a situation that, on the level of meta-narrative, 
reflects Soul‟s liminal ontological status.  Polyphony demonstrates a condition that one narrating 
voice cannot. 
 
The Other’s Words 
Just as Soul‟s narrating I shifts with remarkable seamlessness between two positions that 
we can read as two types of experience, Soul also adopts the voices of other personifications.  
Marguerite‟s adaptation of allegorical dialogue involves a striking interpenetration of voices, one 
that further destabilizes Soul‟s voice.  After the text enacts the “death” of Reason, Soul adopts 
Reason‟s voice and appears alternatively in the dialogue under her standard label as “þis soule” 
as well as “þis soule þat spekiþ in þe persoone of reson.”342 This begins a series of interactions in 
which the personifications stand in for one another and their voices intermingle.  Literally 
masquerading as Reason (the French has “en la personne de Raison,” the Latin “in persona 
rationis”), Soul continues Reason‟s practice of posing questions, asking Love to detail the nature 
and lineage of “mekenesse,” or Humility.  Soul therefore inhabits Reason‟s voice, and engages 
with Love as Reason.  After Love responds by saying none can articulate Humility‟s lineage, 
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Soul offers an answer in her original voice as “ϸis soule,” arguing, “Þis is sooþe…but I shal 
puute heer to þis þat I schal seie.”343 Soul proceeds to describe Humility‟s lineage, and thus 
provides a lengthy answer to her own (or “Reason‟s”) question, another dialogue with herself. 
This is an instance of uniquely explicit prosopopeia in the text – not simply the use of 
speaking personifications (like the allegorical figures that fill the text), but a moment that 
resonates with the original Greek prosopa (“masks”), the term for figures that appear in classical 
Greek drama, identities represented by a mask.  Soul explicitly steps into Reason‟s speaking 
position, puts it on.
344
  Love interestingly makes a similar move, announcing at the start of the 
same section that she will say what “Reson schulde seie.”345 Love‟s comment does not have the 
speech tag of “ϸe persoone of reson,” but fluidly links all three of the figures‟ voices together. 
And Soul‟s voice also blends with Love‟s voice.  Like the ambiguity of Soul‟s name, this 
is written into the operating terms of the discourse.  As Newman highlights, Soul and Love are 
united at the most basic level of word play because their names in French, Ame and Amour, 
reflect one another.  She observes in their dynamic a “mutual mirroring,” one that almost evokes 
narcissism as “Love describes and praises Soul, while Soul explains and celebrates Love.”346 The 
overlap here is more fluid than the adoption of Reason‟s “mask,” which by contrast draws 
attention to a crossed boundary.  There is no specific moment when Soul adopts the “persoone” 
of Love in the latter‟s absence.  She becomes it rather than putting it on.  Indeed, the transition 
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into Love‟s voice is so smooth that in their exchanges we begin to lose clear sight of “Soul” as a 
distinct narrating subject. 
A glance at a few moments in the dialogue illustrates this fluidity.  Soul refers questions 
to Love, and Love answers on behalf of Soul. When Reason asks Soul what makes her glad, 
rather than answering, Soul redirects the question and affirms, “Lady loue…schal seie it for me,” 
referring to Love for the answer to this question about personal joys.
347
 Among other examples, 
in a discussion of Soul‟s necessary three deaths, Love poses a question that stumps Soul, who 
simply turns back to Love for the answer, responding, “I noot, seiþ þe soule þat þis first wroot, 
but loue, ȝe ȝoureself seie it for me.  I may not amende ȝou.”348 The shift back to Love is 
especially striking here because the same sentence includes another mention of Soul as the writer 
of the book, “þe soule þat þis first wroot,” and presumably possessor of all the knowledge 
offered in it.  The experience being narrated is still Soul‟s – her joy, her deaths – but she does not 
or cannot narrate it herself.  Her knowledge about divine mysteries is equal to Love‟s 
knowledge, and Love likewise knows Soul‟s perspective.  Their shared meditations also work in 
the reverse with Soul speaking for Love, for instance when she responds to Love‟s question 
about the condition of the “unencumbered” by explaining Love‟s own nature to her; her response 
to Love‟s query is to explain “love” to Love.349 
What, then, is Marguerite‟s motivation for so destabilizing Soul‟s voice?  Certainly all 
dialogue, by virtue of featuring two or more debating voices, destabilizes authority by making it 
more difficult to locate.  The drama in the Mirror is no exception, and a potentially efficacious 
move for Marguerite‟s daring theology.  It disperses the responsibility of the authorial voice by 
creating distance between Marguerite and what is said by any one allegorical figure.  Several 
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modern readers of the Mirror and similar beguine texts observe that allegorical dialogue allows 
an author access to a range of powerful mouthpieces.  Newman traces a tradition of medieval 
women writers invoking allegorical goddesses to “legitimize their own writing,” and putting 
their words in the voices of such figures who could often double, conveniently, as a 
“representation of divine agency and intelligence as female.”350 Amy Hollywood explores how 
Marguerite both complicates the gender of the divine and also avoids an “external narrating 
voice.”351 We may say that by blending the authoritative, semi-divine voices of Lady Love, 
Truth, or Peace, for instance, with that of Soul (throughout the text most closely identified with 
the authorial voice), Marguerite theoretically adopts those authoritative positions.  
It is difficult, however, to imagine Marguerite planning to siphon authority from the mask 
of literary figures in her text or avoid responsibility for direct claims.  Such a move does not 
quite mesh with what we can glimpse of her character and her own view of her writing.  Her 
continued circulation of her book after its first condemnation, her attempts to obtain approval of 
her writing from theologians of her day instead of altering or abandoning the book, and her 
stalwart, silent defense at trial (spending a year and a half refusing to take the oath that would 
have allowed her trial to proceed) all suggest the exact opposite of eschewing responsibility: 
instead, a strong and public personal stake in the book.
352
 The fact that Marguerite‟s self-
promotion contributed to her undoing warrants notice in light of a tendency to overemphasize her 
fraught status as a woman writing in the vernacular and on the margins of the patriarchal Church.  
She did write from the margins, and must have been aware of the dangers of doing so, but she 
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does not appear to have feared doing so, even to the point of death.  Moreover, from the opening 
chapters, which frame the text as a narrative of Soul‟s experience by beginning “O soule touche 
by God,” Marguerite establishes a close association between the allegorical Soul and the 
authorial I.
353
 I would venture to say that, while her authoritative allegories undoubtedly make 
bold theological claims, she employs them also for another, even more clever purpose: to 
represent shifts in ontological status.   
In order to recognize this at work in Marguerite‟s narrative structure, we must consider 
the complications of how the allegorical figures interact.  The Mirror is not a dialogue in which 
Soul, Love, and Reason simply speak individually, offering theological reflections that border 
heterodoxy.  Rather, Soul speaks as/for all three, sometimes adopting their voices to speak back 
to herself, thus uniting her voice with their voices.  The text‟s form therefore becomes a 
reflection of content: the interpenetration of voices in the text provides a symbolic expression of 
a soul in the process of becoming Other. 
 In the Mirror‟s schema, the goal of the soul‟s advancement is for the soul to embrace and 
melt into God‟s love.  Marguerite depicts a special connection between Soul and Love as the 
result of Soul‟s progress and as an essential, ontological change.354 The text repeatedly declares 
that love must overtake the annihilated human soul; thus Love is what Soul will become in her 
perfected state.  Even a soul in the relatively early fourth stage of annihilation, when overcome 
with the brilliant light of love, reportedly sees nothing beyond love: “þe greete liȝt of loue haþ 
keuered hir,” Soul explains, and “þat suffriþ hir not to se passynge loue.”355 If the annihilated 
soul becomes Love itself, moments in the text in which Love and Soul speak for one another can 
                                                 
353
 Mirror, 250.16 
354
 Among many instances, see Love‟s statement that Soul is “noon oϸir ϸing ϸan loue” once she conquers the 
virtues (ibid. 319.32-33) and Soul‟s pronouncement that she is full only of the love of God (343.30-32). 
355
 Ibid. 340.10. 
147 
  
be read as a reflection of Soul‟s progress: she responds as would the soul transformed into 
love.
356
 This occurs only for a moment, a point to which I will return. 
 But first, it is important to recognize that the personification of Love in the text is a 
representation of God.  This is how Love defines herself, asserting “I am God… for loue is God 
and God is loue,” and at many points in the allegory, the figures of Love and God function 
interchangeably.
357
 Love is the main vehicle of divine knowledge, a role she fulfills, for instance, 
when she announces the seven necessary stages, associating her voice with God‟s voice.358 
Moreover, descriptions of Love, like those of the ineffable God, are the object of critique and 
distrust.  Echoing Soul‟s comment that all that can be said of God is more falsehood than truth, 
in M.N.‟s English, “More gabbinges ϸan it is true seiynges,” Soul addresses Love in the same 
terms.  Soul says she prefers to hear lies about Love‟s goodness than nothing at all because given 
the ineffability of Love‟s goodness, all speech about her is necessarily lies.  As Soul laments to 
Love, “al þat I seie of ȝoure goodnesse, it is but gabbinge.” 359  
M.N.‟s English version not only presents Love and God interchangeably, but at several 
points strengthens the association beyond what appears in Chantilly.  Both texts identify Love as 
the entity that allows access to glorification after death.  In Chantilly, we find, “Et le septiesme 
garde Amour dedans elle, pour nous donner en parmanable glorie, duquel nous n‟aurons 
cognoissance jusques ad ce que nostre ame ait nostre corps laissé” (And the seventh [stage] Love 
                                                 
356
 Arguably Love‟s voice blends with Soul‟s authorial voice from the beginning of the text, for immediately after 
Soul is identified as the writer of the book and the figure of Author appears to announce (in a striking first-person 
plural “we”) the book‟s aim of detailing the Lord‟s love, the second chapter features Love discussing the book as her 
own creation (ibid. 252.11-14).  On this ambiguity, also see Hollywood, Virgin Wife, 90ff.  In Chantilly, the second 
chapter is headed with the caption, “De l‟entreprinse d‟Amour, et pourquoy elle fist faire ce livre” (“Of the work of 
Love and why she has made this book”).  Mirouer, 14. 
357
 Mirror, 274.19, an oft-cited passage recalling 1 John 4:16.  Readings of the gender implications of this overlap 
have been offered by Kocher, Allegories, esp. 93-96 and Newman, Virile Woman, 156. 
358
 Mirror, 300.17-30, prior to Soul‟s elaboration beginning at 338.14.  Love also references the stages at the 
beginning of the text at 252.5-9, equivalent to the end of Chantilly‟s chapter one. 
359
  Ibid. 264.1-2. Cf. 343.9-11: “For al ϸat may be seid of god or written or in herte may be ϸouȝt, ϸat arechiϸ to 
moost seiynges, it is more gabbinges ϸan it is true seiynges.” Also cf. 351.31-2.   
148 
  
keeps within herself, to give it to us in lasting glory, of which we will not have understanding 
until our soul has left our body).
360
 Love is here the gatekeeper of eternity, the means by which 
the human soul can enter it, and thus aligned with God.  M.N. so equates Love with God that he 
inserts a masculine pronoun for a feminine one in the description of the seventh stage: “And þe 
seuenþe kepiþ he wiþynne him for to ȝiue us in euerlastynge glorie.  If we wite it not now, we 
schulen wite it whanne the body oure soule leeuiþ.”361 In light of this association, one Marguerite 
wrote into the text and M.N. (our medieval reader) appears to have assumed, to blend Soul‟s 
voice with Love‟s is to blend it with God‟s. 
The blending of Soul‟s voice with Reason‟s is harder to reconcile given that Reason is at 
many points Soul‟s adversary.  But in the Mirror‟s overall schema, Reason has a crucial function 
in progress toward annihilation.  This perhaps explains why her perspective (even if after her 
“death” resurrected only as a persona shell assumed by other figures) does not – moreover, 
cannot – vanish from the narrative‟s portrait of Soul‟s experience.  As Ellen Babinsky 
summarizes, Reason provides “a particular kind of knowledge to the soul, molding her ability 
and thus producing a sort of intellect that can allow the soul to make further progress”; it is 
Reason that originally orients the soul toward God in the first four stages, stages that are 
certainly inferior to the annihilated state, but necessary steps toward it.
362
 Like the Virtues, 
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Reason is not so much abandoned as transcended: when Soul “takes leave of” the Virtues, they 
remain with her but in obedience to her, aspects or skills she can exercise.
363
  
When she appears in medieval contemplative literature, the allegorical figure of Reason 
is most frequently aligned with something essential to spiritual ascent.  This may have been a 
more natural association for Marguerite and medieval readers than it is to the modern eye.  The 
writings of the Flemish beguine Hadewijch offer perhaps one of the most relevant analogues,  
portraying Reason as a guide that enlightens the human soul and leads it to God.  Hadewijch‟s 
ninth vision features an allegorical figure of Reason appearing as a queen and directing 
Hadewijch on the path to the love of God.  Hadewijch recognizes Queen Reason as her own 
soul‟s faculty of reason that will lead to a “life of Love.”364   
Several of Hadewijch‟s poems depict Reason as inferior to Love, but similarly assign her 
a role as a “noble” step toward it, similar to the Mirror‟s framing of Reason‟s early lessons as 
necessary steps for the soul‟s advancement.  As one poem puts it, “By Reason‟s counsel, work is 
noble; / I do not say that it cannot be nobler; / Reason promises us great rewards / But Love 
herself has rewarded at once.” 365 And although in some poems Hadewijch chides Reason for 
delaying the embrace of God (as Reason likewise does in Marguerite‟s text), the soul speaking in 
the poems recognizes that she cannot “avenge” herself on Reason, who is “Love‟s surgeoness” 
and can orient the soul toward possession of “the highest glory.”366 These perspectives from 
Hadewijch do not identify Reason as “divine,” but they do suggest the soul cannot fully embrace 
God without utilizing its own powers of reason.    
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Similar depictions were popular in M.N.‟s late medieval England, and the association 
probably would have been almost second nature to him.  In the treatise known as Vices and 
Virtues, the oldest extant Middle English dialogue, it is the allegorical figure of Racio who 
appears to narrate a description of the virtues, and who is also identified as the reflection of God 
in the human soul.
367
 The fifteenth-century vernacular play known as Wisdom likewise identifies 
“Reason” with the image of God in the human soul, and its components (personified in the play 
as Mind, Understanding, and Will) help guide the figure of Anima back to God.  Marguerite‟s 
explicit use of prosopopeia when Soul takes on Reason‟s voice connects the speakers while 
maintaining deliberate distance: Soul does not “become” Reason in the same ontological way 
that she “becomes” Love.  Reason is adopted, but subjugated; as Soul demonstrates the ability to 
both anticipate and answer Reason‟s questions and objections, she reveals a capacity to control 
Reason and employ her powers toward the goals of faith. 
To return to literary concerns in the Mirror specifically, in all of this we come up against 
the question that James Paxson asks about prosopopeia: “in a personification figure, exactly what 
gets converted into or personified as whom?”368 It would seem that Soul‟s speaking I is not only 
the I of Soul, but of the other allegorical figures of Love and Reason as well, and conversely 
their I is Soul‟s I. Therefore, is Reason actually Soul, or is Soul actually Reason?  Is Reason the 
faculty of reason accorded to every soul, or the unique reasoning power of Soul?  Is it a power of 
all annihilated souls? Here we seem to slip toward a teleology in which every voice is Soul‟s.   
Yet Soul is not a conglomerate, not a set of faculties each with its own voice.  In the 
dialogue with Love and Reason, as in Soul‟s singing with which I began, Soul‟s voice seems to 
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be less what embraces all others than what emerges from the interplay between them.  Love and 
Reason are not alter-egos of the subject akin to the personified faculties of a soul that battle in 
psychomachia-style dramas.  The dialogue between Soul, Reason, and Love is not primarily a 
drama of triumph over sinful influences or a clash of forces acting on a soul and threatening its 
salvation.  These other figures are instead what Soul becomes, the entities with which she 
merges.  As the interplay of the dialogue allows Soul to inhabit their voices, she temporarily 
becomes the Other.  And in the allegory, that Other is divine.  In the case of Love, it is God 
himself; even in the brief merger with Reason, it is a gift or extension of the divine.
369
 
Crucially, the voices overlap for brief moments in the text, not permanent situations: 
Love does not always speak for Soul, nor Soul for Love.  Marguerite presents them as distinct 
personifications, and they even engage in debate.  In this way, the union between the two 
parallels that between Soul and God, with Soul again negotiating a position between the union 
experienced in the sixth stage and a sense of still standing apart during mortal life – the highs and 
lows of her liminal state.  Through the intermittent blending of her voice with other 
personifications, Soul inhabits a liminal position in the allegory, somewhere between “Soul” and 
“Love,” between “Soul” and “Reason,” between “Soul” and “God” just as she does in relation to 
God as an annihilated soul caught in-between, in the process of becoming fully united to the 
divine Other. 
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God’s Words 
While dialogic structure itself destabilizes authority, any mystical text claiming to relate 
“secret knowledge” of the divine makes the narrating voice uniquely vulnerable: the voices of 
mystic and God must blend if the mystic is to convey special insight into divine mystery.
370
 The 
mystic must adopt the divine voice, destabilizing her own – at best, layering it with her own.  As 
Michel de Certeau writes, when the mystic speaks on behalf of God, the I that speaks actually 
“marks in the text the empty place…where the other speaks.”371 For Certeau, this intersection is 
the very “locus” of mystic speech: if the origin of what is spoken or written by the mystic rests in 
God, mystic speech is in its basic function an engagement between speaker and God, and one 
type of union between human and divine can occur in and through language.  As discussed in 
chapter one, we see the issue in Augustine.  “You hear nothing true from my lips which you have 
not first told me,” he laments to God who is the origin of his words and knowledge.372  
There are significant consequences: the mystic shifts to being narrator of another‟s 
utterance, “the effect” of another‟s speech, and the dynamic complicates her ontological status.  
She becomes like “the musician in Bosch‟s Garden of Earthly Delights, who is caught in his 
harp…played by the song that sends him into ecstasy, insane from being imprisoned in his 
instrument, that is, in the body of the voice of the other.” 373 Where does the song end and the 
musician‟s work begin?  The line blurs between the harp and the musician it possesses as its own 
instrument. 
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The boundary between Soul and God similarly blurs in the Mirror‟s dialogue, a 
culmination of what Marguerite figures in the other blurred boundaries that she writes into the 
text: the linked names Ame and Amour, Soul‟s eventual namelessness, the melding of Soul‟s 
voice with the voices of other personifications.  When Soul announces that she is only able to say 
anything about God by doing so through him, her words blend with divine words.   Introducing 
her two petitions, Soul insists that she does not know how to make her request; neither, she 
insists, do the saints nor any orders of angels.
374
 But divine intervention makes her utterance 
possible: 
Whanne noon of þe nyne ordris wote it not, what wite ȝe, lady soule? seiþ reason. 
So doiþ God, seiþ loue, bi diuine nature, þe drawinges of his loue in her þat in hir 
fourmeþ wiþouten witynge hir demaundes.  And hir demaundes ben out of alle 
creatures knowleche þere creatures mowe haue no knowynge of it.
375
 
God commands Soul‟s psychic life: the petitions – the paradoxically known unknowable –  are  
formed within her without her awareness, “in hir fourmeþ wiþouten witynge.”376 There is, to be 
sure, a theological point to be made here about how one can pray, but also an ontological and a 
narratological one, a reminder that we cannot entirely distinguish the voice that speaks.  Soul 
stands again as liminal, “in-between,” “both/and” rather than “either/or,” and accepts this as her 
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normal state, no “meruaile.”377 It epitomizes the condition of the fifth stage in which “Now sche 
is al and sche is noon,” all and nothing, with God who is everything and yet still aware of herself. 
She still distinguishes herself from God, recognizing that he forms the petitions that she offers.  
This is not a continuous sixth stage in which the soul sees nothing except God, “ne seeϸ but God 
himsilf.”378 
  Soul‟s confusion about her own utterances reflects that this liminal position, here figured 
as the assimilation of one‟s thoughts and voice with those of an Other, is anything but 
comfortable.  When she exclaims, affirming the non-contradictory nature of the Incarnation, “O, 
I, me, seiþ þis soule, from whennes came me þis to seie?” she makes clear that this is not just a 
matter of God implanting an idea within her, but overtaking her.  Thus the speaking Soul that 
Marguerite presents is one who is disoriented, unsure even of the origin of her own words.  By 
way of response, “God ϸe Fadir”  enters the dialogue to announce that he has shared secrets with 
her, and wills “ϸat sche wite ϸe secres of my Sone ϸoruȝ ϸe loue of ϸe Hooli Goost.”379 This is 
not an answer to the doctrinal quandary about the Incarnation, but an examination of 
relationship: it is a discourse about who is speaking.  The text does not offer a simple statement 
that Soul‟s words come from God.  Instead, Marguerite depicts the moment through a dramatic 
dialogue, a meta-narrative representing the very merger of words that is being discussed.   
 Although Marguerite portrays Soul caught in the words of the Other – even words that 
confuse her status – nothing in the text indicates decisively that the reader is supposed to 
interpret all of Soul‟s words as words that occur only in a state of rapture, for instance when 
swept into the sixth stage.  They may be the words of the fifth state.  This distinction becomes 
                                                 
377
 Mirror, 330.34. 
378
 Ibid. 342.13. 
379
 Ibid. 293.16-19. 
155 
  
clearer in comparison with the ecstatic utterances recorded in contemporaneous mystical texts, 
particularly mystical dialogues.   
A notable example is Catherine of Siena‟s Dialogue.  Translated into Middle English 
around 1420 under the title The Orcherd of Syon, the English version is another Continental 
import produced in a context in some ways similar to that of the English Mirror.
380
 As a dialogue 
between God and the soul, the text invites attention to how voices circulate.  The Orcherd frames 
the text as Catherine‟s words dictated while in a state of mystical ecstasy: “when sche was in 
contemplacioun inrapt of spirit, and sche heringe actueli and in ϸe same tyme tellinge tofore 
meny what oure Lord God spake in her.”381 This description stresses that the words have a divine 
source, and as a dialogue, much of the narration is not only Catherine‟s reflections, but 
instruction from the point of view of a divine figure who addresses her.  Therefore, from the start 
Catherine‟s closeness to the divine is modeled by her channeling of God‟s comments, which she 
repeats, and by the state in which she speaks.  Like Bosch‟s musician, Catherine at points seems 
to lose her voice, her words entirely assumed as God‟s.  There are bizarre moments of narration, 
such as when Catherine says (in persona Dei): 
Therfore I seye to ϸee, & longe tyme tofore ϸis I seyde to ϸee, if ϸou wilt 
remembre ϸee, what tyme ϸou coueytist to do greet penaunce for me and seidist: 
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Lord what myȝte I do to suffre penaunce for ϸee? and ϸanne in ϸi soule and in ϸi 
mynde I answeride ϸee and seyde: I am he which delyte me in fewe wordis and in 
manye gode werkis.
382
 
Here Catherine channels the words of God speaking about himself, conspicuously speaking in 
the present about what he has said to her in the past, and also quoting (still in his voice) how she 
responded in the past.  It is God‟s voice (although speaking through Catherine) that recounts 
Catherine‟s past words.  Certeau could hardly ask for a more striking example of the mystic‟s 
captured voice, locked into speaking God‟s speech. 
Most significant for my consideration of the Mirror is that while passages such as this 
commingle the voices of God and Catherine, they indicate the union between them primarily by 
illustrating Catherine‟s ability to channel those words in rapture and operate in this complex 
system of narration, rather than by her words gradually mirroring or merging with those of the 
divine, or even by her use of metaphors and images.  Soul‟s dialogue in the Mirror, by contrast, 
is a drama preoccupied with the line between God and the human soul.  The narrating Soul in 
Marguerite‟s text alternates between her own contemplation (as we see in the reflexive 
dialogues), points at which she channels divine words, and points at which she speaks alongside 
and to God in a dialogue.  In its narrative form, the Mirror plays out a drama of “farnearness”: 
some of Soul‟s speaking positions represent union, while others show Soul standing apart from 
God. 
M.N.‟s gloss stresses that Soul‟s metaphors and meditations should be understood as a 
special language of love.  He frequently attributes Soul‟s speech to moments of insight or a 
change in her state, for instance explaining after one exchange about descriptions of God that 
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“this is an vsage in loues daliaunce” by souls that have special understanding from “cleer siȝt in 
diuine beholdynges.”383 Thus in some ways it appears that M.N. approaches the Mirror as words 
uttered in ecstasy, similar to Catherine‟s text.  But for M.N. the underlying problem is a 
linguistic obstacle: human language simply cannot keep up with what one wishes to say of God, 
and so according to M.N. we must read cautiously, noting these are the words of a soul swept 
into a vision of God and desperately trying to find expression.  The Mirror portrays Soul 
engaged in a struggle to negotiate the boundary of language as well as ontological status, and 
M.N.‟s reading of her words is both aware of, and sympathetic to, that struggle.  Catherine is 
able to utter the divine word without such tensions, and her translator accepts this as simple fact. 
Henry Suso‟s Horologium sapientiae likewise depicts a dialogue between a particular 
soul, Suso‟s semi-autobiographical “Disciple,” and the divine, with the latter appearing as an 
allegorical personification of Wisdom associated with Christ.
384
 Although too late to influence 
Marguerite directly, this Boethian-style dialogue warrants attention in any analysis about how 
religious writers utilize dialogue, being one of the most popular devotional texts of the late 
Middle Ages.
385
 While the text is at points full of the language of embrace and eroticism, often 
drawing imagery from the Song of Songs, it does not represent a fusion between the voices of the 
Disciple and Wisdom.
386
 Rather, the text emphasizes the distance and disjunction between their 
perspectives.  As late as chapter four of Book I, Wisdom still laments the Disciple‟s viewpoints 
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and bemoans that he does not recognize her, is driven out of his mind with sorrow, and has 
“collapsed…„fallen down on the ground.‟”387 As in Boethius‟ Consolation (which this passage 
recalls), over the course of the text Wisdom‟s dialogue with the Disciple aims to realign the 
Disciple‟s perspective to accord with that of his allegorical guide.  Wisdom therefore directs the 
Disciple‟s outlook and speech, for instance advising him on the type of praise he should utter.388 
But neither personification usurps the voice of the other.  
Catherine, Suso, and Marguerite all portray experience of the unknowable and ineffable.  
Catherine offers herself up, letting the divine voice overtake her own.  Suso apportions a divine 
voice to his allegorical personification of Wisdom, and does not endow the Disciple with the 
power of divine speech.  I note these examples not in an attempt to trace or rule out influence, 
but to highlight Marguerite‟s creativity and how she walks a much more complicated line in her 
use of allegorical personifications.  Through the back and forth relational elements of dialogue –
in Soul‟s reflexive moments, in the melding of her voice with those of other figures, in her 
adoption of the divine voice, all of which are temporary – Marguerite represents the incomplete 
nature of Soul‟s mystical union with God. 
A final comparison, this time with the affective moves of other dialogic literature, further 
clarifies the Mirror‟s distinctive use of dialogue.  Devotional lyrics on the Passion are a 
decidedly different textual project than the Mirror, but are related in terms of structure and 
concerns with how mankind addresses God.  To take one striking example, the popular Middle 
English devotional lyric “Stond wel, moder, under rode,” based on the Latin “Stabat juxta Christi 
crucem,” is written as a dialogue between Christ as he hangs on the cross and his mother Mary as 
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she watches below.  For much of the poem, Christ and Mary alternately address one another, 
each speaking three lines at a turn, beginning with a discussion of Mary‟s sorrows: 
 „Stond wel, moder, under rode, 
 Bihold thi child with glade mode, 
  Blythe moder might thou be.‟ 
 „Sone, how may I blithe stonden? 
 I se thin feet, I se thin honden,  
  Nayled to the harde tre.‟ 
 
 „Moder do wey thi wepinge; 
 I thole this deth for mannes thinge, 
  For owen gilte thole I non.‟ 
 „Sone, I fele the dethe-stounde, 
 The swerd is at min herte-grounde, 
  That me by-highte Symeon.‟ 389 
 
But as the poem unfolds, Mary not only expresses grief at watching her son, but reflects back his 
precise sufferings; he in turn suffers at her experience.  The following stanza continues, 
 „Moder rew upon thy beren! 
 Thow washe awey tho blodi teren, 
  It don me werse than mi det.‟ 
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 „Sone, how might I teres wernen? 
 I se tho blodi flodes ernen, 
  Out of thin herte to min fet.‟390 
 
Christ is further hurt by the tears he implores his mother to “washe awey.” For him, they inflict 
pain worse than that of his impending death.  Mary in turn specifically details her son‟s 
suffering, noting the streams of blood that flow from him.  She goes on with further details, 
claims no pain except hell can be greater than her sorrow (thus linking her own pain with the 
journey to hell that Christ announces he must face), and her identification with her son‟s 
suffering culminates with the assertion, “Sone, I wille with thee founden / I deye, y-wis, of thine 
wounden / So rewful deth was never non,” a claim that she herself will die as a result of his 
wounds.
391
 As Suzanne Fein writes, capturing the relational element in this lyric, “the symbiosis 
of [Christ and Mary‟s] suffering is thus constructed in palpable detail as well as in feeling. What 
he experiences as God she may experience even more feelingly as human mother.”392 We could 
say that one speaks for the other, that Mary gives voice to Christ‟s specific sufferings or that her 
announcement of her death really announces (occurring as the last piece of dialogue) Christ‟s 
own death that he can no longer speak.  The two are most deliberately linked by their shared 
suffering.  The tradition of affective piety, which encouraged identification with the suffering of 
Christ and Mary, here finds emotive power in their exchange of words.  It is by virtue of their 
shared experience of pain and common cry of lamentation that their voices mirror one another 
and meld. 
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The Harley lyric “In a vaile of restles mynd” depicts a comparable situation.  The poet 
persona, out wandering, finds a bloody man representing the crucified Christ.  After the poet‟s 
description of the encounter in the first two stanzas, the remainder of the lyric is narrated by 
Christ, who expresses love for his spiritual spouse (i.e., the soul) and bewails her abandonment 
of him.  He begins, “I am trew love that fals was never. / My sister, mannes soule, I loved hir 
thus… She flytt, I followed; I loved her so / That I suffred thes paynes piteous.”393 The 
onlooking poet persona (and reader) are drawn to sorrow and pity as Christ details his torments, 
or as Ann Astell has proposed, drawn to identify with the loving bride Christ seeks “and then, 
through her, with Christ himself.”394 In the second phase of the poem, as Christ addresses the 
onlooker/reader/spiritual bride in the second-person, we find outbursts that focus attention on the 
gruesome details of the Passion, such as “Loke unto myn handes, man,” as Christ details his 
wounds.
395
 Most important for our purposes here is that the dialogue assumes and encourages the 
poet persona‟s imaginative, affective participation in Christ‟s described suffering.  Like 
Marguerite‟s Mirror, dialogues such as these suggest a reflective relationship between God and 
another speaking and desiring subject.  But in the case of the lyrics, the primary bridge between 
the two is an affective connection through shared suffering, expressed through dialogue. 
The Mirror relies almost exclusively on the blending of voices, without dictation from 
prolonged ecstasy and without affectivity, to bridge the gap between Soul and God and to model 
Soul‟s ambiguous ontological status.  Dialogue is one means of representing a status in-between, 
both united and distinct, neither wholly one nor the other, the soul in the process of becoming 
one with God.  The Mirror‟s drama plays this out with temporary movement in and out of the 
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speaking positions of God and his attributes, a symbolic movement in and out of the complete 
union with the divine that cannot yet be permanent.  Commingled voices illustrate the fraught, 
inevitably divisive condition of yearning to abandon the self fully, to “melt” completely into 
God, to lose one‟s name and status, and yet being unable to do so.  Has Marguerite, then, found a 
resolution to the tension she herself establishes between the limitations of language and her wish 
to narrate, a way to represent union and its instability indirectly? 
 
The Mirror’s Final Words 
Early passages in the Mirror tend to stress Soul‟s ambiguous ontological status, which is 
seemingly a result of her move toward the state of annihilation.  For instance, early in the text, 
Love explains that the soul in the course of abandoning herself to God, undergoing the process of 
annihilation, “is so litel þat sche ne may hirsilf fynde,” and has so “þe wittes ylost in þis usage, 
that sche kan not seke God ne hir soule fynde ne hirsilf lede,” stressing not only Soul‟s 
minimizing of individual will but the ambiguity of her status.
396
 Where is she?  And next, what is 
she? The problem appears to culminate in chapter 109 with a seeming crisis of self-definition.
397
 
It is here that Soul questions her state of being and its current shifts by exclaiming, “O God, O 
God…what am I now? Whanne I was nouȝt er þan I owide enyþing, what am I now? Whanne I 
was noþing er þan I owide to my God enyþing bi werk of propre wille,” and again in a plea to 
Truth a few lines later, “Ah trouþe, seiþ ϸis soule, what am I? Seie me.”398  
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Conversely, in subsequent chapters Soul more boldly defines her status.  As part of the 
song in chapter 120, Soul announces to Truth (to whom she earlier turned for an explanation of 
herself), “if it plese ȝou to wite at what I am, I schal seie it ȝou bi pure curtesie.”399 By the 
conclusion of the text, Soul does not hesitate to provide firm and decisive answers.  She 
announces, “I answeride anon, þis þat I am, I am pure nouȝt.”400 This self-definition, a claim that 
she is “nothing,” is in fact a full assumption of her annihilation.  It is, arguably, a self-erasure.  
But it is also, finally, a firm and stable status.  In Chantilly, it prepares for chapter 138, absent in 
the English text, which includes the most direct assertion of annihilation and (re)union with God:  
Or est ceste Ame en l‟estre de ce premier estre qui est son estre, et si a laissé trois, 
et a fait de deux ung.  Mais quant est cest ung? Cest ung est, quant l‟Ame est 
remise en celle simple Deité…sans sentement, dessus la pensee.401 
 
Now this Soul is in the state of her first being, which is her being, and so has left 
three and has made one out of two.  But what constitutes this one?  This one is 
when the Soul is melted in that simple Deity…without feeling, beyond thought. 
 
Watson makes a related claim about Soul‟s progress, reading the English text alongside 
Rolle and other Insular writers concerned with “the rhetoric of ecstasy” and suggesting that souls 
depicted in these texts “melt into God not in the brief moments of ineffable silence…but in 
another way altogether: by talking about it.”402 He also proposes, as I have similarly suggested 
with regard to Soul‟s self-descriptions in the text, that the evolving theological explanations over 
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the course of the Mirror imply that Marguerite herself moved closer to understanding as she 
wrote the book, and we fail to see the text in her terms if we do not allow for its “performative 
aspect as a book…which exists to convert even its own author to the life it imagines.”403 I have 
argued that the performative element of the Mirror occurs in the dialogue itself, in a narrative 
whose shape reveals Soul‟s struggles and status.  The figure of Soul talks through the mysteries 
of her experience and, at the conclusion, appears to better comprehend them and make sense of 
her own desperate metaphors.  But also, she usurps voices to enact a drama evidencing her 
relationship with God, and Marguerite invents her own path, strikingly unique among the 
contemplative and literary traditions before and after her, by having Soul do so in a distinctly 
non-affective way.   
In the Chantilly text, Marguerite seems to write her way, or Soul to speak her way, into 
her sought-after “freedom” and dissolution of a former identity.  By the bold claim of union in 
chapter 138 referenced above, that “the Soul is melted in that simple Deity…without feeling, 
beyond thought,” the allegorical figures that gave structure to the dialogue fade away.404 The 
speaker may be Soul or Love; it is unclear, but the use of the third-person here in any case 
effaces the distinct I accorded to both figures elsewhere.
405
 We have instead a “one,” a glimpse at 
the point at which names are no longer an issue of debate.  Finally naming, like the allegorical 
dialogue itself, is simply superfluous.  In this depiction of a state beyond, Soul is no longer in 
flux; the text concludes with a vision across the borderline.  Whereas earlier in the text 
allegorical dialogue gave shape to impermanent union and represented it through back and forth 
exchange, it is absent here in this final vision of permanent oneness with God.  Ricoeur offers a 
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reminder that a subject can be most present and most necessary when drawing attention to 
another‟s words by attributing that speech.406 Such distinctions are erased as we near the end of 
what survives in Chantilly. 
But the English Mirror concludes with text equivalent to chapter 136 in Chantilly, a 
reflection on God‟s love for the soul, followed by a lyrical “gloss” not found in Chantilly.  In this 
final poem, Soul describes the different ways that God‟s “iȝe biholdeϸ” her, how his eye sees 
her, and she is still caught in a dance negotiating her relation to the divine and looking for 
specific labels that are appropriate in God‟s view: he beholds her in her “necessite,” in her 
willing “noϸing ϸat he ne willeϸ,” and as his beloved.407 In the English text, Soul never escapes 
her own speech, the cycle of shifting positions it narrates, or the struggle to name the self in flux.  
The text ends, therefore, with Soul‟s liminality, coupled with concerns about the central conflict 
with which I began chapter three: the drive to write an experience that is impossible to 
encapsulate in language.  
We cannot be certain that Marguerite wrote the final poem that concludes the English 
text.
408
 I would suggest, however, that the lack of resolution in the English text is just as fitting 
for a conclusion as the glimpse of a soul‟s finally achieved freedom that we see in Chantilly.  
Indeed, it is more fitting, regardless of whether Marguerite, M.N., or someone else penned the 
final piece of the English text.  I have argued that the dialogue is a partial way around the 
linguistic dilemma of describing mystical union and its instability, but it is a remarkably 
elaborate narrative strategy.  The English Mirror‟s final tone of exhaustion and anguish is thus 
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appropriate to the work as a whole.  In the end, we might place Marguerite‟s transcendent 
experience and her attempt to write it alongside that of Augustine, of whom Lyotard remarks, 
“on the point of resting his stilus after thirteen books of contrition and celebration of grace 
incarnate, [he] finds himself at the threshold of [God‟s] door, still stuck in the thick pall of 
affairs.”409 This tension is valuable to us in itself, perhaps a medieval illustration of Ricoeur‟s 
claim that narrative identity emerges in the dialectic between our sameness and the self that is 
always stretching away from it.
410
 It is, finally, a demonstration of narrative both enabling 
communication of the ineffable and entrapping the speaking subject in a never-ending utterance.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
“I SAW HIM AND SOUGHT HIM, AND I HAD HIM AND I WANTED HIM”: 
 
JULIAN OF NORWICH‟S NARRATIVE OF VISIONS 
 
 
Julian’s Narrative of the Self 
Julian of Norwich is now part of the mainstream.  She is perhaps the only medieval 
mystic to have won the attention of a non-academic, twenty-first century readership, with 
editions of her texts now marketed for both popular and specialist audiences.  Recent years have 
seen the publication of a multitude of daily devotionals that excerpt Julian‟s writing, now usually 
available in commercial bookstores chains.
411
 Heroine to a number of modern interest-groups, 
she has been multiplied into what Christopher Abbott calls “mythic Julians.” Among them are 
“Julian the feminist, Julian the eco-theologian, Julian the New Age „oceanic‟ mystic, Julian the 
proto-liberal Christian.” 412 Even within Christian categorizations, she has been identified as a 
Universalist, also frequently appears in catalogs of Roman Catholic saints even though she has 
never been formally beatified, and is honored by the Anglican Communion.  Julian is patroness 
of the mixed contemplative Order of Julian of Norwich (est. 1985), and ecumenical “Julian 
Groups,” which see her work as a guide to contemplative prayer, are flourishing at a dramatic 
rate.
413
  Her shrine, established at the presumed location of her medieval anchorage at the Church 
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of St. Julian in Norwich, is a popular pilgrimage destination, home to the “Julian Centre,” and 
the site of an annual festival. 
It is a popularity that she was never close to attaining in her own day, a modern 
renaissance initiated in part by Evelyn Underhill‟s influential Mysticism, which appeared in 1911 
and highlighted Julian as a key figure in the tradition.  Julian, according to Underhill, “crowns 
the history of English mediaeval mysticism.”414 By the late twentieth-century, Julian had drawn 
attention from diverse academic circles in the fields of theology, history, and literature, as she 
continues to do today.  Despite their differently-motivated interests in her, commentators on 
Julian – scholarly, spiritual, environmental, and otherwise – share a tendency to be effusive in 
their praise.  From a theological perspective, Rowan Williams proposes that Julian‟s writing 
“may well be the most important work of Christian reflection in the English language.”415 One 
recent text goes so far as to declare that Julian‟s way of discussing God “has never been 
duplicated in the clarity and eloquence of its language.”416 This is very high praise, and lavish for 
any Middle English prose text. 
This ardent embrace of Julian‟s text – almost a mystical ecstasy in itself – may have 
several causes.  Aspects of her writing invite the attention of specific groups of readers.  Her 
development of images of Jesus as mother, for example, offers material for Christian feminists 
seeking to critique masculine images of God.  Her visions of the whole of creation held in the 
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hand of the divine resonate with New Age spiritualists.  For scholars, she has the intrigue of 
being one of the few identifiably female writers in medieval England, and one of rigorous 
intellect at that.  And then there is the comfort of Julian‟s apparent serenity, along with her oft-
noted tone of a friend who wishes to share her experience of God‟s love with her “even cristen.”  
Awe toward the subject, and the apparently mesmerizing effects of Julian‟s serenity, 
seem to blind many commentators to the underlying struggles that are an integral part of Julian‟s 
experience and her attempts to describe it.  Julian‟s writing chronicles revelations she 
experienced during a period of illness in 1373, along with her subsequent rumination on them, 
which according to her continued for a minimum of twenty years.  Her writing records a long 
term struggle to understand and redefine herself in relation to the God she experienced in the 
visions.  Like the other mystics in this study, Julian struggles to understand how to live her 
ontological liminality.  Her need to renegotiate the gap between self and divine other, after 
boundaries have been blurred by revelations from God, is the central dilemma in her writing; 
articulating her new relation to God is one of its main challenges.  Thus her text poses a problem 
rather than a solution (a perfect contemplative path): she invites the reader to witness a 
disruption in her perceptions of her own ontology and her subsequent attempts to process this 
change.   
In this chapter, I argue that as Julian negotiates her liminality, a new stance in relation to 
God, the style and structure of her narration parallels this process: the narration itself often resists 
a firm stance and eschews finality and conclusiveness.  Just as Julian continuously renegotiates 
her perception of ontology after her encounter with God in a series of visions, the text similarly 
becomes a hall of mirrors – an unending series of reflections. 
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Julian‟s text presents one of the most interesting medieval cases of form becoming 
content, in large part precisely because it happens so subtly – even peacefully.  Her embrace of 
the liminal is one of the aspects that makes her text distinctive.  In some ways, Julian appears to 
be the most conventional and straightforward narrator in this study.  Her work survives in two 
versions known as the Short Text and Long Text (hereafter ST and LT), both of which are clear 
first-person accounts.
417
 They are the most explicitly first-person writing that I have discussed so 
far.  The reader engages Julian‟s visions only through her own framing of the experience.  This is 
true, as Abbott has put it, “whether the narrative invites us to observe Julian or to observe with 
her.”418 The narrative charts her process of bridging the gap between human and divine.   
And indeed, Julian often seems to be working to explain her relationship to God to 
herself as much as to her audience.  This is in notable contrast to many other medieval 
visionaries whose revelations are reportedly explained to them as they appear.  Such is the case 
for Hildegard and Catherine of Siena, whose visions are narrated by God in a continuous 
voiceover, and the visions of Hadewijch and Margery Kempe, which are accompanied by instant 
interpretive clarity.  Other writers‟ confidence in interpretation contrasts palpably with the 
meditative approach to which Julian herself attests.  She explains that she spent twenty years 
rereading and considering her Parable of the Lord and the Servant; similarly, it is not until fifteen 
years after the visions (even more specifically, fifteen years of seeking their meaning) that she 
grasped the unity of the showings as a revelation of God‟s love.419 We might compare this to 
Hadewijch‟s confidence in her own understanding, something she proclaims even when she asks 
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God for a better explanation: in her vision of the divine “abyss,” Hadewijch pauses to remark, 
“And although I asked to know this, I nevertheless perceived the essence of all the things I saw.  
For all that is seen in the spirit when one is ravished by Love is understood, tasted, seen, and 
heard through and through.”420 Julian receives some guidance in the form of “words formed in 
her understanding” as visions unfold before her, as well as the secondary revelations years later.  
But usually she lacks Hadewijch‟s absolute certainty in the moment.  The plot of Julian‟s 
narrative is her process of understanding and assuming her relation to God. 
While she writes of personal experience and offers glimpses into her life, Julian‟s text is 
by no means a comprehensive life story.  At the start of her account (the beginning of ST and the 
second chapter of LT), she relates her request for three graces from God: “mende of the passion,” 
a life-threatening illness at a young age, and three wounds of contrition, compassion, and longing 
for God.
421
 Yet there are no details to indicate what circumstances inspired these desires.  Julian 
relates rather bare personal details of her age, “thirty yers olde and halfe” when the showings 
occurred in May 1373, and the length and seriousness of the sickness that kept her bedridden and 
on the verge of death at that time. These are details directly related to her youthful petition for 
the three gifts.  She mentions that she had previously forgotten her first two requests and 
remembered only the desire for three wounds, but does not explain why this was the case.
422
  
Nor is her text a pure theological treatise: it is too much a personal exploration of her 
revelations and the development of a theology.  Her texts appear to be the only work of 
speculative theology originally composed in English during her era, as Nicholas Watson and 
Jacqueline Jenkins put it, “a prolonged investigation into the divine” aiming for “a new 
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understanding of human living in the world.”423 It is difficult even to trace her relationship to 
possible models of her time despite the fact that some modern scholars insist she had a vast and 
deep knowledge of medieval authors.  One extreme branch of modern scholarship creates 
another “mythic Julian” in its own image: Julian the hyper-educated young theologian.  
It is not impossible that Julian obtained, perhaps due to some benefactor or connections, a 
directed and comprehensive education in the liberal arts and “Latin and vernacular spiritual 
classics,” as Edmund College and James Walsh theorize. 424 Christine de Pisan was able to attain 
a similar quality of education from her father and the library to which they happened to have 
access.  But it is unlikely.  Julian refers to herself as a “simple creature that cowde no letter,” a 
remark usually taken to mean that she could not read and write Latin, for she almost certainly 
wrote and revised her English text.
425
 More to the point, as was the case for Elizabeth and 
Marguerite as well, there is little in Julian‟s text that would require her to have it.  Indeed, lack of 
a formal education may be the cause of some of the imprecise language that I will observe in her 
text.  Nothing in her book could not have been arrived at through private contemplation (if not 
divine insight), the general theological and devotional currency of her cultural milieu, and/or 
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through the informal education she could have received through social interactions.
426
 There is a 
degree of presumption in assuming that this could not be the case.  We do well to keep in mind 
that a remarkably broad, modern audience has embraced Julian‟s writing, including those 
without formal theological training and even non-Christian readers of the New Age movement.  
This should remind us that her revelations function with remarkable clarity and power even 
entirely outside of the context of the late medieval theological and contemplative tradition.
427
   
Ultimately, Julian‟s writing defies categorization.  Although her writing has affinities 
with other visionary texts and meditative writing, Julian does not merely take any one literary 
type as a model.  The complexity is oft-noted.  Frederick Bauerschmidt suggests that Julian‟s 
text exceeds modern distinctions (such as imagistic/Catholic versus personal/Protestant) but also 
“the interpretive categories available to her.”428 Tarjei Park observes her duality as both 
visionary and “writer on contemplation.”429 Her text is a sort of conglomerate: as Watson 
describes it, “a dialogic, imagistically spare, and theologically dense visionary argument 
which...is without structural precedent or parallel,” although he suggests she could perhaps see 
herself as part of a female visionary tradition.
430
  
My reading suggests that we have difficulty defining Julian precisely because the “story” 
here is about the new relation – Julian‟s liminality – that the revelations initiate, and negotiating 
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a gap that is, in the first place, only hazily understood by her.  Unlike the texts of Elizabeth and 
Marguerite, there is no immediately obvious creativity in form – no dance, no allegorical debate.  
In Julian‟s text, we must look closely at the overlap of epistemological, ontological, and 
linguistic problems that each contribute to her liminal position in order to understand how the 
shape of her narration mirrors that liminality of understanding, being, and language. 
She is, in fact, the most explicitly liminal of the mystics in this study.  Her 
epistemological concerns about the impossibility of knowing God lead to concern with whether 
one can know oneself if the soul is “knit” to an unknowable God.  Ontologically, she struggles to 
understand the line between self and God (and how and whether death remakes it), to understand 
what she is in her “passand lif,” and what she will be later, all the while seeing the soul as 
already a part of God.  Moreover, she receives her revelations while literally on the border of life 
and death during a period of severe illness.  Having become an anchoress at some point in her 
adult life, she lived a symbolic death while still alive, visibly living in the liminal.  And as she 
struggles to find language for all of these concerns and for her experience of God in the 
revelations, she negotiates thresholds of expression.   
 
Julian’s Narrative of Knowing: The Epistemological Limen 
 The first challenge in Julian‟s text is that of trying of write about things she cannot fully 
know, including both God and the self.  Julian connects the entire purpose of the revelation and 
the writing of her text with a process of self-discovery in the sense of coming to better 
understand the nature of her self and her relationship to God.  Her revelation asserts that God is 
love, but also calls into question how the human soul is to respond to the revelation of his love.  
Approaching the conclusion of LT, Julian writes, 
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It longith to us to have iii manner of knowyngs: the first is that we knowen our lord 
God; the ii that we knowen ourselfe, what we arn be him in kinde and grace; the iii 
that we knowen meekly what ourselves is anempts our synne and febilness. And for 
these iii was all the shewing made, as to my vnderstondyng.
431
 
The passage echoes Julian‟s earlier assertion with which I began chapter one, her claim that we 
ought to seek knowledge of ourself, and that knowledge is ultimately only found in God.
432
 
Approaching her conclusion, she does not merely say that such self-knowledge is an important 
lesson, but goes further and says that it is the reason for the revelation: it is to explain this that 
“all the shewing [was] made.” She holds up self-knowledge as an ultimate goal.  It is the goal of 
what we must discover, and God‟s purpose in the showings was to help Julian grasp that this is 
our goal.  
The obstacle is that those in mortal life cannot yet know God, and therefore we cannot 
know ourselves until after death.  As Julian explains, “we may never full know ourselfe unto the 
laste poynte; in which poynte this passend life and manner of peyne and wo shall have an 
end.”433 One cannot know oneself until one knows God.  This is an old dilemma present in 
scripture.  John declares that complete knowledge of the self is not possible until one beholds 
God, advising, “we are now the sons of God: and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be.  We 
know, that when he shall appear, we shall be like to him: because we shall see him as he is.”434 
Julian echoes almost precisely these words in chapter 46 as she contrasts the knowledge possible 
during earthly life with future, complete knowledge: “But our passand lif that we have here in 
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our sensualite knowith not what ourself is; than shal we verily and clerly sen and knowen our 
lord God in fulhede of ioy.”435 
Not only is the process of moving toward knowledge of God and self inevitably 
incomplete, but longing for it increases over the course of life. As Julian continues her discussion 
of knowledge, she suggests that “therfore it behovyth neds to be that the nerer we be our bliss, 
the more we shall longen, and that both be kind and be grace.”436 Julian‟s “even cristen” face the 
impossibility of knowing themselves in this life, and as they reach for that knowledge, will have 
an accompanying, ever-increasing desire for God that likewise cannot be fulfilled until after 
death.  So what is to be done with a longing that continually swells until earthly life falls away? 
Julian‟s answer seems to be that the soul should dwell in longing – even embrace it.  She 
continues with the instruction that “therefore it longyth properly to us, both be kynd and be 
grace, to longen and desiren with al our myghts to knowen ourselfe in fulhede of endles ioye.”437 
It is in our nature to long, “be kynd” to be seeking self-knowledge, or eternal life and the self-
knowledge that comes with it.  And God provides the grace to help the soul long deeply.  This 
longing parallels the desire for complete union with God.  And while the soul in transitory life 
cannot yet be “onyd in bliss” with Christ, Julian emphasizes that “it befallyth us evermore to 
leven in swete prayor and in lovely longyng with our lord Iesus.”438    
What she describes dwelling in, as she longs for knowledge, is a liminal state – a state of 
partial knowledge that coincides with the state of partial union possible during “passand lif.” The 
process of moving toward God and toward the self-knowledge that comes with union is an in-
between existence.  And thus when Julian embraces prayer and the desire for God, which she 
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calls “swete” and “lovely,” she embraces the liminal.  Prayer is part of the process of drawing 
closer to union and the knowledge it allows, and when Julian writes that “prayor is a rythwis 
vnderstondyng of that fullhede of ioye that is for to cume, with wel longyng and sekir troste,” 
she seems to celebrate the path to the joy that is yet to come.
439
  
It is essentially a celebration of the path to annihilation: the death of one self and the 
recovery of a true self.  In this case, there will also be a birth of accurate self-knowledge.  
Through continual prayer, Julian proclaims, “we shal dey in longyng for love.  And then shal we 
all come into our lord, ourselfe clerely knowand and God fulsomely havyng.”440 The liminal is 
still not comfortable; it is not a state of fulfillment.  But whereas Marguerite seems to resent 
mere promises, regretting that Love/God keeps the seventh stage of glorification “within herself” 
and inaccessible, Julian seems to delight in the promise of eventual fulfillment.
441
  
While like Marguerite she asserts that complete union cannot be obtained in “passand 
lif,” Julian‟s sense of liminality does not derive only from mystical union: she understands it as 
inherent to the make-up of the soul.  This may seem an opposition to Marguerite‟s concern with 
how one can regain the soul‟s “first being,” the union of her virtual existence.  Really the 
difference is one of angle and emphasis in approaching the same problem.  We might say, in 
other words, that Julian places emphasis on the form of union that already transcends the 
boundary between life and death, rather than how the soul can temporarily cross that boundary.  
Of the three, Julian‟s understanding of the soul‟s ontology best fits the implied claim of 
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Augustine, “what I am not yet, I am.”442 It is always already partly achieved, making her the 
mystic for whom the boundary between soul and God seems least clear-cut. 
 
 
 
Julian’s Narrative of Being: The Ontological Limen I 
When Julian writes of the soul‟s union, she speaks not only of what is possible through 
rapture or mystical ascent, but also of a shared substance between God and souls: a union with 
God inherent to the soul‟s ontology.  She develops a theology of in-dwelling, particularly in LT 
chapter 68 (ST 22) and first in chapter 54, where she announces,  
And hey vnderstondyng it is inwardly to sen and to knowen that God which is our 
maker wonyth in our soule.  And an heyer vunderstondyng it is inwardly to sen 
and to knowen oure soule, that is made, wonyth in Gods substance; of which 
substance, God, we arn that we arn.  And I saw no difference atwix God and our 
substance, but as it were al God.
443
 
The “wonnyng” that Julian imagines here arguably suggests desire to recover man‟s being as an 
object made in the divine image, or to recover one‟s virtual existence.444 Her statement could 
suggest there is an uncreated part of the soul that is “all God.” The vocabulary is slippery here, 
with “wonyth” probably a form of “wonen,” to live or dwell within, and so Julian suggests that 
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the soul lives in God and God in the soul.
 445
 But Julian‟s claim that she saw no difference 
suggests a union of indistinction.  She speaks of a present situation in which there is no 
difference in substance between mankind and God, and that the soul is of one material with God.  
On the one hand, her reference to knowing “oure soule,” suggests that the soul must be distinct 
from God because it can be known separately.  In fact, as I noted in analyzing epistemological 
problems in Julian‟s text, she claims that it is easier to know the unknowable God than the soul 
that is one with him, asserting, “it is ridier to us to cum to the knowyng of God than to knowen 
our owne soule; for our soule is so deepe groundid in God…we may not cum to the knowing 
therof till we have first knowing of God, which is the maker to whom it is onyd.”446 
Julian is on dangerous ground here, edging toward the language of deification and 
slipping toward a claim that the soul, regardless of its own sin and will, is God.  She stays just 
barely shy of this, adding to the passage about seeing “no difference atwix God and our 
substance” a crucial clarification: “and yet myn vnderstondyng toke that our substance is in God: 
that is to sey, that God is God, and our substance is a creture in God.”447 The soul may take its 
substance from God, “the maker to whom it is onyd,” but it is characterized by its createdness; it 
stands apart as a separate “creture” or individual.  It is a rhetorically careful if only academic 
distinction, a distinction that comes as close as possible to suggesting a union of indistinction in 
mortal life without actually crossing the line.
448
 And modern theologians generally come to her 
defense.  One of the defenders of Julian‟s orthodoxy on this point has been Ritamary Bradley, 
who argues that Julian‟s discrete identity is never at stake in her recognition of this union in 
substance, writing that “this fastening does not, however, indicate identity.  When Julian is so 
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united to God in mutual joy that she could not distinguish her substance from God‟s, she still 
knows they are different,” and cites Julian‟s statement about the “creture” status as evidence.449   
 But there is, at best, ambiguity as to where the self begins and ends: is the self God 
(through whom the soul comes to know itself, as we have seen), or is it distinct from God? And 
what does this union indicate if not identity? Julian appears conscious of the soul‟s createdness, 
demonstrating what Otto calls “creature consciousness” at the same time that she identifies with 
what is not created, an identification of the “personal self with the transcendent Reality.”450 She 
seems to perceive an amalgamate soul, an identity that results from recognition of being both 
one‟s self and one‟s self in conjunction with an Other.  It is another case of “both/and” rather 
than “either/or,” and perhaps the most concrete example in this study. 
  To view this in terms of linguistic structure, Julian seems to transcend the syntagmatic 
chain that produces meaning by order, arrangement, and a system of absences:  she transcends 
the chain in which one is what one is because of what one is not.  As discussed in chapter one, in 
the Lacanian schema of identity formation, “to be „me‟ I have to not be other things, I have to 
not be, at the same time, „you‟.”451 Julian isn‟t choosing one or the other, self or God, and seems 
to transcend all of this. 
To illustrate this, she chooses another image: that of the soul “knit to God.” She explains 
that “man soule [is] made for God and in the same points knitt to God.”452 The image suggests an 
interlacing of two things that are united yet disparate.  It is less daring than Marguerite‟s bold 
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metaphors of commingled liquids, consuming fire, or inebriation.  But what Julian describes is 
more explicitly liminal because it is more explicitly a combination of two entities that join and 
yet remain distinct.  While God wills that souls, after passing from mortal life, will “be knitt and 
onyd to him that therin were kept a substance which myte never, ne shuld be, partid from him,” 
in Julian‟s schema souls are already knit to God, and just in the process of being more intimately 
connected with God, moving toward an even greater union after death.
 453
 Julian looks forward to 
a new, future ontology that completely melds God and the soul, but that combination already 
exists in a liminal “now.” She makes the claim even stronger a few chapters later, saying that in 
creation God “made us all at onys; and in our making he knit us and onyd us to hymselfe.”454 
In chapter two I noted the apparent ease with which Phillip accepts Christ becoming 
visible in Elizabeth‟s body (a new Veronica), Elizabeth‟s ease is impersonating the male Christ, 
and how one way to read this fluidity is in light of Bynum‟s work on medieval ideas of the 
female body‟s openness to fusion with the sacred.455 Julian has also been read as having a similar 
understanding of openness, as Bauerschmidt says, “a view of bodies as malleable, transformable 
realities, a view that blurs the line between soul and body.”  He observes that all three of her 
youthful petitions (understanding of the Passion, bodily illness, and “wounds” of contrition, 
compassion, and longing) have a “startling physicality.”456 Even her request for sickness 
involves God‟s intervention in the physical body. 
 And for understanding amalgamate bodies in a medieval context, we might find further 
contemporary context in Jeffrey Cohen‟s examination of medieval “identity units,” identities 
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formed by a conjunction of the self and some other signifier, which he suggests were an integral 
element of medieval understandings of the self.
457
  Cohen argues for a medieval process of 
identity formation through relationships with others and in the context of ongoing multiplicity (a 
sense of a self in process and always changing), that allows for a physical connection with the 
Other: a hybrid being that literally encompasses the physical body of the Other.   
In his most concrete example, Cohen argues that to the medieval mind, a “knight” 
consisted of a human knight, a horse, and their accoutrements together as a whole.  But he has 
also demonstrated a similar understanding at work for the religious subject.  He suggests that 
Margery Kempe‟s union with God seems to exceed what her body can contain, and so to gush 
forth in her weeping and wailing.
458
 His reading of the vita of the eighth-century solitary Guthlac 
sees the saint‟s body as open to being “the site of a fierce psychomachia waged for its 
ownership” as Guthlac negotiates being drawn to identify alternatively with angels and demons 
who visit his wilderness home, a supernatural “crushing press of undifferentiated bodies” that he 
is enticed to join.
459
  
 Yet when Julian writes of having a substance in God, she is not thinking in material 
terms.  Her assemblage is more abstract than what Cohen and Bynum address.  She opposes 
“substance” to “sensuality,” as several theologians have remarked, associating the former with 
our “heyer parte,” the other with a “lower party that may willen no good.”460 God‟s presence in 
the soul may not be what we consider “substance” or even a reflection of the imago Dei at all, 
but the part of the soul that is in union with God‟s will, perhaps drawing on the theological 
                                                 
457
 Jeffrey J. Cohen, Medieval Identity Machines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota P, 2003). 
458
 Ibid. 178. 
459
 Ibid. 124, 133. 
460
 Julian explores this most directly in 58.93-95.  
183 
  
concept of the scintilla rationis.  This is the part “in us which continually enjoys union with God, 
whether or not „we‟ are conscious of it.”461 And Julian appears very conscious of it. 
 As Julian discusses how the soul is “knit” to God, she shakes up her characteristics of the  
soul again, now emphasizing that the soul is not made of anything:  “And thus I vnderstond that 
mannys soule is made of nought, that is to sey, it is made, but of nought that is made,” again 
leaving room for the soul to be created, but still not a part of anything other than God, who is not 
created.
462
 As she continues, “thus is the kynd made rytefully onyd to the maker, which is 
substantial kynd onmade; that is God.  And therefore it is that ther may, ne shall, be ryte nowte 
atwix God and mannys soule.”463  It is a self-consciousness even in an assertion of her nullity, 
recalling Otto‟s characterization of mysticism as “a valuation of the transcendent object… so that 
the finite self contrasted with it becomes conscious even in its nullity that “I am naught, Thou art 
all.”464 
 Yet here again Julian slips into a statement about the soul‟s future state, the point at 
which the soul “shall be” inseparable from God.  The soul is “life,” the part capable of eternal 
life, “a lif, which lif, of his goodness and his grace, shall lestin in hevyn without end.”465 But the 
soul cannot be “onyd in bliss” during mortal life, cannot yet “fulsomely” have God, cannot yet 
“endlessly ben al had in God.”466 This is why the soul lives “in lovely longing.”467  
How do we reconcile Julian‟s description of current union in nature with her insistence 
that complete (re)union has not yet occurred?  She appears to be struggling to negotiate this 
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herself.  One possible interpretation is that we reach a point after death when “createdness is no 
longer a barrier” to complete union with God.468 However, her statement that ultimately there 
will be “right nowte that is made betwixt my God and me” suggests createdness is not only no 
longer a barrier, but somehow abolished.
469
 She may be moving to either of these theoretical 
stances.  Along the way, her insights about the soul‟s substance are markedly circular.  To 
review: she stresses the impossibility of complete union in chapter 40; nonetheless, she stresses 
the soul‟s shared substance with God in chapter 43; she does this only to then assert, again, the 
impossibility of complete union; she returns to epistemological problems in chapter 46 when she 
asserts that we cannot even know our “substance” until after death; and finally in the same 
chapter she returns to her claim that the soul is so “fulsomely onyd to God” that there is nothing 
between them.   
The revelation involves a growing recognition of just how obscure the situation is, and 
how permeable the boundaries are between self and God.  And Julian‟s writing, which itself 
wavers and evades a firm stand, begins to reflect it.  She is both recognizing in herself, and 
further inscribing, a liminal ontology. 
  
Julian’s Narrative of Seeing: The Ontological Limen II 
 However, before turning attention more directly to the structure of Julian‟s text, there is 
more of her liminal condition to examine.  Julian‟s text is a text about visionary experience of the 
divine, an account of revelations “shewed” to her.  It is primarily through vision that she assumes 
a “stand in relation,” enters into a relationship with the divine Other that defines who she is.470 
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Vision becomes a sort of language in which she begins to blend the I and the thou, the internal 
and the external, what constitutes herself and what constitutes the Other who is both outside and 
within.  The eye – physical and figurative (as in her “gostly sight”) – becomes a means of 
communication with God about who and what she is.   
God‟s visual accessibility offers the opportunity for Julian to better understand relation to 
him, to recognize her imperfect union and desire to see him “more blissfully.”471 Moreover, 
Julian portrays this as part of a divine strategy: God has planned for the soul to behold him and 
consequently realize that its humble existence, its ontological status, is bound up in him at the 
same time that is makes clear the soul‟s distance from him.  She explains that God “wille that we 
levyn that we se him continually,” in all the ways he makes himself accessible, for “he will be 
sene and he wil be sowte.”472 It is through vision that Julian takes her liminal stand in relation. 
 Her “showings” unfold through three types of vision.  Julian pauses to try to explain the 
three forms, saying, “all this was shewid by thre: that is to sey, be bodily sight and by word 
formyd in my understonding and be gostly sight.” The first two forms of sight seem 
straightforward to Julian, suggesting we should interpret them as literally as possible: she sees 
with her physical eye, and words (sometimes accompanying what she sees) are formed in her 
thinking or are brought into her consciousness.  But “gostly sight” is inexpressible: of this form 
of seeing she explains, “I cannot ne may not shew it as hopinly ne as fully as I wolde,” and prays 
that God will help the reader to grasp how she experienced these visions.
473
  
 Julian‟s triad may draw on Augustine‟s highly influential division of types of vision into 
the corporeal, the spiritual, and the intellectual, a schema he lays out in The Literal Meaning of 
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Genesis and that became the standard explanation of how visionary experience occurs. 
Numerous scholars have tried to link the two.
 474
 For Augustine, there is a hierarchy that equates 
with the three heavens: the lowest level of visionary experience is to see corporeal things, the 
next to see spiritually, and finally to have “intellectual” vision, to grasp things with the mind.475 
Like Julian, Augustine struggles to explain spiritual sight, visions of immaterial things that look 
material and “the images of bodies even in their absence.”476 
 This may be one place where Julian betrays a lack of formal theological training.  Her 
awkward description suggests that she is not intimately familiar with the specifics of Augustine‟s 
triad, although she may well be integrating Augustine second-hand by responding to what was 
by her time the prevalent cultural understanding of categories of visionary experience. 
 Julian‟s categories blend.  While she distinguishes “bodily sight” from “gostly sight,” in 
practice the two are at least closely linked and often overlap.  She sees Mary “gostly in bodily 
likeness,” somehow seeing the representation of a physical body with her spiritual eye. The two 
forms of seeing similarly blend in the hazelnut vision of chapter five, which is described as a 
“gostly sight.”  Julian writes that God “shewid a littil thing, the quantitye of an hesil nut in the 
palme of my hand…I lokid thereupon with eye of my understondyng,” explaining this “gostly 
sight” as a gaze into the palm of her physical hand.477 When writing of “gostly sight,” she 
employs the language of physical sight to describe objects and situations that she claims to 
observe in her own soul.  For example, she observes, “our lord opened my gostly eye and shewid 
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me my soule in midds of my herte.”478 Julian refers to a type of “eye,” to being “shewid” the soul 
with a spiritual eye that actively receives images set before it, although those things may 
themselves be immaterial.  Her blending of “bodily sight” and “gostly sight” makes Julian‟s 
approach to visionary experience distinctive among her contemporary English mystics; she fails 
to maintain, as Park observes, “the neat delineation between flesh and spirit so typical of both 
Walter Hilton and the Cloud Author.” 479  
It is possible, however, that the ambiguity of her forms of seeing indicates a problem less 
with understanding than with a lack of language to convey her experience.  It is perhaps another 
sign of the ineffability of what she strives to describe in addition to her outright claim that she 
“cannot ne may not shew it.” 
A bodily sight initiates the revelations.  The opening “shewing” begins as Julian gazes on 
a crucifix, which she watches as all goes dark and the figure of Christ on the cross begins to 
bleed.
480
 She defines the vision as having been initially bodily but eventually hybrid when she 
mentions that later “the bodily sight stinted” while the “gostly sight” remained in her 
understanding.
481
 The beginning of the visions depends on an active gaze focused on a material 
thing.  Julian‟s curate directs her to look at the crucifix, whereas she was previously gazing into 
space, “uprightward into hevyn where [she] trusted to come be the mercy of God.”482   
For Julian, the eye is an essential means of communication; it is the sensory point of 
contact she wished for when, in her youth, she sought a better understanding of the suffering of 
                                                 
478
 Ibid. 67.109.  This also reveals a disjunction between the experiencing self and the self that is seen, an internal 
division I will address below.  
479
 Park, Selfhood, 275.  Also see Glasscoe, Games of Faith, 223, which offers another discussion of the 
inconsistency of Julian‟s divisions. 
480
 Julian, Revelation, 3.4-5, 4.5. 
481
 Ibid. 8.12 
482
 Ibid. 3.4  
188 
  
the Passion.
483
 To understand the effects of seeing the Passion, it is important to recognize first 
that the three gifts Julian requested (understanding of the Passion, bodily sickness, and wounds 
of contrition, compassion, and longing) are related to the goals of affective devotion.  The first 
petition in particular focuses on a shared experience of Christ‟s suffering and the sorrow of his 
first followers.  Julian relates, 
I had sume feleing in the passion of Christe, but yet I desired more be the grace of 
God.  Methought I would have beene that time with Mary Magdalen and with 
other that were Crists lovers, and therefore I desired a bodily sight wherein I 
might have more knowledge of the bodily peynes of our saviour, and of the 
compassion of our lady and of all his trew lovers that seene that time his peynes, 
for I would be one of them and suffer with him.
484
 
Julian frames her request as a desire for deeper, or more perfected, feeling and identification.  
She specifically wants to suffer in conjunction with Christ and the “trew lovers.”  And she wants 
to achieve these insights through “bodily sight.” For Julian, bodily sight allows for a 
“participative knowledge” in Christ‟s sufferings.485   
 She shares an affective and Christocentric devotion with Elizabeth of Spalbeek, one that 
is markedly absent in Marguerite‟s Mirror.  In chapter two I discussed the twelfth-century shift 
in devotional models of imitatio Christi from a focus on imitating Christ‟s divinity to engaging 
with his human suffering.  This transition was reaching its peak in England during the late 
fourteenth-century, having been spread largely by the Franciscans.  It is during the time of 
Julian‟s showings that artistic depictions of the crucifixion and of Christ‟s Five Wounds (the 
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arma Christi) were at their most graphic and bloody, emphasizing the gruesome nature of the 
Passion.
486
   
Connection to Christ through shared pain is the central feature of chapter eighteen.  Julian 
explains that Christ‟s “disciples and al his trew lovers” who witnessed the Passion shared in his 
suffering, indeed experienced worse suffering than he endured because they loved him more than 
he loved himself.  Thus they “suffrid panys more than ther owne bodyly deyng.” Here Julian has 
a revelation of union through pain, announcing, “Here I saw a gret onyng betwyx Christe and us, 
to myn understongyng; for whan he was in payne, we were in payne,” and she continues to assert 
that all of creation shared in this pain.
487
  These are the “trew lovers” whose experience Julian 
prayed to share.  For her, moving toward knowledge of God involves sharing in his experience, 
and the primary way to do that is through vision, observation of the scene of the Passion in a 
manner that recalls the advice of the Meditationes vitae Christi. So it is seeing the crucified 
Christ that initiates Julian‟s deepening sense of union with him.   
There are several moments that join Julian‟s body to the suffering body of Christ, in 
Bauerschmidt‟s terms, moments that imply “a resonance between Julian‟s body and the body of 
Christ on the cross, communicated through the medium of sight.”488 One of the most striking 
occurs as Julian watches Christ‟s body drying out on the cross after profuse bleeding.  Of this 
experience she writes, 
The which shewing of Cristes peynys fillid me ful of payne, for I wiste wele he 
suffryd but onys, but, as he wold shewen it me and fillen me with mynde as I had 
afron desyryd.  And in al this tyme of Cristes paynye I felte no payn but for 
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Cristes paynys. Than thowte me „I knew but litil what payne it was that I askyd,‟ 
and as a wretch repentid me, thynkand if I had wiste what it had be, lothe me had 
be to have praydd it; for methowte it passid bodily dethe, my paynes.
489
 
The sight of Christ‟s dehydrating body and his final pain on the cross is an answer to her 
youthful petition for better understanding of the Passion, but the intensity of the vision makes her 
regret her request.  It becomes a direct experience of his suffering: through his pain, she is filled 
with pain, and has “no payn but for Cristes paynys.” Shared pain unites Julian with Christ 
ontologically, as the lived and felt experience of her body merges with Christ‟s.  The great pain 
also brings her to the threshold of death and passing over into God; it is pain, it seems to her, that 
is beyond “bodily dethe.” 
Then the reverse: she is united to Christ through a vision of his joy.  Still watching Christ 
on the cross and expecting to see the final point of death, Julian explains, “sodenly, I beholdyng 
in the same cross, he chongyd his blissfull chere.  The chongyng of his blissful chere chongyd 
myn, and I was as glad and mery as it was possible.”490 She sees Christ‟s expression change from 
one of pain to one of joy and peace, and she shares in that change as her own countenance and 
bodily experience change in accord with his. 
As Julian‟s body does what Christ‟s does, she becomes a part of him and he of her; the 
visionary experience becomes an intersection between two bodies and two entities.  Julian enters 
a liminal state during the experience, becoming both distinct as a viewing subject (she is still 
aware that she is “beholdyng in the same cross”) and sharing in the feelings and experience of 
the viewed object. 
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This is not simply a “reciprocity” or a “breach” of the line between viewer and object.491 
Similar to Lacan‟s subject looking at himself in the mirror stage (and moments in which it is 
relived), Julian‟s subjectivity – if we try to locate it – is formed through the interaction between 
her act of seeing and what she sees, as she strives thereafter to become the viewed object.  
Bridging the two, she is neither entirely observer nor object; and in the process we begin to lose 
a distinct “Julian.”492 
There are occasional moments of passing over into a mystical union of identity, notably 
in the first showing.  As Julian watches blood trickle down Christ‟s face, she is overwhelmed by 
a sense of union with the Trinity that allows her a taste of heaven.  She writes, “And in the same 
sheweing sodenly the Trinitie fulfilled the herte most of ioy.  And so I understood it shall be in 
hevyn without end to all that shall come there.”493 By experiencing for a moment the joy of 
heaven, Julian crosses the boundary between life and death, between incomplete union and 
complete union.  She is not simply aware that a part of the soul always shares its substance with 
God, but is aware of herself being filled, temporarily, with the joy of the Trinity.
494
 And this 
transitory moment of union, this temporary crossing of the threshold between human and divine 
and into identification with the Trinity, occurs by means of Julian seeing Christ. 
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Julian pauses to reflect on how seeing God actually draws the soul into union with him, 
blurring boundaries between the two.  The first step is that vision inspires longing to be one with 
God.  As she explains, 
And wel I wote the mor the soule seeth of God, the more it desyrith hym be his 
grace…and than we can do no more but behold hym, enioyeng, with an hey migty 
desire to be al onyd into hym, centered to his wonyng, and enioy in hys loving 
and deliten in his godeness.
495
 
Once the soul sees God, it can do nothing but gaze upon him, contemplate him, rejoice in him, 
and desire a more complete and permanent union with him.   
It is perhaps at this point that Julian is most like the Lacanian subject of the mirror stage 
who sees an “ideal-I,” an ideal version of what it can be, and seeks to become it.  While her 
seeing and seeking to become God invites a psychoanalytic reading, Julian‟s dynamic is also a 
textbook example of what some scholars of mysticism would call an impersonal unitive vision.  
In this sub-category of mystical union, the mystic reports “a vivid vision that commences with 
the mystic beholding both him/herself and God as discrete personal beings.  As the vision 
proceeds, however, the two figures merge into one.”496  
In this aspect of Julian‟s text and experience, speculative theology overlaps with concepts 
in her general cultural milieu, and she may be drawing her ideas from multiple sources. In her 
psychoanalytic reading, Aranye Fradenburg has noted similar dynamics in Chaucerian writing.  
She has persuasively argued that the act of gazing on a desired object is essential to the viewer‟s 
identity formation in the prologue to the Legend of Good Women, which depicts a narrator so 
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enthralled by daisies that he continually rushes out to watch their morning bloom.
497
 The 
narrator‟s daisy, and generally the courtly object of adoration (which the daisy will become as 
Queen Alceste) are, like Julian‟s God, necessary to look upon and salvific.  Fradenburg explains, 
“This narrator whose sorrow is softened by following the daisy‟s every movement, by gazing at 
it and at its own ocular receptivity, locates salvific power in visibility itself.”498 The daisy is 
always available, fulfilling the narrator‟s “fantasy... of its perfect accessibility.”499 Similarly, 
analyzing the K igh ‟  T  e, H. Marshall Leicester Jr. has suggested that gazing, and specifically 
gazing upon a desired woman, is something the Knight recognizes as central to the development 
of chivalric perspective.  A key element of Palamon and Arcite‟s activity is gazing upon Emelye; 
she spurs their desire, their jealousy, their battle, and their “chivalric eros.”500  
Julian is remade by her vision.  Seeing God in her soul, she asserts, “and the soule that 
thus beholdyth it makith it like to him that is beholdyn, and onyth it in rest and peas be his 
grace.”501 The soul becomes like God by visually experiencing the divine Other, and so becomes 
united to the divine.  It is a process of viewing and then assuming an image.  There is an 
additional suggestion that the soul is created to gaze and to revel in the visual accessibility of 
God, and in doing so to find its nature in God.
502
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Julian‟s Middle English word “behold,” a key term throughout her text, has a variety of 
potential meanings.  Among them, it can refer to turning one‟s mental attention to an object (in 
essence, to think about or to contemplate), or more commonly, to see, look, gaze, or observe.
503
 
At points, she uses the term separately from the verb “to see,” but often employs it in place of “to 
see,” and generally uses it in connection with visual experience.  It may be that Julian 
appreciated the term for precisely these layers of meaning: when one sees God, one also 
understands, contemplates, and comes to know God in the same instant.   
The vision of God is so necessary to the unitive experience Julian wants to maintain that  
even amid rejoicing that God has revealed himself to her and given her knowledge that “it was 
hymself,” one of Julian‟s feelings is intense fear.  She is in “drede” because, as she writes, “it 
semyd to me in al that tyme that that syte shuld fayle and I ben left to myselfe.”504 What she 
would be “left” with is what she elsewhere calls the “contrarioust” self, that is her self distinct 
from God.  This is what the soul falls to when it fails to see God, as Julian describes:  
We failen oftentymes of the syte of hym, and anon we fallen into ourself, and than 
fynde we no felyng of ryth – nowte but contrarioust that is in ourselfe, and that of 
the elder rote of our first synne with all that followyth of our contrivans, and in 
this we arn traveylid and tempestid with felyng of synnys and of peynes in many 
dyvers manner, gostly and bodily, as it [is] knowen to us in this lif.
505
   
We realize our contrariness; we realize our distinction from the divine.  The soul sees again its 
createdness and all that goes with it, including sin.  Literally, we “fall” from union with God 
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back into ourselves, aware of the distance between the soul and God.  Julian‟s description recalls 
Marguerite‟s fifth stage of annihilation – a fall from the sixth stage of seeing nothing but herself 
in God and God in herself, back into a stage in which the self cannot be annihilated and melt into 
God.
506
  
 By contrast, while beholding God, the contrary self can be annihilated; for Julian, while 
beholding God the self is nothing and can be let go.  When the soul sees God, “his maker, so hey, 
so gret and so good in reward of hym that is made, that onethys the creature semyth owte to the 
selfe.”507 The mystic realizes that alone she is in fact “owte,” “nothing,” and lets go of this self.  
This can occur in the visionary moment, but not in a sustained way.  When Julian 
mentions her “drede,” her fear is not exactly that God will abandon her, but more specifically 
that he will leave her field of vision.  She recognizes that her unitive vision, seeing God so fully 
and making herself like what she beholds, cannot be continuous.  This she laments, although 
noting that it is ultimately for God‟s worship and the soul‟s eventual, unending joy to come.508  
  Such alternating between stages is another element of Julian‟s liminality.  Her fear of 
losing sight of God is one place where some discomfort with the liminal comes through in her 
writing.  Julian is in fact going back and forth between discussing two forms of union with God, 
one complete but temporary, and another, like Marguerite‟s fifth stage, that can be sustained and 
that allows some recognition of partial union with God.  Although thrown back to awareness of 
the self after a unitive vision, there is still the daily recognition that one shares substance with 
God. 
Despite her “drede” and desire, Julian still feels pleasure in the visionary experience, an 
ever-increasing “lovely longing,” just as does Chaucer‟s narrator focused on his daisy, the knight 
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gazing on a lady, or more broadly, the psychoanalytic subject locating the potential for 
wholeness, the ability to redress lack, in the desired Other.  Just as Julian advocates prayer as a 
means of moving toward union, celebrating the “sweetness” of prayer as a taste of the union and 
true self-knowledge to come, she seems to relish seeking a vision of God, the quest itself.  As 
Julian writes in chapter 10, the most developed discussion of seeking and seeing the divine, “we 
ought se of him graciously, than arn we sterid by the same grace to sekyn with gret desire to se 
him more blissfully; and thus I saw him and sowte him, and I had him and I wantid him.”509  
Even more, some of the visions she most relishes are images of her liminal condition of 
being both part and apart from God.  An illustrative example is the vision of Christ in her soul, 
which precedes her celebration of how a soul can make itself like the one “beholdyn.” Julian 
writes,  
our lord opened my gostly eye and shewid me my soule in midds of my herte…in 
the midds of that syte sitts our lord Iesus…The place that Iesus takith in our soule, 
he shal never removen it without end as to my syte; for in us is his homliest home 
and his endles wonyng.
510
 
Here she stands apart from herself to look at her own soul (an action that itself creates an internal 
division), but has a vision of in-dwelling, of Christ as an inherent presence within her.
 
 
The moment recalls Augustine‟s realization and confession to God, “You were within, 
and I was in the external world and sought you there,” and carries the same potential to shatter 
self concept.
 511
 The conditions are right again for the narrating I to “explode.”512 We expect 
Julian to call out, like Marguerite‟s figure of Soul, “Who am I?” And we might expect Julian as 
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narrator to lose her own voice, to be caught in the Other‟s voice, another voice “parasiting [her] 
own voices.”513 
She does not.   
Instead, Julian calls the vision “a delectable syte and a restfull shewyng.”514 She almost 
seems to savor dwelling in the gap between being a distinct self and a self joined to God.  She 
describes it with more tranquility than do the other mystics, a seeming contentment if not 
complete delight.  It is an equanimity that masks underlying conflicts of what constitutes the self.  
But as in her attempt to reason through the question of the soul having its substance in God, in 
Julian‟s alternating descriptions of types of union and their consequences, a narrative structure 
emerges that mirrors the very experience she is trying to explain: a narrative process that mirrors 
a self in process.  And just as much as the other mystics, Julian struggles with the inexpressibility 
of her experience. 
 
Julian’s Narrative of Speaking: The Linguistic Limen 
 We meet Julian on her deathbed.  This is the first portrait she offers of herself.  She is on 
the verge of death and so between two worlds and two types of ontological status.  But as she lies 
on her deathbed, Julian is also unable to speak to those around her.  She describes the silence in 
which her curate finds her when he arrives to administer last rites, explaining, “by than he cam I 
had sett my eyen and might not speke.”515 Both her eyes and lips are immovable.  She will cry 
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out during the vision of the bleeding Christ, but at the start we find her, in Zina Petersen‟s 
Lacanian terms, “on the edge of speech as well as death.”516  
 Julian‟s claim that she cannot speak may refer to her weakened physical state, parched 
and exhausted.  But the problem of communication haunts the text from this early point onward.  
Even after twenty years of writing, it is a theme in LT just as it is in the tradition of mystical 
literature.  She shares in Christ‟s pain, and indeed asserts that she feels it acutely, “that Cristes 
peynys fillid [her] ful of payne” and she “felte no payn but for Cristes paynys.”517 But she claims 
that she cannot describe it adequately, and adds a disclaimer: “for which peynes I saw that all is 
to litil that I can sey, for it may not be told.”518 
 Elsewhere she stretches for metaphors and comparisons to make her visions concrete and 
to help others see them.  She turns to the everyday physical world: the drops of blood falling 
from Christ‟s forehead are shaped like herring scales; his blood gushes like heavy rainwater from 
the eaves of a house; the symbol of creation in her hand is like a hazelnut.
519
 These moments 
reflect her Christocentric, incarnational theology, to be sure, but they also reveal a struggle to 
express herself and a tendency toward the cataphatic solution, toward verbose attempts at 
description rather than avoidance.  Julian does not abandon language despite its inadequacies.   
Perhaps the clearest instance of the inexpressibility dilemma in her text is Julian‟s 
description of the three categories of her visionary experience mentioned above: “bodily sight,” 
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“word formyd in [her] understanding,” and “gostly sight.”520 It is the third that is problematic to 
explain.  She writes,  
But the gostly sight I cannot ne may not shew it as hopinly ne as fuly as I wolde.  
But I truste in our lord God almightie that he shal of his godenes, and for yowr 
love, make yow to take it more gostly and more sweetly than I can or may telle 
it.
521
 
Julian‟s admission betrays the slipperiness of describing revelatory experience itself, the nature 
of an encounter with the divine, even before having to put into words the nature of God or of the 
self in union with God.   
Her response to the problem is to ask God (the original speaker) to assist readers in 
understanding what it is beyond her ability to convey, beyond what she can “telle” directly.  She 
does not opt for negation in the tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius‟ Mystical Theology, for example 
by trying to describe her spiritual sight as being “without corporeal limits.”  She does not attempt 
a succinct explanation, a quick definition of what she cannot say.  But much like Marguerite, she 
nonetheless places her “stakes in language.”522 She simply continues her narration, trusting that 
what she needs to express will somehow, eventually, be clear to her audience.
523
   
She makes a similar move when she declares that she “cannot tellyn” all the joy she had 
in the visions and insights she received.  Again she turns the situation over to providence and 
continues, 
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The nombre of the words passyth my witte and al my vnderstondyng and al my 
mights, and it arn the heyest, as to my syte; for therin is comprehended – I cannot 
tellyn; but the joy that I saw in the shewyng of them passyth al that herte may 
willen and soule may desire; and therefore the words be not declaryd here but 
every man after the grace of God gevyth him in vnderstondyng and lovyng 
receive hem in our lords menyng.
524
 
Analyzing this quotation, we can see that Julian essentially removes herself from a narrator‟s 
responsibility of clear communication.  Julian is certainly not unique in the mystical tradition 
when she continues her narrative even while announcing its limits.  But she is distinctive in her 
absolute, and surprisingly serene, confidence.  
 
Julian’s Narrative of Process: Figuring the Limen 
Julian maintains her confidence in communication even when she is articulating 
circumstances of liminality. Her description of what the human soul is in its essential link to God 
and what she becomes in her experience of unitive vision can be circular and recursive, but it is 
never hesitant.  On the contrary, Julian is bold in revealing the messiness of her contemplative 
process, and it is by examining her willingness to illustrate this process of thinking that we can 
see how the shape of her narrative mirrors her experience of liminality.  While Julian‟s text at 
first seems to lack creativity in its form, her experiment is in leaving behind the traces not only 
of her speculative theology, but of the journey to get there: her narration leaves traces of being 
caught in a process of contemplation that parallels the way she is caught in a liminal status.  
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These traces, what Lyotard might call the “wounds” or “scars” that mark the text, reveal the 
impact of the soul‟s encounter with the divine.525 
In this way her text is closer to circularity than are Elizabeth‟s cyclical performance and 
Marguerite‟s reflexive dialogue, a process that revisits, and revisits, and revisits, each time 
adding a new insight, but without a final conclusion.  She shares with Augustine not merely 
exclamations of confusion, Marguerite‟s “Who am I now then?”, but combing through what has 
already been explored, revisitations of what is difficult to grasp.  In fact, although Julian is 
generally recognized for being deeply Augustinian in her theology and themes, for instance that 
of the soul‟s restlessness apart from God, this similarity in the shape of her text is to my 
knowledge less frequently noticed.
526
  
The composition process of LT testifies to a long period of contemplation and revisiting.  
As I have mentioned, it is generally accepted that Julian probably composed ST shortly after her 
1373 illness and revelations, and LT at least twenty years after the initial showings.  While ST 
devotes most of its attention to a record of the showings themselves, LT is approximately six 
times the length of ST and integrates significantly more interpretation and speculative theology, 
suggesting a lengthy process of thinking and revising.  By Julian‟s own report, it took her more 
than fifteen years to grasp the unified meaning of her visionary experience as a revelation of 
God‟s love, an answer only granted to her after what she describes as an extended period of 
longing and prayer to understand the revelation.
527
 She mentions that it took her twenty years to 
understand the parable of the Lord and the Servant that she omits in ST but includes in LT.
528
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This makes 1393, following two decades of contemplation, the earliest possible date for LT, 
although some scholars have argued for an even later date of composition.
529
 
Even if we lacked Julian‟s admission of the passing years, her description of the visions 
is so inextricably connected to her interpretation of them that it would be evident from the text 
alone that LT must be the product of a long period of thought.  She describes three layers to the 
process of understanding each part of the revelation, which she says that she can no longer 
distinguish at the time of composing LT: 
The frest is the begynnyng of techyng that I understod therein in the same tyme; 
the ii is the inward lernyng that I have vnderstodyn therein sithen; the iii al the 
hole revelation from the begynnyng to the end, that is to sey, of this boke, which 
our lord God of his goodness bryngeth oftentimes frely to the syte of myn 
vnderstondyng.  And these iii arn so onyd, as to my vnderstondyng, that I cannot, 
ner may, depart them.
530
 
Following her categories, then, united together are Julian‟s first reaction, her contemplation since 
the initial showings, and her sense of the revelation‟s meaning as a whole, by which she seems to 
mean the 1393 revelation that love was the “meaning.” According to Julian, she can no longer 
look back and consider the visions outside of, for instance, the larger frame of God‟s love.   
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A. C. Spearing suggests that this may account for the numerous tense shifts in Julian‟s 
writing, particularly noticeable in the parable of the Lord and the Servant: they perhaps reflect 
that her interpretation evolved over several points in time.
531
 Julian‟s discussion of the parable is 
indeed an excellent illustration of the layered interpretative process and feedback loop that she 
describes.  By her own report, she receives the message of the revelation‟s unified meaning, the 
meaning of “al the hole revelation from the begynnyng to the end,” five years prior to coming to 
understand the meaning of the parable as a exemplum of sin and salvation, thus having to return 
to the continuous process of “inward lernyng” even after the secondary revelation that “love” 
was God‟s meaning. 
Also from a theological angle, Julian repeatedly transcends or at least “loops” linear time 
through what Park calls an “eschatological perspective mixed with her paradigm crucifixion 
theodicy.”532 This phenomenon is most visible when she chooses “Jesus” as her “heaven” 
although seeing him on the cross “only in payne at that tyme.” It is a point she insists upon, 
refusing to move her gaze from Jesus on the cross up “to heyn to his Fader”; as she explains, “me 
lekyd no other hevyn than Iesus, which shal be my blisse whan I come there.”533 Marion 
Glasscoe also offers an insightful reading of the coexistance of time and eternity, pain and 
salvation, in Julian‟s theology, perhaps most poignantly revealed in the vision of the blood of the 
Passion flowing into heaven.
534
  A similar approach surfaces again in a theology that proposes 
that, although we must always reject sin, God‟s love and our future union will trump it so that the 
“wounds” of sin can become “worships” in heaven.535   
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Conveying these layers in language is no easy task.  Both Julian‟s thinking process and 
her theology are beyond time; if they are in time at all, they are recursive.  Julian returns to 
elements and events in order to move forward.  Whether it is a return to the crucifixion in order 
to be in heaven, or the initial understanding of suffering in the Passion in order to understand the 
meaning of love, she requires a recursive narrative. 
In a close study of the structure of LT, Baker convincingly argues that the text is a careful 
and deliberate interlacing of critical themes that proceeds in a predictable way.  She suggests that 
Julian begins discussion of each of sixteen showings by establishing how an element of her 
vision or a divine locution “sets a theme for that showing that is reiterated and developed 
throughout that division.”  Each time that Julian reiterates or cross-references a theme, she 
elaborates again.  Thus the text is a narrative that is both “cumulative” and similar to the 
“ruminative process of meditation.”536  
Baker‟s analysis at points seems to overestimate the crafting of LT, for instance when she 
proposes that Julian designed the text‟s structure as a series of “embedded boxes.” 537 But it is 
very clear that Julian‟s interlacing of themes is deliberate and calculated.  Not only does LT add, 
as Baker also notes, a table of contents and an initial summary of all the showings under the 
banner of their unified meaning, “a revelation of love,” but Julian is keenly aware of the overall 
structure of her discussion as she makes her cross-references.
538
   
As an example, we might take Julian‟s reference to visions of the Passion in chapter 33.  
This is part of the discussion of showing thirteen.  Julian situates her exposition of how some 
souls can be damned in relation to what was revealed in earlier visions, explaining: “I had syte of 
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the passion of Criste in dyvers shewyngs – in the first, in the iid, in the v, and in the viii – as is 
seid aforn.”539 Julian goes on to relate these visions to what she wants to say in chapter 33 about 
the possibility that some can be damned, contrasting what she saw with her understanding of the 
faith as taught by the Church and considering it in her current thinking about who can be 
damned.  She continues, “Wheras I had in party a felyng of the sorrow of our lady and of his 
trew frends that sen hym in peyne, but I saw not so properly specyfyed the Iewes that deden hym 
to ded; notwithstondyn, I knew in my feith that thei wer accursid and dampnyd without end, 
savyng those that converten be grace.”540 Here Julian is aware of exactly how many times the 
Passion was revealed to her, of exactly where she previously discussed it in her text, and of what 
details were included.  It is a pattern of cross-referencing that Julian repeats several times.  As 
Baker observes, “Just as a medieval theologian cites scriptural verses to prove assertions or to 
resolve apparent contradictions, so Julian refers to her own revelations both to support and to 
explain her retrospective interpretations of her visionary experience.”541 
I want to draw attention to the “story” produced by this interlaced set of references.  The 
text is not merely a mix of visions with long-considered commentary.  It is a narrative that is not 
only about theological content, but one that creates an image of a soul responding to an 
encounter with God.  First, much like Elizabeth‟s performance, which involves a simultaneous 
adoption of personas from past and present and embodies the Passion in her own thirteenth- 
century, Julian‟s narrative places her in the liminal position of being both situated in time and 
partially sharing God‟s view of an eternal present.  Through the simultaneity of past and present 
as Julian returns to reconsider earlier visions or different layers of the unfolding revelation (from 
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initial vision to later contemplation) the narrative not only refers to theological events that 
transcend time but reflects the perspective of the mystic who stands outside of time; it is perhaps 
another gesture, like Elizabeth‟s, toward an image of God‟s view of time.   
 Even more, in the recursivity of Julian‟s text we see an image of her caught in a 
continuous process of responding to mystical union and its effects on the self.  At various points 
when Julian returns to her previous images of the Passion, as in chapter 33, and indeed seems 
unable to escape layering previous visions with later ones in her ongoing effort at understanding, 
she demonstrates the compelling power of moments of union.  As I have already shown, in the 
visions of Christ on the cross Julian is united to him in his pain, for his “peynes fillid [her] ful of 
payne,” as well as in his joy, being swept into the union she will experience in heaven. 542 
Therefore to relive the vision is to re-engage the liminality that the vision allows.  In a parallel to 
how she doesn‟t want her visions of God to end (and to be thrown back to her “owte” self), she 
doesn‟t allow her retelling to end.  She cannot stop reliving the moment of unitive vision.  Her 
narration demonstrates dwelling in that vision. 
 The text also suspends final resolution.  It resists moving toward resolution not only 
through the narrative‟s recursivity, but also through Julian‟s delay in delivering the entire 
revelation‟s unifying message of love.  She very briefly cites this grand purpose at the start of LT 
(she likely had not received the secondary revelation at the time she composed ST), noting that 
all the showings she will summarize are part of “a revelation of love.”543 But it is not until the 
text‟s final chapter that she describes how God answered her yearning for the meaning of the 
revelation.  She at last relates that she was told in her “gostly vnderstonding” that “love was his 
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mening,” and offers her final interpretation: “And I saw full sekirly in this and in all, that ere 
God made us he lovid us; which love was never slakid, no never shall.”544 
 Announcing the unified meaning of the revelation, Julian appears to have come to a 
conclusion, something that Elizabeth‟s narrative and at least the English version of Marguerite‟s 
Mirror both resist, ending with representations of liminality.  But this is deceptive.  Julian‟s final 
chapter also includes the enigmatic statement that “this boke is begunne be Gods gift and his 
grace, but it is not yet performid, as to my syte,” a statement open to various interpretations.545 It 
could mean that a further revision of the book is planned.  It could mean that Julian is going to 
move on to do the work of God in some other way, perhaps becoming enclosed as an anchoress.  
It could mean that her process of contemplating God, the process she has represented in the text, 
is not done, not yet perfected.  After numerous twists and turns, contemplations and revisiting, 
we do not actually reach an end or even a clear next direction. 
 It is perhaps in the final chapters, where Julian seems to be moving toward her conclusion 
about God‟s love, that her narration creates the clearest illustrations of a liminal subject.  In 
chapters 69 and following, Julian has completed her basic description of all the showings, all 
sixteen promised in the opening summary, and focuses on her evolving interpretations.  The 
short narrative of chapter 83 is a striking example of Julian caught looking both backward and 
forward: back toward her showings and forward toward how to incorporate her insights into a 
philosophy that looks toward future union.  While the chapter describes being caught 
simultaneously in past visions, present existence, and yearning for the future, it also creates a 
snapshot of this situation by actually looking backward and forward in time.   
Chapter 83 begins:   
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I had in parte touching, sight and feling in iii propertes of God, in which the 
strength and effect of all the revelation stondith; and thei were seene in every 
shewing, and most propirly in the xii, wher it seith oftentimes „I it am.‟  
Julian accomplishes three things with this opening.  She points toward the unity of the showings, 
noting that they share effects.  She again attempts to describe something of her manner of 
perception.  Most importantly, she looks back to the twelfth revelation in particular, the showing 
of God in his glory, that she discussed in chapter 26, which is itself a crux of her main concerns.  
Therefore she demonstrates revisiting her revelations and layering them together.  By returning 
to the twelfth revelation, she calls to mind the key problems that she previously laid out; this was 
the moment in which she grasped that the soul cannot have rest until it knows God as “fulhede of 
ioy, homely and curtesly blisful and very life,” and thus she gestures toward the epistemological 
problems of her text and the soul‟s desire to know God fully.  The twelfth revelation is also a 
moment in which she confronts inexpressibility, declaring that she “cannot tellyn” the joy of the 
revelation, of the moment of seeing God in his glory, which is an experience of the union to 
come after death.
546
 
 Having gathered these key issues again, she continues chapter 83 by enumerating the 
properties of God – life, love, and light – that have emerged in each of the showings, but stresses 
their connection in the “on goodness” of God, pointing toward the unity of the revelation.  She 
reflects further, 
into which goodness my reason wold ben onyd and cleve to with all the myte.  I 
beheld with reverent drede, and heyly mervelyng in the syte and in the feling of 
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the swete accord that our reason is in God, vnderstondyng that it is the heyest 
gifte that we have receivid, and it is groundid in kinde.   
Julian now meditates on the union between God and man‟s capacity for reason that is created in 
God‟s image, the capacity for reason being one way in which the soul shares in divine nature.  
Julian has taken her readers from focus on the unity of the visions to the unity of God and man‟s 
soul; narratologically, we watch her take these steps. 
Her next lines break into an ecstatic riff that recalls Marguerite‟s Soul alternating 
between chant lines, for here a number of past themes and concerns are given voice all at once in 
a sort of polyphony of theological problems:   
Our feith is a light, kindly command of our endles day, that is our fader, God; in 
which light our moder, Criste, and our good lord the Holy Gost ledith us in this 
passand life...The light is cause of our life, the night is cause of our peyne and of 
al our wo, in which we deserven mede and thanks of God;   
While the main point here is the interconnection between life, love, and light, the passage also 
evokes numerous themes from the showings, including the Godhead as father and Christ as 
Mother (elaborated in chapters 58-61), and the transitory nature of the “passand lif,” a concept 
that appears throughout the text but that is particularly developed in chapter 46‟s discussion of 
self-knowledge.  Julian then describes how she believes souls ought to go through that transitory 
life, “wisely and mytyly,” seemingly with a bold faith and confidence in the reward, or “mede,” 
to come. 
 Finally, closing chapter 83, she writes, 
And at the end of wo, sodenly our eye shall ben openyd, and in clerte of light our 
sight shall be full; which light is God our maker and Holy Gost in Christ Ihesus 
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our savior.  Thus I saw and vnderstode that our faith is our light in our night; 
which light is God our endless day.
547
  
The last lines of the chapter look to the future, to the “end of wo” and the complete knowledge of 
God (and therefore of self) that will be possible after death.
548
 She ends with a statement about 
being left in-between and in desire, regardless of all the new insights that she has just 
enumerated.  
She has been stuck, in her narration during this chapter, in the details of past revelations – 
of the glory of God in the twelfth revelation, of Jesus‟ maternal love, of man‟s inability to know 
himself.  Julian writes about the liminal state in which the soul is both with and without God, in 
the dark yet in the light of faith that is a link to God.  But the path to this statement has been 
circular and therefore liminal in itself, for it is unbound by time and linear order, more a 
gathering of past moments.  The conclusion here parallels the closing chapter 86, in which Julian 
describes her secondary revelation that love was the meaning of the showings but still does not 
announce the book‟s completion.  Instead, she announces that the book is not yet “performid.”   
 Thus Julian‟s structure does more than draw the reader in, more than what Soskice calls 
“recruit[ing] the reader as a fellow traveler into the mystery of the love of God” by virtue of the 
text‟s recursivity: her narration creates a simultaneous image of the liminality that so dominates 
her experience of knowing, being, and speaking of God.
549
 The text itself becomes a sign, like 
Elizabeth‟s performance that creates a physical image of union with God.  It is a sign like 
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Marguerite‟s text, in which the book is the princess‟s “image” of her absent king, and the 
allegory a verbal portrait of the soul‟s mystical union with God.   
Julian‟s text is not only an introduction to the mystery of the love of God, but the 
experience of recognizing and negotiating the boundary between the self and God as one yearns 
for complete and lasting union.  Writing on authority in Julian‟s text, Watson has noted that “the 
circumlocutions and repetitions which result from her difficulties are the most effective possible 
image of the distance between God and her own human understanding.”550 The text actually does 
this and much more: it is an image of the distance between God and the human soul, always 
overlapping but not yet one.  And it is an image, also, of the distance between Julian‟s human 
language and the divine language that “speaks” to her through a combination of physical visions, 
other images seen inwardly, and words, a multimodal language that Julian‟s text cannot perfectly 
replicate, but dimly reflects through its structure.   
 
Julian’s Narrative of the Liminal II 
 In closing, I want to return to Julian‟s embrace of liminality.  As is the case for all the 
mystics I have discussed, the liminal state is a disruption.  For Julian, the varieties of liminality 
she describes have at least two effects that complicate her perception of ontological status: 
awareness of the soul‟s substance in God means the impossibility of fully knowing one‟s self in 
mortal life, and Julian also experiences brief unitive visions only to be returned to her “contrary” 
self after the vision ends.  But for Julian, the disruption is a welcome one that stirs the soul and 
draws it closer to the divine.  This is her assessment as well of how an illness that brings her to 
the threshold between worlds can actually be part of a bridge across it.  She reveals pleasure in 
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the process of coming to know God, and in the process of yearning for complete union, what she 
calls “lovely longing.” There is pleasure in God‟s visual availability, and the soul desires to see 
him more fully and “more blissfully” after each glimpse.  
Julian does not seek death either in her initial petition for a bodily illness or during her 
period of illness, even though she stresses that permanent union occurs only after the “last 
poynte.”  Instead, she seeks to teeter on the verge of death in order to grow closer to God.  She 
explains that she prayed for “all manier peynes bodily and ghostly that I should have if I should 
dye, with all the dreds and tempests of the fends, except the outpassing of the soule…and after 
liven more to the worshippe of God because of that sekenesse.”551 What Julian seeks is the 
bodily and spiritual experience of being as liminal as possible, getting as close as she can to God 
without quite passing over into death.  When in what she believes to be her final hours, she 
acquiesces to her impending death but claims to regret not having more time to love God better, 
and so a part of her still hesitates at death.  Yet she embraces the condition of being on the 
threshold.  She says that she hopes the near-death experience will be “for the more speede in my 
deth, for I desired to be soone with my God,” a preparation for the death to which the young 
Julian apparently looks forward.
552
 
 This liminality parallels Julian‟s love of process in her narration, her indulgence in 
thinking through and her twenty-year-long work of writing her response to the visions and her 
attempt to “take a stand in relation.”  Julian both has her union with God and does not yet have it.  
She is in-between having it and not having it.  As she writes in one of her most poignant 
framings of the paradox, “thus I saw him and sowte him, and I had him and I wanted him.”553 
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Similarly, her narration asserts understanding only to have to contradict itself, to return to earlier 
moments for clarification, to have to look back again.  It gives a shape to what it means to both 
have and not have understanding. 
 Perhaps it is ultimately this that so draws the post-modern reader to Julian‟s text: perhaps 
not so much her serenity itself, but her ability to cope with unsettledness – with knowledge, with 
ontology, with whether and what language can represent.  She is at peace in the uncomfortable 
liminal just as she is at peace in the troubled world (medieval England during a period of civic 
and religious upheaval and following multiple waves of the plague), trusting that “all will be 
well.”  Julian has no need to cry out like Margery, to exceed the boundaries of her body like 
Elizabeth, or to stage debates and existential crises like Marguerite.  For Julian it is enough to 
leave questions, and her text, unsettled, non-linear, circular, and inconclusive.  This is the reality 
of the “passend lif”: to see and still seek, and to have and still desire. 
 
Epilogue: Julian’s Life on the Threshold 
 In addition to her remarkable faith, Julian‟s life and social context might also help us to 
account for both her heightened awareness of forms of liminality and how she coped with it so 
naturally and with such remarkable composure.  We have scant facts about her life, and almost 
nothing conclusive.  But what we do have suggests a woman who may have experienced 
numerous dramatic transitions in her life, and eventually lived a life that was in many ways 
liminal. 
 While the scribe of ST describes Julian as an anchoress, it is unclear exactly when Julian 
entered the anchorhold and what her previous life entailed, something we will probably never 
know for certain.  One theory which has long dominated Julian studies asserts that Julian was 
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initially a nun, probably at the Norwich priory of Carrow, and then sought a more austere life as 
an anchoress, possibly following her visions of 1373.  There are several problems with this 
thesis, as has been best highlighted by Benedicta Ward.  Her nearly-conclusive refutation has 
still not received the recognition it deserves, and a short summary is in order here.  Among the 
problems is a striking absence in the Carrow records that Julian, or any young nun later enclosed 
at St. Julian‟s, had any connection with the priory whatsoever.554 Julian‟s petition for the three 
graces (the third of which “dwelled with [her] continually”) and her report that during the 
revelations Christ thanked her for her service in her youth have been taken to suggest a young 
life lived under religious vows.  But there is no reason to assume that either of these statements 
refer to actions in religious life: they reflect precisely the type of piety encouraged for all devout 
laity.  The fact of the desires passing from Julian‟s mind suggests she was not a lifelong religious 
who in theory would have devoted her life to meditating on such concerns; rather, as Ward notes, 
“whereas a nunnery would have been a place where [such desires] were remembered, marriage, 
especially a happy marriage, with the responsibility of a household, might well cause anyone to 
forget such ideas until the coincidence of illness at a significant age…reminded her of them.”555 
The description of Julian‟s deathbed scene also suggests a household rather than a convent.556   
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Moreover, it is well-attested that during the rise in anchoritic life in late fourteenth-
century England most candidates seeking enclosure were laity.  This was particularly true in the 
case of women.  While some anchoresses were initially nuns, the great majority were not; and 
while most were virgins, some were widows and a few were wives who entered anchoritic life 
with a husband‟s consent.557  
The reason it is so important to keep this ambiguity in mind is that Julian‟s precise status 
in 1373 is rich in potential implications.  If Julian wrote either ST or LT shortly after being 
enclosed, then that text reveals a subject at a point of transition between social identities while 
also contemplating the ontological status of the soul.  And if she entered anchoritic life directly 
from her household rather than from a cloister, we can assume the transition to have been all the 
more dramatic.  If she wrote either text while in the anchorhold, she wrote while not only 
contemplating the threshold of union with God after death, but living out a daily liminal 
existence. 
Medieval anchorites lived on the threshold between life and death, still in the mortal 
world, but understood to be, and living as though, already having passed on to the next.  Ann K. 
Warren has described their status as a “permanent liminality” that resonates with Turner‟s theory 
of the liminal as a state of simultaneous “lowliness and sacredness.” 558 Those who chose the 
anchoritic life abandoned all previous markers of social status, including being among the living. 
Rituals for anchoritic enclosure symbolized death to the mortal world.  Although particular 
elements varied, common features of the rites included administration of last rites to the 
anchorite-to-be, chanting of the Office of the Dead, and in the later Middle Ages, sometimes 
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even a requiem mass for the “deceased” anchorite.  All would have included a symbolic sealing 
of the entrance to the anchorhold.
559
 
The anchorite therefore became a “nonperson,” someone whose “whole life was to be a 
transitional stage, its realization only in the next world.”560 It is against this backdrop, a literal 
life of the liminal, that Julian may have engaged in her meditations about the soul‟s inherent 
ontological union with God, and struggled to understand her experience of mystical union in 
which she crossed the threshold to blend, momentarily, into the Jesus she saw before her.   
 The view of the anchorite as a “nonperson” was, however, probably more often an ideal 
than a complete reality. Attempting an anchoritic lifestyle, particularly connected to a street in 
the middle of the bustling town of Norwich, could not have meant total detachment from the 
world.  And in Julian‟s case, we have evidence that she, like many anchorites, continued to 
engage with the world as a spiritual advisor.  Margery Kempe had a three-day visit to Julian‟s 
cell, and also testifies to Julian‟s local fame.  The surviving Norwich wills that bequeath money 
to Julian suggest this as well, particularly the 1415 will of John Plumpton, who left not only forty 
pence to Julian, but also twelve pence each to her current and former serving maids, and knew 
the latter‟s name to be Alice, suggesting a long-term pattern of visits to the anchorhold.561  
William Inge even proposes that town children may have been among Julian‟s regular visitors.562  
As an anchoress in medieval Norwich, Julian would have been theoretically isolated yet 
personally connected to the community that surrounded her, both part and apart.   
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Such a situation in her Norwich cell parallels, as Watson and Jenkins observe, a shift that 
many readers observe in the course of Julian‟s text:  her narrative moves from focus on her 
personal visionary experience to its application to all her “even cristen.” She is both a visionary 
and lover of God, and also the conduit and interpreter of her revelations for others, a “double 
role” that “bridge[s] the gulf...between cell and world.”563 An attempt to balance her 
contemplative life and separation from the world against significant worldly duties and 
interaction (even if for spiritual purposes) seems likely to have reminded her of just how liminal 
she was in her daily experience.  This is the backdrop against which she may have undertaken 
her extended consideration of the soul‟s ontological liminality and its inherent and potential 
forms of union with God.   
We likewise know unfortunately little about the daily lives of Elizabeth and Marguerite.  
Both may or may not have been beguines.  Ambiguity haunts all their life stories.  But it is 
perhaps fitting that scholars cannot pin down the precise lived experience of any of these 
mystics, which might tempt us to try to ground in specific circumstances and materiality these 
mystics who saw the self as ever-changing, and the soul that comprised it as always in a process 
of becoming other. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
I have argued that the narrative structures and positioning in the texts analyzed here – 
Elizabeth‟s performance, Marguerite‟s dialogue, and Julian‟s revisiting of her visionary 
experience –  are informed by and reflect the sense of liminality that was central to these 
women‟s spiritual lives and experiences of God.  To bring this element of the texts to light, I 
have approached them not only as theology or contemplation, but as literary products, and have 
taken a broad view of what constitutes a “text” and a “narrative,” including, for instance, 
Elizabeth‟s dance.  In other words, I have not confined the texts to traditional categories that 
would limit interpretation by dictating what we should find.  I have approached the texts as 
inherently multi-faceted and best studied through the multiple critical perspectives of speculative 
theology, narratology, literary history, psychoanalysis, anthropology, performance theory, and 
the history of religious devotion.   
 Much recent work on medieval women mystics has tended to group the texts as distinctly 
“women‟s mysticism” and move away from studying the mystics‟ depiction of spiritual 
experience in the context of their medieval Christian understanding of ontology.  Undoubtedly, 
such work has made valuable contributions to our understanding of the culture in which the 
women mystics lived and the faith practices available to them, and the texts can no doubt be 
illuminated by understandings of women‟s devotional practices, as my reading of Elizabeth 
addresses.  But the current study aims for a broader view, acknowledging that to narrow the 
scope of analysis to what is distinct about mystical experiences as exclusively w  e ‟  
experiences (or as products of women‟s fraught relationship to male ecclesiastical authority) can 
also risk distracting us from how sophisticated they are in manipulating the conventions of genre 
and linear narrative and in creating narratives that represent ontological status.  It would be 
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particularly problematic to approach the grouping of Elizabeth, Marguerite, and Julian‟s 
narratives through a distinct category of women‟s mysticism because surviving evidence 
suggests that in these cases their medieval readers (particularly in England) paid little heed to the 
sex of the authors.   
Notably M.N., the Middle English translator of Marguerite‟s Mirror and one of the few 
medieval readers whose direct impressions of the text survive, simply assumes the writer to be a 
man, repeatedly referring to her as “him.” The scribe who copied Richard Methley‟s translation 
of the English version into Latin saw no conflict in his mistaken understanding that the author 
was Ruysbroeck, and presumably neither did his readers.
564
  This calls into question how many 
of the text‟s supposedly feminine elements and challenges to a specifically male ecclesiastical 
establishment are read into the Mirror by modern readers and may not have occurred to a 
medieval audience.  Moreover, the Mirror‟s almost total detachment from Christological 
theology and the place of the body in devotional practice make Marguerite, as Kocher writes, “a 
difficult figure to recuperate for women‟s history [because] her text also constitutes an exception 
to some of the most important findings that have come out of that historiographical 
movement.”565  
Similarly, it is almost only by coincidence that we know the author of the Revelation of 
Love was a woman.  Julian mentions this only in the Short Text, which survives only in one 
extant copy.  And while the Short Text scribe also makes note of it, scribes of the Long Text 
copies evidence no concern with the author‟s name or sex, even despite her extended meditations 
on the maternal aspects of God and of “Jesus as Mother.” 
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Probably the dominant assessment of Elizabeth has been that she usurps a priestly role by 
embodying Christ for an audience, and therefore challenges Church authority.  As I noted in 
chapter two, Rodgers and Ziegler suggest that in her enactment of Christ‟s redemptive actions, 
Elizabeth “negat[es] church hierarchy,” asserting a right to make him visible in an “assumption 
of the bodily presence of Christ, entire.”566 However, her actions actually display a reverence for 
the priest‟s position and also an awareness that Christ is present in the Eucharistic host in a way 
that he is not present in her.  She relinquishes her cross position prior to receiving, and accepts 
the host with tears and devout sighs.  She does not displace either the necessity of the Sacrament 
or the priest‟s actions; indeed, she relies on them and acts in response.  Overall, there is little to 
support a view of Elizabeth intentionally challenging the ecclesiastical establishment, or even to 
support the idea that she would have felt a need to do so.   
Yet while my analysis returns to considering these mystical texts in terms of what they 
say about the human soul and its potential for (re)union with God, and so has some affinities 
with the broad comparative work on mysticism conducted in the first half of the twentieth-
century, it is a return with critical tools of the last several decades in hand: psychoanalysis‟ 
theories of the divided subject, further split by his own speech; phenomenology‟s rethinking of 
the centrality of the body, narratology‟s evolving question of what constitutes narrative, and the 
concept of the liminal as it has now entered several strands of critical discourse from its origins 
in anthropology and performance theory.  And mine is also a reading that allows the texts to be 
literary as well as theological products. 
Ultimately we come to the question of what kind of medieval narrative the texts show us.  
Given their concern with liminality, one would expect them to tend toward division, toward 
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crisis, to reflect souls questioning what they are.  And they do: each text shows us a destabilized 
narrator and a text that resists linearity.  But they also all seem to assert that these conflicts of the 
self can be worked through by narrative means.  Reflecting the power of language to explore 
relationship to God, which I examined in chapter one‟s discussion of the text as a forum for 
divine encounter, the mystics make use of their texts to address and express, although perhaps 
not resolve, internal conflict. 
In this way, the texts actually affirm some of recent scholarship‟s models of medieval 
narrative, a finding that is somewhat surprising given these texts of such varied form.  On the 
one hand, their keen awareness of consciousness and its divisions, and their creative depictions 
of it, seem to resist models such as Spearing‟s that would push such developments toward a later 
date.
567
 But they quite remarkably fulfill Vitz‟s theory of the way medieval narration tends 
toward synthesis.  In Vitz‟s most developed example of the Romance of the Rose, the poet 
manages “a multiplicity of I‟s” (dreamer, hero-dreamer, real-life hero, and narrator), and the 
temporal instability of a story “dreamed...in symbolic form and actualized only later,” but the 
work sustains a remarkable sense of unity.
568
 A reader hardly registers these distinctions without 
close analysis.   
A “synthesis” of narrative selves in the mystical texts, of the multiple I‟s that result when 
the soul alternates between states of being, is perhaps best illustrated by just how in-control of 
textual structure the mystics seem to be despite the divisions to which they testify.  A crucial 
distinction is that their texts seem crafted to expose that division.  Narratologically, they look 
toward the Middle English dream vision tradition much more than secular Continental literature, 
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the medieval English tradition being more directly concerned with dramatizing internal division.  
Here we might note in particular The Book of the Duchess, Piers Plowman, and (although not a 
dream vision) Hoccleve‟s My Compleinte and Dialogue with a Friend, texts in which narrative 
and discussion are means of both self-reflection and resolution of internal conflict.  Re-reading 
those texts in light of what the mystics reveal about representations of selfhood and 
consciousness and its divisions may enrich our understanding of their conventions and 
experiments with form, and trace how literary influences may have overlapped the religious and 
secular realms or have circulated in late medieval England in unexpected (even indirect) ways. 
We could also look back and attempt to trace the influence on the mystics not only in 
religious writing but literary ideas of narrative that precede the Middle Ages, the gesture that 
McMahon makes when he briefly parallels the union of form and content in what he sees as 
Augustine‟s narrative of meditative ascent in his Confessions with a union of logos and ergon, 
pointing to work on Plato.
569
 This is a move that is more logical for his writers such as 
Augustine, closer in time to the ancient world and also well-versed in Platonic philosophical 
perspectives, than the medieval women I have profiled here.  And as I explain in the 
introduction, I have not made significant attempts to trace direct lines of influence on the 
mystical texts because my concern has been with the representation of personal spiritual 
experiences involving liminality.  On this point, I concur with Rudolf Otto that we will not reveal 
the “essential nature” of mysticism through a search for its beginnings and recycled forms and 
images.
570
 But although it has not been my path, certainly one route for future readings to take, 
as a bridge of work on narratology and mysticism hopefully continues to develop, is to further 
explore parallels with classical understandings of textuality and its categories.  
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The most productive future investigations, however, may be those that look neither 
forward nor backward but across: across culture, religion, and era, the field of broadly 
comparative mysticism and interdisciplinary study of mysticism that is now growing.
571
  It must 
consider not only the shared nature of human experience, but also shared forms of expression.  
One shared element across the texts analyzed here (also present in the late medieval English texts 
mentioned above) is that, while focused on the spiritual experiences of the self, the texts engage 
an audience.  They are inherently dialogic, engaging in a conversation.  They invite readers into 
their world, as M.N. says, to “entriϸ and walkiϸ in ϸe wey of illuminacion.”572 But that 
“audience” may be divine or human, real or imagined, one‟s own consciousness or another‟s.   
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